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Abstract 
 
The phenomenon of ‘Suicide by Cop’ (SbC) may be described as a ‘high impact low 
probability’ type of event occurring where a vulnerable individual, with ‘lethality of 
means’, initiates self-destructive violent conduct. Necessary to sustain public 
confidence and police legitimacy, research to understand the police response to SbC 
is deficient in England & Wales (E&W). By understanding the theories, challenges 
and operational reality of mitigating a vulnerable individual’s SbC ideation, this 
research seeks to develop a fuller comprehension of the use of force (UoF) paradigm 
within an E&W policing context. Using a mixed method approach, a survey 
questionnaire (n=315) and published UoF Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) dataset 
(n=132,410) was statistically analysed. Comparing MPS TASER and authorised 
firearms officer’s UoF, this research analyses the response, effectiveness and 
limitations of policing high-risk persons. The findings indicate the sample response to 
a ‘high-risk’ person is statistically similar, implying a minimal difference in decision 
making or application of force. The influence of training appears a factor in mitigating 
threat or risk and the proficiency of any response. This research indicates that 
firearms officers enhanced training conditions a ‘primed’ response, reducing cognitive 
burden and enabling the use of other de-escalation tactics. This thesis argues the 
occurrence of SbC or similar averted ‘near miss’ type incidents is not measured and 
is reliant on post-incident investigations to improve operational practise. This 
research concludes implying the mode of arming and use of force paradigm within an 
E&W context may innately restrain police use of fatal force. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to broaden current academic understanding of a unique 
and complex area; where a vulnerable individual may pose a substantial risk or threat 
to himself or another and there is a requirement for the police to intervene or 
potentially use lethal force.  
 
Necessary to sustain public confidence and police legitimacy, it is essential that any 
fatal police shooting is thoroughly investigated. The phenomenon of ‘Suicide by Cop’ 
(SbC) may be described as a ‘high impact low probability’ type of event and occurs 
where a vulnerable individual, with ‘lethality of means’, initiates self-destructive 
violent conduct. This may either be conducted purposefully or with indifference to the 
circumstance and as a direct consequence police may have to use lethal force. 
Research to understand the police response to the SbC phenomenon is deficient in 
England & Wales (E&W) and any subsequent use of force to a vulnerable or ‘high 
risk’ individual will always be considered contentious. This thesis examines context 
and uses the findings to comprehend the response, effectiveness and limitations of 
policing high-risk persons.   Using both TASER and authorised police firearms 
officers who have received enhanced conflict resolution training, this research 
compares and contrasts qualitative responses, validating and critically analysing 
these against reported ‘use of force’ (UoF) data. By understanding the theories, 
challenges and operational reality of mitigating a vulnerable individual’s SbC ideation, 
this research seeks to develop a fuller understanding of the UoF paradigm within the 
E&W policing context.  
 
It is estimated that globally almost one million people committed suicide in 2014 
(Samaritans, 2016; World Health Organisation, 2016). Where a vulnerable individual 
commits suicide, it may be described as a ‘hidden’ event, as it frequently conceals 
much of the context and societal or demographic disparities. Suicide statistics are not 
centrally collated in the United Kingdom (UK), creating discrepancies in data 
accuracy and any subsequent use of it. It is estimated that 6,122 UK citizens 
committed suicide in 2014. Where the rate per 100,00 population is used to 
characterise population sizes and regional variations, the published suicide rate1 was 
5.2 for women and 16.8 for men (Samaritans, 2016). Acknowledging the number of 
                                                 
1
 Data collated in 2014 published for England, Wales and Republic of Ireland per 100,000 population. 
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individuals committing SbC is likely to be very small within E&W, this type of incident 
may present long-term consequences for police legitimacy. Any post incident 
investigation, review or inquiry will scrutinise the whole event to identify if this fatal 
encounter may have been prevented. This coronial process may include public 
health and adds to the layers of scrutiny to identify ‘mistakes’; whether operational, 
tactical or procedural, providing some public reassurance that the police and other 
public services are being held to account.  
 
1.1  Extant research.  
 
Most of the academic research on SbC originates in the United States of America 
(USA) e.g. Lord (2000, 2001, 2012, 2014), Hutson et al. (1998), Mohandie and Melot 
(2010, 2011). With limited studies in other westernised countries2 and only one in 
E&W, the extant research is significantly biased to the policing and cultural context of 
the USA. The extant literature appears incapable of clarifying if SbC occurs in other 
countries, the scope of any particular SbC issue or any basis for this apparent 
restriction to westernised nations. 
 
Considerate of the research and situational context in the USA; this thesis examines 
the theories, concepts and challenges presented by SbC, to develop a literal 
framework and broaden understanding. Societal change, social bonds and personal 
strain are analysed alongside suicide rates and motivational typology. The multitude 
of definitions 3  and approaches to theorise suicide have restrained research and 
progression. This thesis deliberates Coronial verdicts and suicide recording, which 
may subsequently bias UK and global data (Silverman, 2006; Tollefsen, Hem and 
Ekeberg, 2012, World Health Organisation, 2016). The literature suggests the 
absence of adequate studies to characterise SbC, combined with a lack of 
international consensus, appear to have stalled development of operational practise 
and policy to protect vulnerable individuals.  
 
Considering the extant research, this thesis deliberates suicidal risk factors and the 
relationship mental health or suicidal ideation has upon completed suicides (Kesic, 
Thomas and Ogloff, 2010, Samaritans report, 2016).  The reliance on post-incident 
fatal SbC data is discussed, with the subsequent influence upon hypotheses being 
                                                 
2
 Excluding USA, only other published SbC research originates from Australia, Canada or Germany. 
3
 World Health Organisation (2016) identifies twenty-seven differing suicide typologies. 
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developed from potentially biased data. To enable a broader comprehension of the 
police use of force within E&W, this research thesis discusses apparent gaps in 
international peer reviewed studies that may avert a potential SbC e.g. de-escalation 
or a ‘restraining’ of the use of lethal force.  
 
The existing SbC theory, literature and research that are currently used to determine 
suicidal intent is considered. There is a multidimensional relationship between a 
vulnerable individual in acute crisis, the influence of complex risk factors, any 
situational or behavioural indicators and their ‘lethality of means’. Where police 
respond and use lethal force to mitigate a situational threat, this thesis examines the 
extant post-incident research to establish an evidenced based method and determine 
‘hidden’ suicidal intent.  
 
Contrasting the complex means used to commit suicide or SbC, this thesis compares 
specific risk factors and their influence upon any interaction with responding officers. 
By evaluating a subject’s ‘hidden’ actions, whether intentionally confrontational, 
indifferent or irrational; it assists in establishing a post-incident sequence of 
behaviour that may subsequently explain the intent of the suicidal person at the time 
of death. Using a number of complementary methods, this thesis studies the 
demographic range of realised suicides and the risk factors that could potentially be 
utilised to identify vulnerable individuals who may be considering SbC. The challenge 
faced by police responding to a vulnerable individual focused on SbC ideation, 
creates its own significant operational dilemma. This thesis contrasts the complex 
decision-making dilemma for police, who respond to an incident without adequate 
information relating to their specific risk factors, intention or lethal capability.  
 
The situational context in E&W, role and method of policing is explored and the 
influence this may have upon the outcome of a SbC. Critically analysing the 
considerable amount of US-led SbC studies and contrasting this to E&W policing 
context; this thesis examines the resultant effect that context, policing style or mode 
of arming may have upon outcome. By examining the ‘restraint paradigm’ it critically 
analyses how E&W policing legitimacy is sustained within an unarmed paradox. 
Analysing international studies, this thesis argues there is a global dearth of research 
to understand SbC. Further, through examining cognitive decision-making, it will 
explore the limitations or operational consequences for responding officers to 
Nicholas FRANCIS 4 
mitigate the capability, threat or risk presented by a vulnerable SbC individual. As a 
consequence of training and operational exposure, it is argued police responders 
become ‘recognition primed’. This increases their intuitive ability to recognise SbC 
factors and where possible utilise other options to restrain or negate the necessity for 
resorting to lethal force.  
 
1.2 Research thesis 
 
This thesis contains eight chapters. The second chapter reviews the relevant extant 
literature relating to suicide, examining the theories for SbC or intent, with contextual 
examination of police decision-making and response to a person in mental health 
crisis. The third chapter explains the mixed methods approach used in this thesis and 
research to examine and understand the main research question: 
RQ1: ‘How does a Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) compared with an unarmed 
Specially Trained TASER Officer (STTO) differ in ‘conflict’ decision making?’. 
Exploring the differences in decision-making and resolution tactics, this research 
aims to develop a broader understanding of how police officers in E&W deal with 
conflict. A sample was drawn from Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Specially 
Trained TASER officers (STTO) and comprises of two sub-groups; ‘unarmed’ STTO 
and AFO’s 4 . This research analysed and compared the sample sub-groups to 
establish if there was any difference in decision-making or use of force applied to a 
person with mental illness (PMI). Quantitative analysis of MPS Use of Force (UoF) 
data (N=132,410) examined the tactical approaches utilised by the sample sub-
groups and to inform the construction of a scenario-based survey questionnaire 
(N=315). A supplementary research aim was to understand if there were specific 
tactics, techniques or approaches used for to de-escalate conflict with vulnerable 
high-risk individuals. 
The fourth chapter examines the findings of the quantitative MPSUoF dataset and 
the research survey questionnaire. This provides a qualitative perspective to the 
MPSUoF data, exploring and defining the officer’s role specific assessment of 
incidents. Chapter five discusses the findings from both the qualitative and 
quantitative data. Using relevant literature, it examines the STTO and AFO role 
                                                 
4
 As part of the MPS STTO population, AFO’s are trained and routinely issued TASER as a ‘less lethal option’. 
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related decision-making processes and to add context compares this against the 
research survey questionnaire or MPSUoF data. The last chapter concludes, 
summarising the research to draw some recommendations for future consideration or 
study.   
The next chapter contains a literature review, which will critically examine the extant 
suicide research, analyse the SbC theories focusing on the subject’s intent and the 
E&W police response to a person in mental health crisis.   
Nicholas FRANCIS 
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2. ‘Suicide by Cop’ –theories, taxonomy and challenges 
 
This chapter will critically consider the hypotheses, classifications and academic 
issues surrounding ‘Suicide by Cop’ (SbC). Examining the extant research this 
chapter this evaluates challenging topic and how this may have influenced 
conceptualisation of this unusual and extreme policing phenomenon. Where a person 
may use police as a proxy to enable suicide, the formative theory of ‘Victim 
Precipitated Homicide’ (Wolfgang, 1957) has been progressed by understanding key 
indicators, but has also been constrained by an inability to classify it.  
 
In considering the extant literature, a knowledge gap for policing in England and 
Wales (E&W) emerges. Existing SbC research largely consists of post-incident case 
studies, this influenced the methodology and aims for this research thesis. By using a 
mixed method approach, this research aims to bring context and develop 
understanding of the use of force within the E&W policing paradigm. By analysing 
police data and survey questionnaire, it develops an understanding of the range of 
operational and use of force responses to a vulnerable person in crisis.  
 
2.1.1 Suicide hypothesis and its restrictions 
 
To develop a fuller understanding and give context, it is useful to briefly evaluate the 
research literature on suicide. Durkheim (1897) defines suicide as ‘death resulting 
directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he 
knows will produce this result’ (Durkheim, 1897 (1951), p. 44).  More recently it has 
been described as ‘an act deliberately initiated and performed by a person in the full 
knowledge or expectation of its fatal outcome’ (Pillay and Thomas, 2015; World 
Health Organisation (WHO), 2016). Almost 120 years after Durkheim’s (1897) 
formative hypothesis, the descriptive WHO statement highlight some of the core 
issues contemporary society is still experiencing when trying to classify suicide. 
 
Durkheim (1897) examined how a combination of personal motivational factors may 
interact on an individual’s path to suicide, theorising four wide motivational 
classifications (Durkheim, 1897; Lankford, 2013; Lord, 2010; Parent and Verdun-
Jones, 1998).  Defined as a ‘fatalistic’ suicide, where an individual is motivated as 
they face inescapable suffering, wish to avoid persecution or some form of 
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discomfort. Where an individual lacks purpose, direction, or a function within society, 
have no social standing or responsibility and therefore struggle to integrate into that 
community; this belief of insignificance combined with an inability to assimilate within 
society may diminish their confidence and consequently increases the probability of 
an anomic suicide (Durkheim, 1897; Lankford, 2015a; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 
1998). Durkheim (1897) suggests that the purpose of social networks acts as an 
influence and standardises a person’s emotional characteristics, therefore preventing 
social disconnection and separation. It theorised that egoistic suicides are caused 
when, without these social systems, a person is susceptible to ‘depression or 
disillusionment’ (Lankford, 2013, pp. 256). Lastly, ‘altruistic suicides’ are motivated by 
a personal conviction that the collective need is larger than an individual one e.g. a 
person who may be compelled by their belief to commit suicide.  
 
Exploring Durkheim’s (1897) theory, there appears a correlated link between suicide 
and societal change. Suicide may be considered as a coping mechanism to 
overcome personal strain created by individual or societal context; the unattainable 
aspirations or disparity created by a need for physical possessions, kinship, the 
absence of communal integration, authority or achievement (Durkheim, 1897; 
Merton, 1957; Lord, 2010; Samaritans, 2016; Schneiderman, 1998; Parent and 
Verdun-Jones, 1998). This appears to corroborate the wider typology of egoistic 
altruistic, fatalistic or anomic suicides.  
 
Fundamentally, by making a positive commitment and decision to take their own life, 
suicide is a deliberate act (Durkheim, 1897; Lord, 2000; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 
1998; Pillay and Thomas, 2015). Extant research has generally focused on the 
behavioural characteristics of suicide. There is limited analysis focused on suicidal 
ideation and the significance of how particularly complex risk factors influence an 
individual’s intent (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010, 2012; Lord, 2010; Parent and 
Verdun-Jones, 1998).  A variety of risk factors appear to influence the conversion of 
suicidal ideation into realisation, these include; substance misuse, certain mental 
health conditions, the regularity of prior suicide attempts, personality disorders, 
emotional crisis or life events e.g. absence of social ties or emotional stability (Best, 
Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Booth et al., 2010; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; 
Lankford, 2015a, 2015b; Lord, 2000; Miller, 2007; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998).  
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In addition, a conscious commitment to take their own life, an individual requires 
accessibility to the means and an opportunity to commit the act. Frequent means of 
committing suicide, such as jumping, drowning or by substance overdose necessitate 
an actionable motivation to take one’s own life; (Best and Quigley, 2003; Lord, 2000, 
2010). Though, when considering suicide, an individual may engage in a conscious 
life-threatening and apparent criminal confrontation, to incite an additional party to kill 
them (Gebeth, 1993; Lord, 2000; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; VanZandt, 1993 
Wilson et al., 1998). This focused and determined action means the difficult choice to 
die is essentially removed to another individual ‘by proxy’.  
 
The next section examines Wolfgang’s (1957) theory of ‘Victim Precipitated 
Homicide’ which initiated academic debate and led to future research. Theory and 
understanding have been developed since, focussing on the subject and a change in 
emphasis from homicide to suicide.  
 
2.1.2 Conceptualising ‘Victim Precipitated Suicide’ 
 
Where a suspect had an obvious and substantial participation in a crime, and by 
accident, provocation or compulsion they were subsequently killed, Wolfgang (1957) 
hypothesised this as ‘victim-precipitated homicide’. Between 1948 and 1951 
Wolfgang utilised empirical data from criminal homicides (n=588) in the USA. Whilst 
some of the personal descriptive language within the research is derogatory, the 
theory of an encounter where a ‘victim’s’ criminal conduct may be the causation in 
initiating his or her own suicide has shaped debate (Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998;  
Wolfgang, 1957). Discussed later, subsequent research to understand the subject’s 
intent has refined Wolfgang’s (1957) definition, arguing this is not ‘homicide’ but 
instead ‘suicide’. 
 
Developing Wolfgang’s (1957) original classification, Gerberth (1993) hypothesised 
the person’s behaviour should be considered as suicidal conduct.  Categorised as 
‘officer assisted suicide’ this is completed when a person, who is resolved to realise 
suicidal ideation, purposely engages in a conceivably fatal criminal act to induce 
another to kill them (Gerberth, 1993); now colloquially termed as ‘Suicide by Cop’ 
(SbC). 
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However, there are some fundamental difficulties in achieving consensus for a 
mutually accepted taxonomy of SbC (Feuer, 1998; Geller and Scott, 1992; Noesner 
and Dolan, 1992). Many academics agree that SbC may follow when a person feels 
suicidal ideation and in spite of aspiring to die, they are incapable or unwilling of 
taking their own life. In this case the subject utilises another in an deliberate way, as 
a process or instrument, to fulfil their lethal goal (Gebeth, 1993, Patton and Fremouw, 
2016; Hutson et al., 1998; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; Sarno and Van  Hasselt, 
2014). Numerous terms or labels have been applied to this phenomena, including: 
‘Suicide by Cop’ (Feuer, 1998; Gerberth, 1993; Homant and Kennedy, 2000; 
Kennedy, Homant and Hupp 1998; Lindsay and Lester, 2008; Mohandie, Meloy and 
Collins, 2009) ‘police involved victim provoked shooting’ (McKenzie, 2006), ‘law 
enforcement-assisted suicide’ (Lord, 2000), ‘suicide by police’ (Homant and 
Kennedy, 2000; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010) and ‘victim precipitated homicide’ 
(Wolfgang,1957).  
 
Early research papers labelled the suicidal individual as a ‘victim’, however the 
participant’s roles within the encounter may actually be reversed. Additionally, this 
‘victim’ label may not be appropriate in this unique type of incident, as this may also 
make the responding officer a ‘suspect’. By labelling one character a ‘victim’ this 
commonly has affirmative, compliant or susceptible value; whereas a ‘suspect’ or 
‘offender’ similarly has negative implications, such as fear, hazard or danger 
(Holstege et al., 2009; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Wolfgang, 1957; Patton 
and Fremouw, 2016). This thesis will use the contemporary neutral term ‘subject’, 
‘person’ or ‘deceased’ (Holstege et al., 2009; Patton and Fremouw, 2016).  
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2.1.3 Variances within SbC research 
 
SbC research overlaps multiple disciplines including law, mental health, law 
enforcement and criminology; and is a contributory factor for the variety of 
incompatible and overlapping classifications or conflicting terms. Restricting any 
beneficial or progressive dialogue on suicidal behaviour there is a reliance on 
selected hypotheses that contain a negative inferences or out-dated terminology 
(Azizi, 2010; Lord, 2000, 2010; Patton and Fremouw, 2016; Pillay and Thomas, 
2015; Sarno and Van Hasselt, 2014; Silverman, 2006). It appears the failure to 
establish a practical or universally established SbC definition has restrained accurate 
comparative studies to gauge the true global scale of SbC (Azizi, 2010; Pillay and 
Thomas, 2015).  
 
As each discipline uses different research methodologies or has objectives 
concentrated within their own field, additional complications in theorising SbC have 
been created (Patton and Fremouw, 2016). It appears SbC theory has not been 
meaningfully widened, developed or expanded for some significant period; with the 
lack of consensus adding to the considerable challenges that exist in researching this 
problematic subject (Azizi, 2010; McLeod, Thomas and Kesic, 2014; Patton and 
Fremouw, 2016; Sarno and Van Hasselt, 2014). 
 
2.1.4 SbC case studies, limitations and burden of proof 
 
Researching historic case studies, academics have been striving to improve the SbC 
criteria and identify commonalities. A significant number of qualitative and 
quantitative studies (Appendix A) have studied the environmental influences, 
behavioural markers, the rates of occurrence and dynamics within SbC incidents 
(Patton and Fremouw, 2016). This thesis is dependent upon international research to 
draw knowledge and valuable understanding. Whilst the only two E&W based peer 
reviewed SbC studies (Best and Quigley, 2003; Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004) offer 
valuable context, this research was restricted by the small number and availability of 
case studies within E&W.   
 
Although the ‘Suicide by Cop’ term was often used within the law enforcement 
circles, early studies were unable to calculate the regularity of SbC occurrences 
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(Gerberth 1993; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Van Zandt, 1993). When Parent 
and Verdun-Jones (1998) studied Canadian police lethal shootings (n=58) in 
establishing ‘victim-precipitated homicide’ theory they concurred with Gebeth (1998) 
hypothesising ‘[….] the initiator is a direct, positive precipitator of his or her own 
death’ (Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998, p. 22). A study of US shootings (n=437), 
classified 10.5% (n=46) of the sample as SbC encounters, identifying particular 
characteristics and intent of the subject (Hutson et al.,1998). 
 
Arguably, SbC occurs when ‘a suicidal individual intentionally engages in life-
threatening and criminal behaviour with a lethal weapon or what appears to be a 
lethal weapon towards law enforcement officers or civilians to specifically provoke 
officers to shoot the suicidal individual in self-defence or to protect civilians’ (Hutson 
et al., 1998, p. 665). To stimulate a predicted lethal police response, initial research 
hypothesised the subject either threatened the officer or transferred their malice 
towards another, but without actually putting any person in danger (Van Zandt, 
1993). Where suicidal individual’s use ‘words or gestures or they confront the police 
with a dangerous weapon despite having no way to escape, virtually forcing the 
officer to shoot’ this may assist in establishing intent (Kennedy, Homant, and Hupp, 
1998, pp. 22; Lord, 2000).  
 
Including particular behavioural elements may enable a classification of intent e.g. 
pointing a weapon towards captives and aiming, charging or throwing weapons at 
responding police officers (Lord, 2000). Lord (2000) applied a different SbC criteria to 
Hutson et al. (1998), with law enforcement officers self-selecting previous US police 
shootings (n=64) they believed met the research criteria. Critically, there were 
limitations with this study created by the variations in police procedures, 
documenting, deployment practices and self-selection bias. While the size of this 
sample may not be large enough to permit any reliable extrapolation of the SbC data, 
this study creates a hypothesis to develop knowledge to infer an individual’s intent.  
 
Increasing the SbC research criteria, has permitted a consideration of the broader 
situational context, with a focus on the behavioural interaction between the police 
and subject to improve an understanding of suicidal ideation (McKenzie, 2006; 
Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 2005; Pinizzotto et al., 2012). To realistically progress 
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SbC research, a clear consensus with a recognised assessment criteria to classify 
suicidal intent is required (McKenzie, 2006).   
 
Existing research is generally limited to descriptive case study analysis of suicide and 
SbC. Recognised by several studies, SbC is challenging to methodically examine, 
which may be responsible for the lack of international research. Studies are 
completed on vulnerable individuals, some with complicated mental health issues; 
and where they complete suicide, the research is dependent on third party narratives 
(Pillay and Thomas, 2015). Evidential inadequacies commonly inhibit the contextual 
and conclusive proof required for SbC; as collating evidence from family, witnesses 
or even professionals who are connected or had an involvement with the subject can 
be problematic (Pillay and Thomas, 2015). The distressing effect of being a 
participant in a ‘suicide by proxy’ may possibly traumatise others, generating further 
victims (Kingshott, 2009; Van Zandt, 1993). 
 
The UK recorded rate of suicide or SbC may not be accurately reflected within 
Coroner recordings of death (Pritchard and Hansen, 2015; Samaritans, 2016 
Silverman, 2006). For the legal and clinical classifications, the threshold of suicide is 
set at the criminal burden of proof, which is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. A Coroner 
must be satisfied, that at the material time, the individual intended the consequence 
of their actions to be their own death. Arguably, by reducing the level of proof to the 
‘balance of probabilities’ threshold, it is estimated that recorded suicides would 
increase between 30 to 50%, which may emphasise the true national scale of suicide 
within E&W (Pritchard and Hansen, 2015; Habgood, 2017). Similarly, for a potential 
SbC inquiry, if the subject’s suicidal intent cannot be proven then a finding of 
‘Justifiable Homicide’ or ‘Lawful Killing’ is made (Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; 
Pritchard and Hansen, 2015; Wilson et al., 1998). As coronial findings of death are 
set within court procedures, the creation of a distinctive SbC ruling may increase 
public awareness or contribute to quantifying this complex issue (Atkinson, 1978; 
Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; Pritchard and 
Hansen, 2015; Wilson et al., 1998). 
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2.1.5 The influence of data in defining SbC  
 
The limited number of E&W police shootings and an absence of E&W centred 
research, has created a dependence on US based SbC studies (Best and Quigley, 
2003). The effect of using contrasting criteria, parameters, research methods and 
classifications between different studies has resulted in conflicting estimations; where 
SbC may occur in between 16% and 46% of all US police involved shootings (Hutson 
et al., 1998; Kennedy, Homant and Hupp, 1998; Klinger, 2001; Kesic, Thomas and 
Ogloff, 2010; Lord, 2014; Mohandie and Meloy; 2010; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 
1998). In an attempt to advance understanding and quantify the SbC issue, the US 
government has sought consensus to classify suicidal behaviour, standardise 
statistical recording and promote a thematic analysis of SbC (Azizi, 2010; Kingshott, 
2009; Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012, 2014). However, there is no established 
classification in existence for academics, police or the coroner to empirically 
determine if a homicide was a SbC (Dewey et al., 2013).  
 
The challenge of silo based SbC research approaches is characterised by each 
study employing a contrasting set of criteria to define SbC and then removing 
incidents where specific traits are not indicated. This approach reduces any sample 
size, lessens the ability to draw comparative conclusions and removes valuable 
research opportunities (Dewey et al., 2013; Klinger, 2001; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 
2010; Lord, 2014). Post-incident studies appear dependent on accessing police or 
public records, which may not necessarily capture all the data points required for that 
study. As each agency operates under a variety of systems to gather ‘post incident’ 
statistics, this may unduly influence research outcomes; resulting in incomplete and 
potentially unsound assumptions derived from incorrect data (Alpert, 2015; Azizi, 
2010; Hutson et al., 1998; Klinger, 2001; Lord, 2000, 2014; Miller, 2007, 2015; 
Mohandie and Meloy, 2010) (Appendix B presents a number of SbC models). 
 
Law enforcement agencies do not register ‘near miss’ occurrences e.g. where police 
de-escalate an incident and consequently avert a suicide or SbC; unless an arrest or 
a mental health referral is made, no official record is created (Azizi, 2010; Best and 
Quigley, 2003; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; McKenzie, 2006; Morabito and 
Socia, 2015; Squires and Kennison, 2010). Similarly, scholars ‘do not study non-
events’ (Pinozzotto et al., 2012, p. 286) and as research criteria tends to omit these 
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instances it narrows comprehension of the ‘use of lethal force paradigm’ (Pinozzotto 
et al., 2012; Squires and Kennison, 2010). Where the police ‘restrain’ their use of 
force and use other tactics to avoid a fatal encounter, analysis of these ‘near miss’ 
incidents may increase understanding and create quantifiable data to determine best 
practise (Azizi, 2010; Best and Quigley, 2003; Lord, 2014; Pinizzotto et al., 2012).  
 
The dearth of scientific proof inhibits our understanding of how some police shootings 
are avoided and prevents scrutiny of those effective police tactics that may be used 
to prevent future fatal encounters (Alpert, 2015; Azizi, 2010; Best and Quigley, 2003; 
Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; Lord, 2010, 2014; McKenzie, 2006; Mohandie and 
Meloy, 2010; Squires and Kennison, 2010). It is argued ‘potentially fatal encounters’ 
(Squires and Kennison, 2010, p. x) do not receive any detailed examination. To 
comprehend the entire context of a fatal police encounter is crucial in the prevention 
of future deaths. The collation and utilisation of data from fatal police shootings alone 
may give an unrepresentative description of the police use of lethal force. 
 
Future studies are necessary to develop a fuller understanding of when police 
actually use force and provide an evidence base to verify or refute the value of 
employing other tactical options. In circumstances where police did not fire, 
exploration of approaches or techniques to reduce the influence of suicidal motivation 
is required e.g. giving a subject ‘time and space’ (Best and Quigley, 2003; Kesic, 
Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; Klinger, 2001; Lord, 2010, 2014; Mohandie and Meloy, 
2010). However, where individuals are detained, survive or surrender avoiding a 
prospective SbC, an immediate debrief of all parties involved may secure a vital 
opportunity to identify and reveal best practise (Klinger, 2001; Lord, 2010; McKenzie, 
2006).  
 
The literature indicates a number of fundamental issues and when these are 
combined act as a limiting factor for scholars efforts to research or quantify the 
frequency of SbC. Underdeveloped definitions, deficiency of empirical research and 
imprecise data have led to an abundance of descriptive provincial studies which 
obscure the real magnitude of the problem (Habgood, 2017; Lord, 2000; Pritchard 
and Hansen, 2015; Samaritans, 2016; World Health Organisation, 2016). It is 
uncertain if the deficiency of research studies, literature or data has limited the 
normally influential effect that academics have upon law, policy or training within 
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public health or law enforcement; but within the existing literature the ‘hidden’ nature 
of this issue increases the vulnerability some may face.  
 
By learning lessons from previous fatal encounters, the operational police response 
to prospective SbC incidents has developed over time e.g. recommendations 5 
relating to the management, training, tactics and post-incident procedures (Best and 
Quigley, 2003). The focus of recent studies has been to conduct a contextual 
examination to improve understanding of the situational and behavioural interaction 
between the individual and the police. The next section will consider the literature 
concentrating on the situational and behavioural stimuli that may shape suicidal 
ideation. 
  
                                                 
5
 Recommendations made by the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which is a former title of the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IOPC) and investigates police conduct. 
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2.2 Intent, suicide risk factors and quantifying context 
 
The literature indicates there has been insufficient progress to define or study SbC 
within the UK; the resultant impact has decreased the potential influence on policy, 
decision-making or tactical options in a potential SbC confrontation. Police may pre-
emptively use force in order to prevent a SbC or remove the individual’s capability to 
harm. Where a subject’s injuries are fatal, a comprehensive scrutiny of the subject’s 
behavioural traits needs to be conducted in order to understand if there was any 
specific intent to die (Azizi, 2010; Klinger, 2001; Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012). 
In an effort to validate suicidal ideation, contemporary studies now focus on the point 
of interaction to characterise behavioural or verbal indicators and the subject’s 
‘rationality of thought’ (Lord, 2012, 2014). 
 
Whilst the ‘live versus die’ dilemma is subjective for the individual it is a significant 
influence on the probability of a police shooting (Kilnger, 2001). Individual motivation 
and purpose to die appears as diverse as human nature, proving a challenge to 
establish or accurately measure (Azizi, 2010; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; 
Lankford, 2015a, 2015b; Lord, 2012). Instead of limited behavioural indicators, by 
analysing the ‘chains of behaviour’ it may enhance understanding of the subject’s 
intent within a SbC incident (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; McKenzie, 2006). 
Using data from post-incident case studies and fatal police shootings, numerous 
hypotheses have been established to develop and increase awareness of causation 
factors (Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Homant and Kennedy, 2000; McKenzie, 
2006; Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012).  
 
2.2.1 Quantifying suicidal intent   
Whilst evaluating incident which may meet the general SbC typology, a US study 
identified a number of ‘decision points’ which may categorise the incident (Homant 
and Kennedy, 2000). For example, the encounter was a premeditated confrontation 
planned by the individual, where the subject presented a type of nonconforming 
emotionally unpredictable behaviour or they engaged in ‘normal’ criminal activity 
(Homant and Kennedy, 2000). These broad categories established the core of the 
‘decision tree’, which may be further separated into nine sub-types (Homant and 
Kennedy, 2000). In a ‘planned’ event, a hypothetical correlation exists between the 
individual initiating or designing a state where police intervention is required. It is 
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envisaged that the ‘disturbed person’ category would include those who are 
intoxicated due to substance abuse, mental illness or suffering emotional crisis. The 
remaining category is where a subject participates in a ‘crime-in-action’ and when 
confronted by police and unable to escape they ‘elect’ to be killed by police.  
 
Utilising the ‘decision tree’ creates a framework to differentiate SbC from other 
incidents where police have used lethal force. This study clearly illustrated the dearth 
of data and comparable literature available; as the limited overall sample group 
(n=145) had a restricted number of cases in each classification and utilised a range 
of data sources, with reliance on some unverifiable media reports (Homant and 
Kennedy, 2000). This typology was extended and further developed in several other 
studies (Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012). Best, 
Quigley and Bailey (2004) examined police shootings (n=22) in E&W between 1998 
and 2001, with Lord and Sloop (2010) and Lord (2012) using a further revised 
‘decision tree’ to analyse data (n=356) from the USA Hostage Barricade Data System 
(HBDS).  
 
A modified ‘decision tree’ (Figure 1) may enable suicidal intent to be quantified. 
Combining primary evidence with behavioural, situational or suicidal indicators, may 
provide contextual evidence to classify a subject’s ‘indifference’ (Azizi, 2010; Lord 
and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012). 
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Figure 1. Modified ‘Decision Tree’ (Source: Lord and Sloop, 2010, p.891). 
 
It is suggested the quantification of a person’s suicidal intent should not be limited to 
a singular data point (Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 
2012). Enlarging the number of measured behavioural, communicated or planned 
indicators enables a more accurate assessment to be made. The more data points 
met, the higher the probability of a subject’s intent to manipulate police into a lethal 
response (Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012). 
Utilising this method, a score may be generated to establish the probability of a 
planned SbC and offers an opportunity to quantify vulnerability, intent or rationality. 
The researcher has been unable to establish if this methodology has been applied or 
tested upon post-incident cases studies, but this probability framework may offer 
future research opportunities to develop an enhanced understanding of SbC intent.  
 
Studying vulnerable people is a complex problematic issue. This complexity 
increases where an individual’s intent is concealed or ‘hidden’; either purposely, with 
indifference to the consequences or, due to the effect of particular suicidal risk 
factors, where their behavioural actions maybe unintentional or misunderstood. 
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2.2.2 ‘Hidden Suicides’ - the influence of concealed intent  
 
For some deaths that originally seem to be accidental e.g. one-car collisions or 
workplace fatalities, where suicidal intent is subsequently established these have 
been hypothesised as ‘hidden suicides’ (Homant and Kennedy, 2000; Lord, 2012). 
Equally, where a suicidal individual seems apathetic to the significance of their 
interaction with police in a potentially fatal scenario, these incidents may be 
considered as ‘hidden suicides’. As suicide is not completely understood, is under-
reported the ‘decision tree’ (Figure 1) may assist in a comprehensive analysis to 
verify suicidal intent (Lord, 2012). 
 
Lord and Sloop (2010) identified a need to recognise specific influential behavioural 
factors within an amended ‘decision tree’ (Figure 1) e.g. alcohol or drug intoxication, 
mental health crisis or interpersonal issues. These features add to ‘evidence of 
irrational thought’ and may negatively influence intent or clarity of thought. Arguably, 
in the interaction with police, a vulnerable individual who is either confused or 
unconsciously behaving in a manipulative manner may not rationally intend to 
commit suicide (Lord and Sloop, 2010). Previously classified SbC shootings could 
have been produced by an individual’s ‘indifference’ to death and confused or 
irrational conduct (McKenzie, 2006). Therefore, a subject’s response to police or an 
officer’s consequent reaction to the threat they pose may be situational and the 
individual’s actions or intentions were either misinterpreted or unintentional 
(McKenzie, 2006; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998).  
 
Where previous studies had combined behavioural conditions, in order to develop a 
fuller understanding of rationality at the point of lethal confrontation, it may be 
necessary to further categorise instances where a subject could be influenced by 
alcohol, drugs or mental illness (Lord and Sloop, 2010). Utilising supplementary 
classifications within the data set may permit scholars to determine the influence of 
irrational thought and compare this with behavioural indicators of those individuals 
who evidently intended for the police to end their life (Lord, 2012). The influence 
irrational behaviour upon SbC or general self-inflicted suicides appears to be minimal 
and therefore, whilst acknowledging it, significant weight should not be placed upon 
an individual’s vague or unclear intent (Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Lord and 
Sloop, 2010).  
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2.2.3 ‘Outrageous Act’- planning and expressing intent 
 
By purposely initiating police contact, a suicidal individual may engage on an 
‘outrageous act’, thereby exhibiting individual or situational features which are unique 
to the SbC phenomenon (Azizi, 2010; Lord, 2004, 2014; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010). 
In an E&W context, a practical example is a drunk and suicidal subject in mental 
health crisis, armed with a firearm, holds his estranged partner hostage in a house 
threatening her. As the subject leaves the house he points the firearm at an unarmed 
officer who tries to negotiate with him. Armed police locate him, point firearms and 
during this initial encounter the subject states he wishes to die and for police to shoot 
him. He is holding the firearm to the side of his leg, pointed at the ground. The 
subject is wearing body-armour and refuses to talk with armed police responders 
who are trying to negotiate with him. Not getting a reaction from the armed officers, 
he slowly brings the firearm towards his own temple. At this time armed police fire 
‘less lethal’ Baton Gun and TASER at the subject. These have no physical effect and 
despite this the subject kills himself (IPCC, 2016). This combination of a person in 
extreme crisis, complex risk factors and lethal capability clearly shows the 
operational dilemma presented to police to safely resolve these incidents. 
Additionally, it also reveals the acute vulnerability of these individuals. 
 
Homant, Kennedy and Hupp (2000) state the effect that planning has upon on 
completed or averted SbC cases (n=123) (Geberth, 1993; Homant, Kennedy and 
Hupp, 2000; Kennedy, Homant and Hupp, 1998; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1996; 
Wilson et al., 1998). Developing theoretical assumptions, the threat presented by the 
individual was measured. Yet, the paper does not present, explain or give any 
description of the research methodology. However, the authors do concede the 
limitations of extrapolating assumptions from their restricted data set, as other 
features, such as demographics or risk factors may adversely influence the value of 
this data (Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000). Homant, Kennedy and Hupp (2000) 
claim that 27% were carefully planned, 24% had possibly arranged the encounter 
and 49% appeared spontaneous; arguing that some individuals who did not plan the 
encounter may be measured as a ‘lower danger’ of completing SbC. It was further 
theorised, those who lacked an emotional ability perform the suicidal act themselves 
or who did not wish to expose others to danger, their ‘purposeful’ behaviour with an 
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unloaded or imitation weapon may provoke a lethal police reaction (Homant, 
Kennedy and Hupp, 2000).  
 
Equally, a desperate individual may unsuspectingly have the capability to harm. 
Arguably, that individual should not be eligible to preferential treatment even if, as 
may be determined in a post-incident investigation, there is no substantial capacity 
for them to pose a hostile threat (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Klinger, 2001; 
Ogloff et al., 2013). Similarly, although an individual with an unloaded or imitation 
weapon is unable to actually present a viable threat, a post-shooting inquiry may 
recognize a legally reasonable ‘mistake’ made by the officer (Klinger, 2001). This 
stance concurs with Wolfgang (1957) initial ‘victim-precipitation’ theory; where an 
individual’s hostile acts may require officers to respond in an honest belief with 
potentially lethal force, even though it may subsequently be discovered the subject 
presented no viable risk (Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Klinger, 2001).  
 
In hiding suicidal intent, through implying or perpetrating a criminal or homicidal act, 
an individual may anticipate police to respond with potentially lethal force (Azizi, 
2010; Durkheim, 1897; Klinger, 2001; Lord, 2004, 2014; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010). 
It may be suggested that in completing or intimating this ‘outrageous act’ it reveals a 
clarity of thought; where any behavioural, verbal or planning indicators may be 
additional evidence of suicidal intent (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010; Klinger, 2001; 
Lord and Sloop, 2010; Lord, 2012; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010). This hidden causal 
association between homicide and suicide can be reproduced in varying conditions 
e.g. a suicidal person wishing to die rather than face imprisonment or intentionally 
threatening others to provoke a conflict requiring police use of lethal force to protect 
another life (Durkheim, 1897; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Kingshott, 2009; 
Klinger, 2001).  
 
2.2.4 The conflicting influence of time  
 
In communicating with a person who has ‘planned’ SbC the use of time may only 
have a limited influence in moderating the risk of injury or death (Mohandie, Meloy 
and Collins, 2009).  As the police response is a dynamic reaction, a ‘planned’ SbC 
reduces police time or ability to employ other strategic options which may avoid a 
fatal outcome (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff,  2010, 2012; Mohandie, Meloy and Collins, 
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2009; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998). Hutson et al. 
(1998) cite 37% of US SbC incidents (n=437) are concluded within five minutes, with 
other research suggesting that 70% of fatal police shootings happen within 30 
minutes (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Kingshott, 2009). Conversely, by using a 
‘low key’ response through limiting police officer numbers or by providing the subject 
space, time and utilising effective communication, it may provide a more effective 
option (Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Klein, 2006; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 
1998; Ruiz & Miller, 2004; Van Zandt, 1993). While the conclusion may be dependent 
on the duration of the event, the psychological effect of a violent scenario and either 
party being surprised increases the likelihood that officers will respond with lethal 
force (Best and Quigley, 2003; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Lord, 2000; Mohandie and 
Meloy, 2010; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998).  
 
Suicidal thoughts or an abnormal fixation with death may add to circumstantial 
evidence of suicidal ideation. Where specific intent is uncertain, the influence of 
particular risk factors may lead to fatal interaction with police, where an individual’s 
unintentional or hypothetical plan may be ‘accidently’ completed (Lord, 2012).  
 
2.2.5 Suicidal risk factors 
 
A person’s individual ‘genetic, biological, social, psychological, environmental and 
situational factors’ (Pillay and Thomas, 2015, pp. 555) may influence the risk factors 
and their propensity towards suicide. The central characterised risk factors are 
extensive and may include; mental health, previous suicide attempt, gender, suicidal 
ideation, alcohol or drug misuse, domestic violence, capability and lethality of means, 
severe depression and any unexpected or stressful life events e.g. familial death, 
divorce or marital separation, dismissal from work, personal injury or illness (Azizi, 
2010; Booth et al., 2010; Lord, 2012; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; Pillay and 
Thomas, 2015). Defined as a ‘Complex suicide’, between 1 and 5% of subject’s use 
more than two methods to achieve suicide, either concurrently or in succession (Azizi 
2011; Pillay and Thomas 2015). The consumption of alcohol or drugs with hanging, 
asphyxiation or a firearm are examples of some of the most common reported 
methods in complex suicides (Pillay and Thomas 2015; Racette and Savageau, 
2007; Toro and Pollak, 2009). Demographically there is a statistical variation which 
appears influenced by gender, methodology and risk factors, with a higher male to 
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female ratio of completed complex suicides (Pillay and Thomas, 2015). SbC may be 
considered within the typology as a complex suicide. 
 
SbC research indicated 89% of subjects were male (n= 109) with a general age span 
between 15 to 80 years and a mean age of 31.8 years (Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 
2000). Comparable studies agreed and cited that 89-96% were male with a narrower 
age range of 18-54 years (Lankford, 2015a, 2015b; Lord, 2004; Pyers, 2001). Lord’s 
(2012) comprehensive quantitative examination of US National Violent Death 
Reporting System (NVDRS) data (n=918), comprised of primary police reports and 
coroner narratives, giving a demographic analysis (Figure 2) which concurs with 
generalised suicide data and reports (Degue, Fowler and Calkins, 2016; Samaritans, 
2016; World Health Organisation, 2016).  
 
Figure 2. Demographics of sample (Source: Lord, 2012, p. 1639). 
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2.2.6 Risk factors influencing ideation 
 
The breadth of commonly reported disorders or diagnosis within suicide samples is 
extensive; from personality disorders, schizophrenia, major depression to bipolar 
disorder and substance abuse disorders, with particular attention to behaviours that 
intensify suicidal ideation including aggression, impulsivity, hopelessness, depression 
and anxiety (Dewey et al., 2013; Homant and Kennedy 2000; Kingshott, 2003; Parent 
and Verdun-Jones, 1998; Pillay and Thomas 2015). Although mental health and 
particularly depression appear to be a leading precursor to suicide; substance abuse, 
predominantly alcohol, is the second most contributory risk factor, with research 
arguing that over 50% of suicidal individuals were under the influence of alcohol (Ho 
et al., 2007; Lord, 2004; Pyers, 2001). 
 
The literature suggests mental illness is the foremost risk factor for suicidal ideation 
and outcome, with Homant and Kennedy (2000) finding that 22% (n=27) of SbC 
subjects had documented mental health issues (Azizi, 2010; Homant and Kennedy 
2000; Kingshott, 2009; Pillay and Thomas, 2015). In isolation, this small sample size 
may affect the validity of this research conclusion; Pyers (2001) also cited 58% had 
some type of psychiatric record and another comparative study of SbC mass 
shooters (n=185) indicated 88.9% were ‘suicidal or life indifferent’ (Lankford, 2015a). 
Another US quantitative study agreed, classifying 25% of SbC subject’s (n=275) were 
known by police or mental health services (Lindsay and Lester, 2004; Mohandie & 
Meloy, 2010; Ogloff et al., 2013; Pillay and Thomas, 2015). Significantly, US studies 
indicate that mentally ill individuals were 3.49 times more likely to be involved in a 
provoked police shooting, increasing to 9.97 in a siege incident (Mohandie and 
Meloy, 2010; Pillay and Thomas, 2015;).  
 
Arguably, those who commit suicide face societal and systematic strains. It has been 
contentiously argued that SbC is ‘not really a police problem’ (Azizi, 2010, pp.192) 
but the obligation of public health services to engage that individual in an early 
intervention strategy. Although, hypothetically this may be accurate, the purpose of 
the police has always been more than just dealing with crime (Bittner, 1970; Wolff, 
2005). Additionally, at the point of suicidal realisation where a vulnerable individual’s 
capability or threat is significant, the utilisation of the public police is ‘in the interests 
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of community welfare and existence’ (Lentz and Chaires, 2007, p.69) appears to be 
an ethically legitimate use.  
 
Lord’s (2012) SbC study identified correlations between suicidal intent, risk factors 
and other interchangeable suicide related variables. Figure 3 (Lord, 2012, p.1641) 
reveals the comparative quantitative analysis between individual characteristics and 
unconnected variables through the degree of intent. This study integrates and 
validates former SbC studies (Hutson et al., 1998; Lord and Sloop, 2010; McKenzie, 
2006; Mohandie, Meloy and Collins, 2009); quantifying significant connections 
between SbC intent and behavioral influences including substance addiction, 
domestic violence, previous suicide attempts, mental health crisis or a refusal to 
surrender (Booth et al., 2010; Drylie, 2006; Homant and Kennedy, 2000; Hutson et 
al., 1998; Lord, 1998, 2000; Mohandie, Meloy and Collins, 2009; Miller, 2007, 2015; 
Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; Wilson et al., 1998;). 
 
Although a specific agreed definition for SbC does not exist, Lord (2012) theorises 
the probability of an SbC event in a quantifiable measurement, by using the scale of 
intent against specific demographic and/or risk factors. For example, a subject’s 
refusal to surrender when combined with a risk factor such as mental health crisis, 
substance abuse or an ongoing domestic incident, indicates a diminished intent to 
commit SbC; however, when combined with an earlier suicide attempt may intensify 
their SbC ideation (Booth et al., 2010; Lord, 2012;). Whilst early research solely 
focused on the police tactical deployments, inadequate demographic information was 
collated about the subject or their perceived intent.  Despite insufficient clarity, 
consensus or a definition, researchers have started to determine quantifiable findings 
by studying the specific contextual components of SbC events. Current research now 
hypothesises the likelihood of SbC through comparative analysis of an individual’s 
specific traits, risk factors and intent against previous case studies.  
 
The next section will explore how understanding decision making processes and 
analysis may assist the police to implement collaborative strategies thereby 
minimising risk to the public, police and subject; thus preventing deaths and diverting 
those vulnerable people towards a healthcare pathways. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Personal Characteristics and Independent Variables Across 
the Degree of Intent (Source: Lord, 2012, p.1641). 
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2.3 Factors which affect police response 
 
This section contrasts and reflects upon the reality of operational policing against the 
two preceding sections of this thesis, critically examining the research. Firstly, by 
examining the UK policing model, it aims to understand influences that shape any 
response and compare these against the E&W policing paradigm. Developing an 
understanding of the police decision making process within critical incidents, this 
thesis examined how heuristics, perception and bias may influence the use of lethal 
force. The ‘hidden’ nature of an individual aspiring to realise their SbC ideation with 
lethal capability, creates an operational dilemma for police to pragmatically restrain 
their own use of lethal force. Finally, this section identifies collaborative pro-active 
methods that could be developed to de-escalate and minimise the use of potentially 
lethal force. 
 
2.3.1 The British policing framework and paradox 
 
In E&W, the development of a consent based unarmed policing model for the benefit 
of an unarmed population has changed little since 1829. However, in response to the 
1987 Hungerford massacre, the UK Government instigated legislative measures to 
restrict public access to firearms and created a full-time armed police capability to 
protect the public (Mawby, 1999; Squires and Kennison, 2010). In E&W, armed 
officers act in response to support unarmed colleagues, which appears to support 
why police discharged firearms in just 0.024% of all deployments (N=44,800) (Best 
and Quigley, 2003; Mawby, 1999; Metropolitan Police Authority, 2003; Squires and 
Kennison, 2010). This lack of protection creates an important paradox, as police 
officers have to adapt and employ different techniques to deal with a theoretically 
dangerous subject (Knutsson and Strype, 2003). Similarly, a comparative analysis 
between routinely armed Swedish police and their Norwegian equivalents, who 
required permission before withdrawing weapons, identified a five-fold increase in 
Swedish police firearms discharges (Knutsson and Strype, 2003).  
 
The police have always provided an important social function as ‘quasi-social 
workers’, but now frequently act as first responders to more persons in mental health 
crisis than ever before (Clifford, 2010; Cummins and Edmondson, 2016; De Tribolet-
Hardy et al., 2014; Lamb, Weinberger and Decuir, 2002; Short et al., 2014; Wollf, 
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2005). SbC has the taxonomy of a ‘wicked’ problem e.g. the critical nature of the 
event, a person in crisis with hidden vulnerabilities at the point of suicidal realisation, 
requiring decisive police action to save life, within a minimal timeframe for decision-
making or implementation (Grint, 2005; Rittell and Webber, 1973).  
 
2.3.2 The British policing ‘restraint paradigm’  
 
The assumption in E&W is that each person has an absolute right to life is set within 
Article 2 Human Rights Act 1998. Described as the ‘restraint paradigm’ (Squires and 
Kennison, 2010, p1) the use of minimal force, within the law and against a citizen, 
sustains the legitimacy of the police to serve the public. The context and facts of any 
police shooting in E&W are scrutinized by an independent investigative body6, with 
recommendations made to remedy ‘mistakes’ in training, tactics, command or police 
weaponry (Best and Quigley, 2003; Squires and Kennison, 2010).  
 
Mental illness is a significant risk factor, with US studies indicating those in crisis are 
twelve times more likely than the general population to be fatally shot (Ogloff et al., 
2013). Contrary to the E&W context, countries that have routinely armed police 
provide an immediate and accessible capability for an individual to realise their 
suicidal ideation (Ogloff et al., 2012; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; VanZandt, 
1993). Between 1999 and 2001, the UK police deployed firearms on 44,800 and in 
that period reported 20 discharges and 11 fatalities (Metropolitan Police Authority, 
2003). A key review (Metropolitan Police Authority, 2003) cited 48 recommendations 
to improve the tactics, training and management practices, with two crucial themes 
that increased the probability a shooting; a subject’s vulnerability and the unsuitable 
use of ‘standardised’ tactics to resolve the incident speedily. Best and Quigley (2003) 
quantitative study analysed UK police shootings, using a binary assessment criterion 
to generate an ‘individual vulnerability score’ to quantify the individual, context-based 
or policing risk. However, the classification to score or calculate the subject’s 
vulnerability was not disclosed. 
 
Debatably, the existence of risk factors intensifies the likelihood of confrontation; by 
applying a ‘vulnerability score’ (Best and Quigley, 2003) and a presumption of the 
                                                 
6
 Formerly Police Complaints Authority (PCA), then Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) and now the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). 
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subject’s rationality it could influence the likelihood of a fatal outcome. Educating 
officers to recognise primary indicators may reduce the need for lethal force and if 
practicable within the situational context, to restrain this use of force or utilise 
alternative tactics (Azizi, 2010; Best and Quigley, 2003; Dewey et al., 2013; 
Metropolitan Police Authority, 2003). Seeking a rapid resolution by the use of tactics 
or force may compound the probability of ‘mistakes’ occurring or a weapon being 
discharged by police (Best and Quigley, 2003; Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004).  
 
At the point of contact, a subject’s vulnerability may be concealed by their 
exaggerated behavioural factors, therefore increasing the risk and complexity of the 
incident. Arguably, the ‘learning by mistakes’ method employed by the IOPC reflects 
a deficiency of SbC evidence-based studies, placing responders, with a limited range 
of tactical options, in an almost untenable position (Best and Quigley, 2003; Best, 
Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Metropolitan Police Authority, 2003; Squires and 
Kennison, 2010). To enhance knowledge of the fundamental risks and develop 
greater understanding of the context when police may fire, requires an empirical 
examination to understand how police use force upon those suffering with mental 
illness (Best and Quigley, 2003; Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Kesic, Thomas and 
Ogloff, 2010, 2012; Klinger, 2001).  
 
2.3.3 Cognitive decision-making  
 
For many reasons within the specific context of any critical incident, the information 
may be unclear and overly complex to fully unravel in time-pressured circumstances 
(Alison et al., 2007; Flin and Arbuthnot, 2002). Effective decision making within these 
conditions is vital to enable and facilitate an efficient response, placing a 
considerable cognitive burden upon the decision makers in constantly changing 
situations.  Alison et al. (2007) examined the decision-making process, separating it 
into three stages: ‘situation assessment’; ‘plan formulation’; and ‘plan execution’. 
Therefore, a responding officer is reliant on their skill and knowledge to quickly 
evaluate a scenario and instigate an appropriate tactical response to mitigate any 
threat (Alison et al., 2007; Hastie, 2001; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989; 
Yates, Venott and Patalano 2003).  
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Heuristics are ‘mental shortcuts’ or strategies that are a type of decision-making 
process which, utilises a simple ‘rule of thumb’ to cognitively resolve complex 
scenarios within an unpredictable environment (Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014, 
p.1672). These ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics, permit rapidly accurate decisions to be 
made in uncertain circumstances, with minimal information or cognitive effort; and 
which can be as effective as those decisions made using an intentionally deliberate 
process (Gigerenzer, Todd and ABC Research Group, 1999; Gladwell, 2007; 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer, 2014). Also characterised as intuition, unconscious 
heuristics are where an individual may not be able to rationalise the ‘automatic’ 
reason for selecting an option (Gladwell, 2007). 
 
The intuitive process is quickly adapted to the prevailing circumstances with little 
conscious effort and is initiated through rapid identification of an incident through 
visual or other indicators (Bryant et al., 2017; Gladwell, 2007). ‘Expert practitioners’ 
who have gained knowledge through heuristics and experience use this intuitive 
approach. Where a decision maker is more proficient in the role, there is a likelihood 
they will be ‘recognition primed’ or through intensity of training ‘conditioned’ to make 
a quicker response (Burrows, 2007; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989). This 
enables them to intuitively react quicker and initiate a reaction; or where they are 
sufficiently expert to bypass the normal linear approach and make accurate ‘leaps’ in 
the decision making process (Alison et al., 2007; Jenkins et al., 2010). It is argued 
that actual experts ‘ […] know when they don’t know. However, non-experts (whether 
or not they think they are) certainly do not know when they don’t’ (Kahneman and 
Klein, 2009, p.524). It is the nature of this subjective confidence in intuitive decision 
making which challenges its own hypothesis (Kahneman and Klein, 2009).  
 
Termed ‘adaptive expertise’, it allows decision makers (in this case firearms officers) 
to ‘cognitively and behaviorally adapt to unpredicted and dynamic events’ (Boulton, 
2016, p292); recognising when and why particular options were or were not 
applicable and intuitively identifying when tactics should be modified (Boulton, 2016; 
Wiltshire et al., 2014). It could be safety critical to a firearms officer that any 
judgment, assessment or a correct ‘shoot or no-shoot’ tactical option is selected 
within an instant of time; with an adverse effect giving the officer negligible time to 
calculate a subject’s intent (Burrows, 2007). It appears through regular exposure to 
training and live operational deployments that firearms officers can respond to these 
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environmental cues, increasing their intuitive and cognitive decision-making ability 
(Boulton, 2016; Burrows, 2007).  
 
Similarly, Lipshitz and Ben-Shaul (1997) contrast how ‘experiential difference’ may 
affect performance between the expert and novice; where ‘novices will deliberate 
about which option to select while experts will deliberate about what is going on in 
the situation’ (Lipshitz and Ben-Shaul, 1997, p.160). The analytical, rational and 
conscious decision-making approach is time-consuming, following a prescribed linear 
route without deviation. ‘Following the rules’ is often utilised in the early stages in a 
new role, as this is considered to be a safer preference by novices until knowledge is 
acquired (Bryant et al., 2017). This knowledge can then assigned to memory for use 
in complex environments, offering a range of rapidly available strategies 
characterised as ‘cognitive niche’ (Mousavi and Gigerenzer, 2014). Through the use 
of any repetitive learning activity, it may assist decision makers to enhance both 
intuitive and analytic methods to process information (Alison et al., 2007; Allen, 
2011). Dependent upon the task, decision makers may have the ability to switch 
between an unconscious or intuitive decision making process, to a thoughtful and 
analytic approach (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002).  
 
2.3.4 Decision Making - Barriers and Biases 
 
By evading, disregarding an option or failing to commit to a decision through 
‘decision inertia’, this inactivity may stall or halt any decision-making process due to 
uncertainty and the subsequent doubt created (Alison and Crego, 2012; Alison et al., 
2007; Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997; Power and Alison, 2014). Lipshitz and Strauss 
(1997) theorise three strategies to manage uncertainty; by ‘reducing’ or eliminating it 
altogether through collecting sufficient information before making any decision; 
‘acknowledging’ and selecting an option which evades risk; or lastly ‘suppressing’ 
and rejecting any adverse information. However, despite collation of additional 
information the decision quality may not be enhanced due to the ambiguity of 
environmental factors (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
Stress or other emotional factors may further influence decision making; with positive 
emotions increasing creativity in problem solving and information assimilation (Alison 
and Crego, 2012; Mellers, Schwartz and Cooke, 1998). In contrast, negative 
emotions can result in the quicker use of information, increasing the accuracy of any 
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resulting decision (Estrada, Isen and Young, 1994).  
 
Although stress may weaken cognitive performance or narrow the field of 
concentration, this is particularly significant in critical incident decision making, which 
also necessitates the organisation of concurrent and complex tasks (Fiedler,1988, 
cited in Mellers, Schwartz and Cooke, 1998; Kahneman, 1973; Pashler and 
Johnston,1998). Any heuristic evaluation process may disregard significant or 
relevant information and result in flawed decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). 
Where errors in heuristic decision-making occur, this may also be attributable to a 
number of wide-ranging individual cognitive biases (Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2012; 
Bryant et al., 2017; Hodgkinson and Maule, 2002). A bias may deviate any decision-
making process from a more scientific normative, predictive or logical approach 
(Bryant et al., 2017; Vroom and Jago, 1974). For example, incorrectly assessing a 
situation by excluding or not considering all of the relevant data (base rate fallacy); or 
by being inclined to pursue, infer or place emphasis on specific information to 
corroborate a preconception (confirmation bias) (Kahneman and Klein, 2009).  
 
2.3.5 The dichotomy of restraining instinctive reaction 
 
The challenge facing officers reacting to a spontaneous and rapidly developing 
situation is undeniably testing; to evaluate the risk an individual may present, with 
limited information relating to their vulnerabilities or influencing behavioural factors 
(Brown et al., 2004; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Pillay and Thomas 2015; Silverman, 
2006). Although identification of behavioural risk factors may be valuable, an officer’s 
individual bias may negatively affect the assessment of the true level of threat 
presented (Best and Quigley, 2003). Where unconscious bias towards the mentally ill 
may exist in the general population; within the police service a contributable factor 
may be the influencing effect of an officer’s previous operational or training 
experiences (Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998 Pescosolido et al., 1999; Socall and 
Holtgraves, 1992).  
 
There appears a theoretical link between the officers’ assessment of an individual’s 
vulnerability, the situational context and likelihood of police shooting; as, without 
exhibiting any significant behavioural characteristics, an officer was more likely to 
shoot if the person posed a threat to life. Conversely, if the person was identified to 
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be vulnerable e.g. through mental health or substance misuse, studies indicated 
police restrained the use of force for extended periods before discharging their 
weapons (Best and Quigley, 2003; Ho et al., 2007). 
 
Where officers face violence or believe a particular situation to be dangerous, 
MacDonald et al. (2001) argue that ‘Danger perception theory’ increases the 
probability that officers will use lethal force in incidents. Additionally, the likelihood of 
police firing a weapon is probably increased by the subjective bias of that person, 
situational or environmental aspects, the community or policing context (Alpert, 1989; 
Garner et al., 1996; Miller, 2015). The ability to analyse the ‘deadly mix’ (Pinizzotto et 
al., 2012) hypothesis is still perplexing scholars e.g. the dynamic interaction between 
the police and the individual, and to also quantify the ‘perceived’ versus ‘actual’ 
danger of the encounter at the time of suicidal completion (Homant, Kennedy and 
Hupp, 2000).  
 
2.3.6 Perception and quantifying ‘dangerousness’ 
 
US studies indicate that between 10% and 38% of police are injured whilst employing 
physical control techniques upon a subject and any use of force increases the 
likelihood of injury to responding officers (Alpert, 2015; Alpert et al., 2011; Johnson, 
2011; Lord, 2014). However, another US quantitative study (n=6131) reported there 
was no apparent rise in injuries to either police or mentally ill suspects when physical 
forced was used (Morabito and Socia, 2015). Conversely, suspects perceived to be 
mentally ill resisted in 74% (n=4536) of incidents and if the individual was intoxicated, 
through alcohol or drugs, it significantly increased the probability of injury to all 
parties (Alpert, 2015; Best, Quigley and Bailey, 2004; Engel, 2015; Mulvey and 
White, 2013; Metropolitan Police Authority, 2003; Morabito and Socia, 2015; Rekrut-
Lapa & Lapa, 2014; Schulenburg, 2016; Watson, Corrigan and Ottati, 2004; Watson 
& Fulambarker, 2012). 
 
Homant, Kennedy and Hupp (2000) post-incident quantitative study rated ‘actual’ 
danger, classifying fatal incidents to unarmed persons who implied they were in 
possession of a firearm. As ‘actual’ danger can be quantifiably measured, learning 
can be achieved by reproducing these situations in future training. Yet, ‘perceived’ 
danger has a legally significant meaning and is challenging to measure; where 
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officers may use their own personal perception as a potential justification for any 
proportionate use of lethal force (Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000).  
 
Watson, Corrigan and Ottati (2004) qualitative study theorised how an officer’s 
subjective view of a mentally ill individual influenced the outcome of a scenario. 
Officers (n=382) were observed in training initially sympathising with the individual’s 
mental health condition and believing them to be irresponsible for their actions, 
treated them compassionately (Alpert, 2015; Engel, 2015; Morabito and Socia, 2015; 
Watson, Corrigan and Ottati, 2004). However, the officers still perceived this mentally 
ill subject as dangerous; which impacted upon their inclination to utilise less coercive 
methods to resolve the incident, instead escalating or increasing the degree of force 
used (Johnson, 2011; Ruiz and Miller, 2004; Short et al., 2014; Watson, Corrigan and 
Ottati, 2004; Wood, Watson and Fulambarker, 2016). Suicidal risk factors have a 
resultant influence on behaviour or logical reasoning, requiring responding officers to 
flexibly utilise tactics, specifically applying them to the circumstances to nullify the 
threat (Best and Quigley, 2003; Lord, 2012; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998).  
 
2.3.7 Influencing a tactical use of ‘restraint’  
 
The subject’s actions stimulate a police response, where following a sequence of 
events, an escalation may occur and lethal force may be used to mitigate a potential 
threat to life. To sustain public protection and minimise risk to both officers and the 
subject, the competence of police to strategically use tactics is essential. Yet, to 
reduce the probability of a vulnerable person being shot requires a capacity to 
determine or predict the influence that particular SbC risk factors have upon that 
individual (Best and Quigley, 2003; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998).  
 
Fridell and Binder (1992) deliberated how the initial interaction point, communication 
and the series of events thereafter may all be influential to the probability of lethal 
force being used. By educating officers to recognise suicidal risk factors, it may 
influence or restrain the need for the use of lethal force. This may also facilitate a 
period of time where other strategic or tactical opportunities could be employed 
(Azizi, 2010; Best and Quigley, 2003; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Pinizzotto et al., 
2012). US quantitative research compared SbC to non-SbC fatal shootings which 
occurred during intervention techniques (n=508) (Lord, 2014). Whilst previous 
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research suggested individual behavioural indicators were predictors to police use of 
force; there appears a convincing argument to create a ‘time interval’ to de-escalate 
any confrontation and achieve the subject’s compliance via communication or 
alternative tactical methods (Garner et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011; Lord, 2014; 
McKenzie, 2006; Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 2005). 
 
Developed as ‘Interactional theory’ (Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998, p.433) it argued 
by using a less hostile response it may de-escalate the incident and subsequently 
counteract a vulnerable person’s behaviour. Similarly, by strategically withdrawing it 
may reduce any impulsive response, giving each of the participants sufficient time or 
distance (Azizi, 2010; Ho et al., 2007; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Miller, 2015; 
Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998). US research reported 
the safe resolution of between 50% (n=1111) and 93% (n=1012) of incidents 
involving mentally ill persons; where lethal force could have been legally utilised, 
officers ‘tactically restrained’ themselves from firing a weapon (Ho et al., 2007; 
Pinizzotto et al., 2012). However, despite the use of time or other tactics, if a 
person’s ideation is not being fulfilled, they may escalate incident to accomplish their 
aspiration (Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998).  
 
The literature reveals a high proportion of shootings during spontaneous police 
deployments happen when the information or circumstances are imprecise or the 
individual did not follow police instructions (Azizi, 2010; Best and Quigley, 2003; 
Fridell and Binder, 1992; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff,  2012; Mohandie and Meloy, 
2010; Pinizzotto et al., 2012; Miller, 2015). However, by planning a deployment and 
utilising an effective command structure, it minimises the risk of police firing shots 
and increases the probability of neutralising any potential threat safely (Best and 
Quigley, 2003; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Metropolitan Police Authority, 2003). Yet, 
there is a narrow range of tactical options for police to effectively intervene and save 
the life of any suicidal individual. An intervention may not be a safe or achievable 
option; especially without representing a considerable risk to officers, particularly 
where this is unlikely to prevent the intended death or the individual is only 
threatening their own life (Ho et al., 2007; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Lord, 
2014).  
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The ‘method’ of policing a person in mental health crisis may influence the outcome; 
as the mere presence of armed police may create the means for the subject to 
accomplish their SbC ideation (Dewey et al., 2013; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; 
Ogloff et al., 2013). Where police are first responders and encounter a mentally ill 
suicidal person, who is vulnerable and supervised in the community, it represents a 
possibility of inadvertently increasing the lethality of the event or maintaining public 
protection (Dewey et al., 2013; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Ogloff et al., 2013; 
Wood, Watson and Fulambarker, 2016).  
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2.4 Summary 
 
The hidden characteristics of suicide are explored to understand the resultant impact 
of suicide risk factors and how demographic inequalities may influence ideation. 
Durkheim’s (1897) influential study hypothesised suicide, classified a comprehensive 
motivational typology and by exploring Wolfgang’s (1957) formative “Victim 
Precipitated Homicide’ hypothesis this chapter examined the challenges within SbC 
extant research. This thesis recognises the effect of validated suicide statistics has 
upon future public health strategy. Irregularities created within incident records and 
Coroner’s judgments complicate an already challenging environment, further 
complicated by the variety of multi-discipline suicide classifications. The deficiency of 
post-incident data from realised or de-escalated SbC incidents presents research 
opportunities to enhance the use of force paradigm and explore where ‘restraining’ 
the use of lethal force may be appropriate.  
 
Where lethal force is used reactively, post-incident interpretations of the complex 
factors influencing risk, situational or behavioural factors are necessary to identify 
‘hidden’ suicidal intent. Comparing the use of complex approaches in carrying out 
SbC and the behavioural chain may assist in establishing intent at the time of death. 
Mental illness a considerable risk feature in both SbC ideation and completed 
suicides  
 
The function of the police is not exclusively directed towards crime, but to safeguard 
those vulnerable within society. Examining the E&W ‘unarmed paradox’ this section 
considered how police legitimacy might be maintained within the ‘restraint paradigm’. 
Further studies are required to influence policy, training and operational response, 
and this thesis questions the legitimacy of the current ‘learning by mistakes’ 
approach. Trying to mitigate the risk or threat posed by a vulnerable individual at the 
time of suicidal ideation places responding officers in a challenging position. A 
vulnerable individual’s ideation may be significantly advanced, negating reactive 
tactics, options or police capability employed to change or avert that person’s suicidal 
intention.  
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This thesis compares extant literature, arguing that ‘adaptive expertise’ may permit 
firearms officers to react quicker in a more ‘recognition primed’ and intuitive 
response. By recognising environmental cues earlier, an officer’s cognitive ability 
may be enhanced, reducing the decision-making process and offering a tactical 
advantage. By examining how training, ‘dangerousness’ perception, bias and 
experience affect the use of lethal force, this thesis discusses the implications of the 
strategic use of restraint, the conflict of limiting such an instinctive reaction and de-
escalation techniques to minimise the use of lethal force. Significant knowledge gaps 
are identified, necessitating further co-operative research to increase understanding 
and improve the multi-agency response.  
 
The next chapter will justify and explore the methodological approach used to answer 
the research question.   
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3. Methodology  
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the chosen research methodology in relation 
to other established approaches. Justifying the research strategy used in this thesis 
and the methodology applied, this section will introduce the systems that were used 
or applied in pursuit of the core research question (RQ1). The technique employed 
must not only be driven by the research question, but also by the suitability of a 
particular philosophy to achieve the aims and objectives of the research.  
 
3.1 Problem Statement 
 
‘Suicide by Cop’ (SbC) is an occurrence where a vulnerable individual with ‘lethality of 
means’ commences self-destructive potentially violent behaviour. An individual’s 
conduct may be used to induce police to use lethal force through a purposeful 
intentional process or with indifference to any subsequent consequences. What may 
be described as ‘High impact low probability’ type of event can be challenging to 
research or measure. The limited and historic nature of the extant research within 
England and Wales (E&W) necessitates a ‘mixed methods’ approach, using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods to study and develop an understanding of the 
same research topic.  
 
3.1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research is to develop a clearer understanding of how police 
officers in E&W attempt to resolve the interaction with a high-risk person including 
those who may be in mental health crisis.  
  
Nicholas FRANCIS 
 
40 
3.2 Research Questions 
Within the E&W policing context, this thesis seeks to understand the main research 
question:  
 
RQ1: ‘How does an Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) compared with unarmed 
Specially Trained TASER Officer (STTO) policing affect decision making?’. 
Developing and assisting to answer the main research question, this study will also 
consider the following sub-questions:  
RQ1a: Do routinely unarmed (STTO) officers respond differently to their routinely 
armed counterparts during (conflict?) interactions with the public?  
RQ1b: Is there any difference in decision making or the subsequent application of 
force between an AFO and unarmed officer to resolve an incident with a PMI? 
RQ1c: Do ‘high risk’ groups mean officers are more likely to use certain strategies? 
RQ1d: How does the AFO response to those they perceive are intent on self-harm 
differ to unarmed officers?  
The majority of police officers in the 43 E&W forces are routinely unarmed, with each 
force having access to a number of permanently armed officers. An AFO may be 
defined as an ‘officer who has been selected, trained, accredited and authorised by 
their chief officer to carry a firearm operationally’ (College of Policing, 2019). The focus 
of this research was London based, using Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers 
and data. With the largest population (8.9m) London accounts for approximately 16% 
of recorded crime and over a third of all firearms incidents in E&W. Compared to other 
E&W forces; the MPS also has the biggest workforce (n=31,028), with the largest 
number of AFOs (circa 2500) and TASER7 trained officers (n=4889) for any police 
area (Home Office, 2018a; ONS, 2018). As a serving police officer and AFO an 
additional reason for using the MPS is the ability to gain access to perform this study. 
 
                                                 
7
 A registered brand name, TASER is an abbreviation for Thomas A. Swift Electronic Rifle. 
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The null hypothesis is, there is no initial difference between ‘unarmed’ specially trained 
TASER officers (STTO) or Authorised Firearms Officers in response to a person with 
mental illness. However, where the threat or risk posed by the subject exceeds the 
operational capability of the STTO, the alternative hypothesis suggests there is a 
difference and hence AFO specialist tactics, training or equipment may be required.  
 
A mixed methods strategy was developed to assist in understanding the use of force 
paradigm in E&W and to analyse the core research question.  
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3.3 Conceptual framework 
The methodological approach adopted for this research may be defined within 
philosophy, where concepts relating to a phenomenon are collated, examined and 
utilised. Whilst not mutually exclusive, certain philosophies can be subdivided within 
a range of disciplines; within policing the philosophies may be considered as 
positivism, interpretivism, pragmatism and realism. The research design and 
approach in this thesis will draw from the pragmatist philosophy. Generally, this 
philosophy develops from acts, circumstances or outcomes. It underpins a mixed 
methods research design within social sciences; initially concentrating upon the 
problem, by applying a diverse and concentrates on a ‘what works’ approach to 
establish knowledge or comprehend a problem (Creswell, 2009; Morgan, 2007; 
Patton, 2002; Rossman and Wilson, 1985). A mixed method is not dedicated to any 
one technique, but ‘enquirers draw liberally from both quantitative and qualitative 
assumptions when they engage in their research’ (Creswell, 2009, p.10). 
Consideration was given to adopting other methodological approaches for this 
research thesis; including Grounded Theory Method (GTM), a Randomised Control 
Trial (RCT) and a qualitative or quantitative only study. 
Described as ‘theoretical sensitivity’, a fundamental feature of GTM is the researcher 
must set aside preconceived theoretical ideas to allow a central theory emerge from 
the data (Glaser, 1978). Theoretical components are established and relationships or 
connections between constructs further developed (Gregor, 2006; Urquhart, 2012). 
The collation of police Use of Force (UoF) data within E&W has only recently 
commenced and subsequently been published. Whilst the GTM approach may be 
suitable for examining the overall UoF, it was unlikely to achieve the research aims 
within the timescale or enhance understanding of UoF against a high-risk person in 
mental crisis. 
The RCT is epitomised as a ‘gold standard’ research method and compares a 
section of the population who receive a specific type or range of intervention, against 
a control group who does not. In medicine whilst advocating this approach, ethics 
committees have been unwilling to support RCTs which deprive a potentially useful 
treatment, are unfeasible due to ‘difficulties with randomisation or recruitment’ 
(Sibbald and Roland, 1998, p.201) or due to the time and cost implications. Although 
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the police service seeks to create an evidence base to validate or justify its actions 
and responses; the ‘high impact-low probability’ nature of SbC incidents, where the 
state may potentially resort to utilising lethal force, is of such a moral, legal and 
ethical significance it would make this study unsuitable for a RCT (Sibbald and 
Roland, 1998).  
Consideration was given to using a singular qualitative or quantitative approach only. 
Whilst each may offer a focussed insight, this type of approach has been used within 
previous post-incident SbC studies. The aim of this research is to understand the use 
of force paradigm on a high-risk person within the E&W policing context. This 
requires analysis of use of force data and understanding the sample’s reaction to 
certain scenarios involving threat, risk or vulnerable subjects.  Whilst a singular 
approach would offer some contribution, it was discounted as this would not fully 
achieve the aims of this thesis. 
Therefore, the method adopted within this research consists of a survey questionnaire, 
utilised primarily as a data collection tool to quantitatively analyse responses and draw 
conclusions from them. This is a mixed methods approach, providing ‘methodological 
triangulation’, with both quantitative and qualitative approaches to concentrate on the 
same research topic.  Qualitative and quantitative approaches to research should not 
be considered at extreme ends of a scale, or in contrast to each other, but as 
‘different ends of a continuum’ (Cresswell, 2009, p.3); with the mixed methods 
approach in the centre of this range combining fundamental components from both 
methodologies. This enhances the benefits each qualitative or quantitative method 
offers, balancing the innate weaknesses within particular approaches against the 
strength of another. This triangulation approach also minimises researcher bias, 
increasing its validity and reliability (Creswell, 2009, p. 202). Each of the methods 
necessitate the inclusion of philosophical assumptions and definite methods or 
processes. 
This approach utilises a literature review to understand the issue, discuss existing 
theories, methodological approaches and examine gaps in knowledge. Quantitative 
analysis of use of force data will be used to develop understanding of frequencies, 
correlations and reliability. Quantitative analysis of the scenario-based survey 
questionnaire was utilised to offer a qualitative understanding of both the MPSUoF 
data and the research question. 
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3.4 Approach 
 
This section will discuss the design and rationale for the use of a mixed methods 
approach. As previously indicated, SbC may be termed as ‘high impact low probability’ 
type of incident, creating challenges to measure or research this phenomenon. SbC 
research is exceptionally limited and a variety of approaches have been employed to 
understand the phenomenon, each within differing social or policing models.  This 
thesis uses a literature review to frame understanding, examine current theory, 
research approaches and discuss knowledge gaps. Using Creswell’s (2009) 
framework, the purpose or study aim is used to specifically classify the intent, design, 
data collection and detail the rationale for using a particular research approach. This 
research design adapts Creswell (2009) explanatory sequential strategy as shown in 
Fig. 4.  
 
Figure 4. Explanatory Mixed Methods Sequential design (adapted from Creswell, 
2009 p. 211) 
Therefore, the purpose of this research is: 
Intent – The aim is to understand if there is a difference in ‘conflict’ 
decision-making between a STTO and an AFO. 
Design- An explanatory sequential mixed methods design was used, where 
quantitative and qualitative data were collected in sequence.  
In comparison to other designs e.g. parallel or embedded models and 
convergent designs, this sequentially phased approach requires equal time 
to collate and process any data within each phase, increasing the overall 
length of time to accomplish the task (Creswell, 2009; Morse, 1991). 
However, this may not always be the case, as a beneficial design 
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characteristic is using quantitative methods to simplify the approach and 
statistically analyse qualitative data to measure a phenomenon (Hendy, 
2019; Maruna, 2010).   
Data collection- A literature review was employed as a framework to 
understand existing theories, identify gaps in extant research and other 
research strategies. MPSUoF quantitative data was initially examined to 
inform the construction of a scenario-based survey questionnaire, which 
was used to explore an officer’s assessment of scenarios within their role 
specific functions. By comparing MPSUoF quantitative data in contrast 
with the survey questionnaire sample, statistical analysis was used to 
establish differences between the sample sub-groups in decision-making 
or use of force used on a PMI.  
Rationale - A singular research approach alone is insufficient to 
understand the phenomenon. The quantitative element contains a vast 
amount of MPS UoF data from interactions, but does not give context or 
expand upon an officer’s rationale. However, it does provide a reasonably 
objective overview of the association between the variables involved.  
By examining historical use of force data and using this to validate the 
survey questionnaire, this research aims to enhance understanding of the 
police response and UoF paradigm within in the E&W context. Therefore, 
this design approach gives an opportunity to present supplementary 
evidence; to articulate or refute associations between variables, interpret 
behaviours or significance within specific contexts and to develop 
understanding of any potential interconnections within the phenomenon.  
 
The following sequential phases were utilised: - 
 Literature review - a ‘non-committal literature review’ (Urquhart, 2013) was 
conducted to develop a qualitative framework; to understand existing theories 
and outline research methodologies which may be further developed within 
the E&W context. This identified knowledge gaps within existing research for 
consideration and development within subsequent phases.  
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 Data collection and analysis - The primary source of information is a published 
statistical database detailing MPS UoF interactions and utilising statistical data 
analysis this informed future research phases.   
 Collation and examination of data- giving equal emphasis to quantitative and 
qualitative data informs and gives focus to the compilation of the research 
survey questionnaire.  
 Interpretation of findings - this strategy is informative, where quantitative 
methods are interpreted and the results qualitatively analysed against the 
literature. The relevance of the literature review will be determined and if 
needed re-evaluated during this phase for application to the findings.  
 
With only four main phases the simplicity of this approach, with the ability to describe 
and report it present fundamental advantages. Utilising a mixed methods design 
permitted the comprehensive collation and examination of data, enabling a 
measurable narrative of UoF encounters to be produced whilst concurrently exploring 
theoretical concepts (Hendy, 2019). A balanced approach ‘increase[s] the 
interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of constructs and inquiry results by both 
capitalizing on inherent method strengths and counteracting inherent bias in methods 
and other sources’ (Greene et al., 1989, p.259). 
As explained earlier, this research utilises an amalgamation of methods to study the 
hypothetical base for tactical decision-making. The next section will discuss the 
quantitative phase. 
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3.5 Data  
Previous UoF and SbC related studies have used a variety of approaches to 
empirically study police interactions. Due to the dearth of research, the majority of 
studies are not contemporary and relate to international studies including; Best et al. 
(2004) (N=22) the only E&W SbC related case study reviewing police shootings, Lord 
(2000, 2001, 2012, 2014) (N=768) US based post incident study, with Hutson et al. 
(1998) (N=46) and Mohandie and Melot (2010, 2011) (N=55) a US based review of 
officer involved shootings (Appendix B).  
Within E&W, the police may lawfully use force and in rare circumstances this may be 
lethal. In 2017/18 it is conservatively estimated there were over three million public/ 
police interactions in the MPS8 (MPS, 2019). Not every police/public encounter will 
result in force being used, but where force is used, officers have a legal obligation to 
record that instance.   
UoF data is published by each of the 43 police forces within E&W. It collates any UoF 
by police irrespective of role i.e. unarmed, STTO or AFO into one dataset. This 
dataset has initially been selected due to its accessibility and availability to the 
researcher and although useful, this quantitative data alone does not add context or 
rationale to UoF incidents. The quality, validity and reliability of this published data 
will be discussed in section 3.5.2.  
In 2018/19 there were 132,410 recorded instances where MPS officers reported the 
use of force. The entire dataset is worthy of a future study. For the purpose of this 
thesis it will only be used to bring operational context to the research survey 
questionnaire, permitting a comparative analysis of unarmed versus armed paradigm 
and contrasting scale of tactical approaches.  
 
  
                                                 
8
 Estimated using aggregated call and body worn video data from MPS Force Management Statement (MPS, 
2018). 
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Figure 5 shows the MPS UoF dashboard summarising the type of data utilised within 
this study.  
Figure 5. MPS Use of Force data 2018/19 (MPS, 2019). 
The MPSUoF database contained 132,410 entries, with 272 fields, generating a 
potential 36m values. The MPSUoF data fields included: time, location, subject 
demographics, type of police duty, impact factors, UoF rationale, information relating 
to injury to subject or officer, physical or mental disabilities and outcome (Appendix 
C). For this analysis, utilising the raw published data the researcher coded and 
transferred the complete dataset onto IBM Statistical Program for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) (Appendix D). 
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3.5.1 Data Quality 
An assessment of the characteristics of any data must be made to establish its 
validity, reliability, usability and therefore its quality. The integrity of the data can be 
evaluated by its accuracy, consistency and legitimacy across the duration of the 
records (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Fowler, 2013). The quality and integrity of 
data can be assessed against its completeness, uniqueness, timeliness, validity, 
accuracy and consistency (Babbie, 1990; Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Fowler, 
2013).  
Completeness may be further defined, where all the significant variables or 
mandatory information are included and recorded (Wand and Wang, 1996). As each 
variable may not necessarily be relevant to the circumstances, there may be 
instances where data has not been entered. For example, missing data points and 
variables may have been omitted or, for unknown reasons not entered. The 
researcher has identified that some of the incidents listed within the sample are 
subject to a post incident procedure (PIP) investigation by the IOPC. As a result, due 
to ongoing legal and anonymity issues these were not recorded at the time by the 
officer using force. The MPS have acknowledged this matter and are implementing a 
solution to ensure this UoF data is recorded at the earliest possible opportunity 
(Nelson, 2018).  
Police officers are under a legal and ethical duty to record any use of force at that 
time. To administer recording accuracy; each record is examined by a supervisor 
before submission to a central panel for validity and consistency checks. Each MPS 
officer now wears body worn video (BWV) and must commence recording on route or 
arrival at an incident. Data is not collated on each interaction, however the 50k 
uploads of BWV per week give an indication of the volume of MPS encounters 
(MOPAC, 2018). Whilst not impossible, due to both internal and external scrutiny it is 
unlikely that a UoF encounter would not be recorded. It is therefore a working 
assumption the UoF dataset is largely reflective of MPS UoF encounters for 2018/19. 
Data validity and reliability are discussed in detail in section 3.5.2. 
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3.6 Data Analysis 
 
This section will summarise the quantitative data analysis techniques applied to 
examine the MPSUoF data and survey questionnaire. It will detail the rationale and 
various statistical tests applied to the examine the variables and groups. 
 
Using SPSS statistical software, descriptive statistics, such as frequency analysis 
and contingency tables were employed to understand the distribution of data; with 
inferential statistical tests used to explore relationships through t-tests, Spearman’s 
rank coefficient analysis and bivariate correlation.  This section will summarise the 
rationale and various statistical tests applied to the survey questionnaire, variables 
and groups. 
Where the survey questionnaire permitted a free text response, this section will 
discuss the qualitative analysis of open questions in the survey questionnaire.   
3.6.1 Parametric and non-parametric testing 
 
The type of data within this research has meant that consideration needs to be given 
to the nature of statistical tests applied. Where the data is continuous or scalar e.g. 
age, there is a potential for parametric tests to be used. To ensure reliability each test 
has assumptions where specific conditions must be met e.g. a t-test requires two 
normally distributed independent samples with homogeneity of variance.  
 
Where the data is ordinal, whilst this variable may convey qualitative meaning 
caution must be exercised when attempting to derive statistics from the results. 
There has been some debate regarding the application of parametric tests on ordinal 
data and the treatment of ordinal scale as a numerical value (Albaum, 1997; Harwell 
and Gatti, 2001; Knapp, 1990; Yusoff and Janor, 2014). However, within this thesis 
equivalent non-parametric or ‘distribution free’ tests have been applied. As they do 
not require normally distributed samples and have fewer validity conditions, they are 
considered more liberal. These tests may be used on ordinal or ranked data, with 
smaller sample sizes and, where the data is skewed, the central tendency may be 
better represented by the median.  
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Whilst the benefits of a non-parametric test may be initially be appreciated, the result 
is a loss of ‘efficiency’. Parametric tests are considered to have greater ‘statistical 
power’ to detect a significant effect and reject a hypothesis, with a lower probability 
value than a non-parametric equivalent. Where non-parametric tests are utilised on 
ordinal data within this thesis, caution will be taken in interpreting any results or 
subsequent associations. Whilst inferences may be drawn, without further research, 
the ordinal nature of the data does not permit statistical associations to be confirmed.   
 
3.6.2 Chi-Square test ( ) and Fishers Exact test 
 
The Chi-Square non-parametric statistical test may be utilised in two ways: 
 as a ‘test of independence’ to establish if the relationship in observed 
frequencies are a result of chance or the influence of another variable 
 testing the ‘goodness of fit’ to a model, through examining the data 
distribution to measure a between an observed and hypothesised expected 
value.  
 
Within this thesis, the Chi-Square test has been used in contingency tables to 
statistically approximate the difference in answers between groups e.g. AFO v STTO, 
and if this has occurred by chance or is the influence of another factor. Whilst Chi-
square is one of the simplest parametric tests to apply, there are conditions which 
limit its use. The sample data must be independent, contain at least 50 values with 
frequencies of 5 or more observations. If these conditions are not met, the  value 
will be misleading and the null hypothesis may be wrongly rejected. Academics argue 
whether there is a necessity to comply with some of these limiting factors; however, it 
is apparent these conditions may only be disregarded where the sample is 
sufficiently large e.g. >1000 and with an overall frequency in 20% of cells ≤5.  Where 
the sample did not meet the Chi-Square conditions needed to enable an accurate 
calculation, the Fishers exact test has been applied to examine the significance of 
the association. As it calculates the deviation from the null hypothesis exactly the 
Fishers exact test is more effective than the Chi-Square approximation test when 
using smaller samples. Both will be reported using the  symbol.  
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3.6.3 Mann-Whitney U test 
The survey questionnaire produced Likert type scale non-parametric ordinal data. As 
the assumptions for employing the t-test are not met; to statistically examine the data 
the Mann Whitney U test (M-WU) is utilised in order to compare each sample group 
e.g. do STTO and AFO responses differ? Whilst a t-test compares the means, the M-
WU test analyses the medians to rank the scores for each question across the 
groups and therefore the distribution of any scores does not affect the result. 
This test has set assumptions which are met for use in this thesis e.g. the sample 
taken from the population is random, they are mutually independent and an ordinal 
scale is used. If a statistically significant difference between the groups is identified, 
the mean (M), with direction of difference and standardized test score (z) will be 
reported to quantify the result (Pallant, 2016). As previously discussed, where 
comparison of the means is analysed, the results should be treated with caution 
given the nature of the ordinal data. 
      
3.6.4 Correlation 
 
Where police officers may employ or deliberately not utilise tactics at their disposal, a 
statistical analysis enables a comparison between the STTO and AFO response. 
Two types of statistical correlations have been performed to determine the strength 
and direction of any relationship; and dependant on the type of data either may be 
used or reported within this thesis.  
 
Both methods report values from +1 to -1, where zero is no correlation and indicate 
the positive or negative direction of any association between variables or groups. For 
continuous interval type data, Pearson product movement correlation coefficient (r) 
was utilised to define any linear relationship and the strength between the variables. 
Initial analysis was conducted to ensure the normal distribution of data, it was linear 
and examined for homoscedasticity. 
 
Several survey questions required participants to rank their response to a scenario 
and place in order the tactics which may been used during an encounter. Although 
the Pearson product-moment correlation would normally be applied to interval or ratio 
data, where any Pearson correlation assumptions are violated e.g. not normally 
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distributed, the alternative nonparametric test would be applied. The Spearman 
Rank-Order correlation coefficient was utilised to analyse any ordinal nonparametric 
data and subsequently define any monotonic relationship. Where any ranked 
variables had ‘ties’ or equal values, to enhance confidence in the p-value the full 
Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation coefficient (rho or rs) formula was utilised. 
(Kinnear and Gray, 1999; Pallant, 2016; Clef, 2013; Rees, 2000).  
 
 
3.6.5 Significance, Effect size and shared variance 
 
The significance level (p-value) indicates how much confidence may be placed in the 
results, whereas the r-value (r, rho or rs) defines the strength of any relationship. The 
sample size may influence the p-value; if it is small i.e. n=30 there may be moderate 
correlations that do not have any statistical significance at the p<.05 level, whereas 
for large samples n=>100, a smaller correlation where r= .2 may attain statistical 
significance. Any positive or negative effect size (r value) will be reported using the 
Cohen (1988, pp.79-81) guidelines:  
Small   r = .10 to .29  
Medium  r =.30 to .49  
Large  r = .5 to 1.0   
 
Squaring the r-value enables a calculation of the ‘coefficient of determination’ and 
defines the percentage of shared variance between two variables.  
 
3.6.6 Grouped frequency analysis 
Some published data is set within grouped tables, aggregating the frequencies and 
classifying them for presentation. The survey questionnaire has also gathered data, 
which using the Likert scale, has grouped some of the demographic information from 
the sample. Both reduce the ability to analyse raw data therefore, where appropriate, 
an estimated mean and median from the grouped data have been calculated to 
comparatively analyse this data between the sample and population.  
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3.6. Type I and Type II errors 
 
Statistical tests are utilised to understand the real-world condition if there is an ‘effect’ 
within the population. As the p-value is established on probability, where a result 
indicates statistical significance, it may not be mathematically possible to validate a 
research hypothesis with complete certainty i.e. 100%; therefore, there will always be 
a probability of reaching an incorrect assumption when accepting or rejecting the null 
hypothesis (H0).  
 
A Type I error or ‘false positive’ occurs when a true null hypothesis is incorrectly 
rejected and findings are reported as significant, when they actually occurred by 
chance.  The probability of a Type I error is represented by the alpha level (α) and 
the p-value below which the null hypothesis is rejected. Conventionally, the 
probability of making a Type I error and rejecting the null hypothesis has a p-value of 
0.05 (or 5%). For example, presuming there is no effect in the population, where a 
test is conducted 100 times, it may be expected that on five occasions a large 
enough test statistic is generated to believe there was a genuine effect, when in fact 
there was not. To reduce the possibility of a Type I error, the p-value may be 
decreased e.g. p-value of 0.01 would denote a 1% probability of committing a Type I 
error.  However, the implication of using a lower alpha level also reduces the 
probability of identifying a true difference if one really exists and risking a Type II 
error by accepting the null hypothesis. 
Type II or ‘false negative’ error occur where a null hypothesis is not rejected when it 
is actually false e.g. when a researcher incorrectly assumes there is not a significant 
effect, when there really is one. Cohen (1992) suggests the maximum acceptable 
probability for a Type II error (Beta or β-level) is 0.2 (or 20%). For example, if 100 
samples taken from a population in which an effect exists, the consequence of a 
Type II error is the effect would not be detected in 20 samples, or 1 in 5 valid effects.  
 
The chances of committing these errors are inversely proportional e.g. decreasing 
Type I error rate increases the probability of a Type II error rate. However, Howell, 
(2012) argues as the relationship between the two errors is not based upon the same 
assumption e.g. Type I there has to be no effect in the population, whereas Type II 
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the opposite is true and an effect has been missed, and therefore the exact 
relationship is normally left to the researcher to decide. 
 
It is acknowledged that the use of multiple bivariate tests may increase the likelihood 
of a Type I error. In reducing the probability of accepting an affect as genuine i.e. 
making α smaller, the researcher considered this may increase the probability of 
rejecting a genuine effect and producing a Type II error. Therefore, in considering 
this the statistical analysis utilised within this thesis will be the conventional criterion 
p-value of 0.05 (or 5%) throughout.  
 
 
 
3.6.8 Qualitative response analysis 
 
The design of the survey draft is detailed (3.8.2) where the use of qualitative and 
quantitative question styles were considered.  
It is acknowledged the construction of the questionnaire survey means it is primarily 
utilised as a quantitative data collection tool, with a number of open-ended questions 
for clarification at the end. Whilst using a combination of methods permits concurrent 
examination of a problem, it reduces the researcher’s ability to use a single software 
solution e.g. SPSS or NViVO. To examine the open-ended questions a number of 
methods were considered to ensure the data was correctly captured and to reduce 
the time burden for the researcher (Braun and Clarke, 2013; Creswell, 2009; 
Denscombe, 2007; Morris and Mathers, 2009).  
The Bristol Online Survey portal was used as the primary questionnaire survey data 
input tool and on completion of surveying participants their Likert and free text 
responses were automatically collated within a MS Excel sheet format.  
For the qualitative responses, the researcher manually examined and coded each 
free text response within the Excel sheet for analysis (Appendix G). Initially, ‘open’ 
codes were attached to each response line to classify what the data may be 
indicating. Aware of researcher subjectivity in assigning codes to each response the 
process was both iterative and reflective. In examining the quality of responses ‘data 
saturation’ was achieved, which may be defined as where “no new information or 
themes are observed in the data” (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson, 2006, p. 59), 
Nicholas FRANCIS 
 
56 
indicating to the researcher that data collection may cease (Faulkner and Trotter, 
2017). Once an initial pass was completed the researcher reviewed the entire set of 
responses again to assess the quality and accuracy of the assigned open codes, and 
where needed amended them to ensure consistency. 
At the time of coding, it was apparent that some participants responses were not 
confined to answering the survey question and whilst minimal in number they 
appeared to utilising the survey as a cathartic method of highlighting another issue. 
Following completion of the open coding process, as this research was created to 
examine an emerging subject with a limited sample size, and whilst no new themes 
were identified, caution should to be paid to any claim of ‘total’ saturation. Each 
response has been retained and the researcher may consider to utilise those which 
were out of scope for this research within a future study.  On completion of the open 
coding process, each were grouped into larger ‘selective’ codes to categorise the 
data. This process is presented in the Findings (Chapter 4). 
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3.7 Survey questionnaire study 
Selection of the appropriate method to collate data is central to achieve the aim and 
assist in answering the research question. Consideration of other methods was given 
and whilst every method has its positive attributes, there are also limiting factors in 
their use. The research survey questionnaire is located in Appendix E.   
A survey questionnaire was chosen for this research for a number of reasons.  As the 
this can be delivered remotely, it is considered an impartial, efficient method, with 
potentially a broader reach.  In comparison with other more time intensive 
approaches, a survey questionnaire can be used to collate both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a more efficient way for subsequent thematic and statistical 
evaluation (Braun and Clark, 2006; Buckingham and Saunders, 2004; Cockcroft et 
al., 2018). This approach enables the research process to be easily reproduced, is 
the most practicable means of collating data from a large quantity of participants and 
reduces researcher influence or bias (Cockcroft et al., 2018; May, 2011).  
As a cost and time efficient method, initial consideration was given to conducting an 
electronic survey questionnaire of staff and to mobilize interest this could be 
conducted over several ‘waves or phases’ (Denscombe, 2007). However, a resultant 
effect of the ‘interview society’ is survey fatigue or participant apathy, which affects 
the overall completion rate (Baruch and Holtom, 2008; Kaplowitz, Hadlock and 
Levine, 2004; Silverman, 1993). Regularly inundated with a variety of work-based 
survey questionnaires, especially when combined with an active or demanding role, 
this may arguably be a contributory factor in low completion rates. Whilst survey 
fatigue or completion rate may have negative impact upon this approach; where 
police officers are offered anonymity, it creates an environment where they are freely 
able give open and honest responses (Bradburn et al., 2004; Cockcroft et al., 2018).  
One important purpose of a survey questionnaire is to sample the population and 
enable statistically correct inferences to be drawn from it. By using a properly defined 
and structured instrument, with a validated scale, it enables the collection of data 
relating to a specific research area. This permits statistical tests to validate the 
results and ensure they are characteristic, justifiable and a reliable representation of 
the sample (Creswell, 2009; Forza, 2002). A limitation of this survey questionnaire 
approach is there is only one instrument to collate data. The ability to alter the style, 
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question phrasing or to develop upon a valid line of enquiry with the participant is 
removed. There appears a higher probability of a wrong response in self-
administered survey questionnaires due to misinterpreting the question and a lack of 
personal interaction may also impact on the completion rate (Ivankova, 2015).   
This research survey questionnaire aims to establish whether there is a difference in 
response to a set of circumstances between STTO and AFO sub-groups, understand 
any variation and analyse it. The survey questionnaire design enables responses to 
be statistically measured; to assess heuristic and behavioural characteristics, 
commonality of tactical response between groups, examination of the subject’s ‘role’ 
within a conflict situation and understand the influence training or equipment may 
have. In contrast to the electronic delivery method, a benefit of surveying the sample 
whilst at a training centre is they are in a position to complete the survey 
questionnaire immediately and not defer it (Selinsky, 2015).  
In summary, to meet the aims within the timeframe, the researcher believed this 
strategy enhances the ‘feasibility, practicability and validity’ of this research (Francis, 
2000, p.42). 
Defining the population and sample group. 
 
The MPS workforce comprises of 30,390 police officers and 28,953 are operationally 
deployable (Home Office, 2018a). Consideration was given to surveying all MPS 
police officers. However, to maximise understanding, the researcher refined this to 
the operational STTO and AFO qualified police officers who had received additional 
training and were potentially experienced in the use of force beyond a ‘traditional’ 
unarmed police officer. In selecting this group, the researcher considered this sample 
may provide a greater depth of knowledge or information to realise the research 
objectives. Additionally, in using this sample they could understand and relate to the 
topic area more easily, providing informed operational based judgements compared 
to those in a non-operational role e.g. office-based support staff (Silverman, 2016). 
Within the MPS a proportion of officers are trained in the use of Conducted Electronic 
Devices (CED), commonly referred to as ‘TASER’ (Table 1).  
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Table 1. MPS STTO trained population (MPS, 2019; Home Office, 2018a). 
 
Therefore, the potential population or ‘sampling frame’ (Honness, 2015, p.29) for this 
research was 4889 MPS STTO trained officers; comprising of 2369 ‘unarmed’ STTO 
and 2520 AFOs who have TASER as an additional ‘less lethal’ option (Home Office, 
2018a; MPS, 2018b).  
 
3.71 Survey questionnaire sampling method  
 
Each participant was STTO trained and had been notified by their manager to attend 
either mandatory refresher training or a course, naturally dividing the population into 
groups or ‘clusters’. Each officer had an ability to either self-select or deselect their 
attendance at training and this sample was drawn at a particular point in time when 
each participant was present at the training centre. Therefore, this may be may be 
considered a simple form of ‘random cluster sampling’, selecting desirable 
characteristics of a population to meet the objective of the study and in the context of 
this research brings some additional benefits (Bryman, 2008, Buchanan and Bryman, 
2009). As MPS officers are geographically spread across London, STTO trained 
officers are brought together into groups for mandatory training by a central unit. This 
produced a mix of staff with differing skill levels e.g. STTO or AFO and experiences, 
where each group or ‘clusters’ were then requested to participate in this research. 
Each member of the STTO population had an equivalent probability of being chosen 
to form part of the sample group on that day. Whilst this type of sampling is 
considered more time or cost effective and logistically feasible; it also requires 
greater sample sizes and is not considered as precise as a truly random or 
systematic random sample (Bryman, 2008, Buchanan and Bryman, 2009; Creswell 
and Poth, 2017).  
 
To minimise self-selection bias, the survey questionnaires were conducted over a 
range of days and during several weeks in February and March 2019. In minimising 
selection bias this type of sampling process may be considered a reliable method to 
Population Sample
(n ) (n )
 'Unarmed' STTO 2,369 74 3.12%
AFO 2,520 241 9.56%
Total STTO population 4889 315 6.44%
MPS STTO trained % Pop.
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gather information; it augments internal and external validity, enabling any results to 
be considered representative of the whole population (Buchanan and Bryman, 2009; 
Bryman, 2008; Morris and Mathers, 2008). However, caution is required to ensure 
the sample is truly demonstrative and appropriately random to permit legitimate 
assumptions to be drawn (Bryman, 2008; Morse, 2010).  
 
The survey questionnaire was offered to 320 officers and completed by 315 (98.4% 
response rate), representing 6.48% of the available STTO population. Whilst this 
may appear low, it could be considered valid and representative. At a 95% 
confidence level, the population parameter for this sample (n=315) produced a 
margin of error or confidence interval of 5.349. For example, if the arithmetic mean 
calculation or true value to a particular question was 32%; with 95% confidence, the 
answer would be within 5.34% and therefore between 27.34% and 37.24%. It is 
argued, this sample may be considered characteristic of the population and 
subsequent conclusions may be believed to be valid.  
 
  
                                                 
9
 Calculated using ‘Sample Size Calculator’ (Creative Research Systems, 2012. Available at http://www.survey 
questionnairesystem.com/sscalc.html. Accessed 04/06/19) 
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3.8 Survey design and construction 
Whilst a survey questionnaire is a systematic method to generate a sizeable quantity 
of data, a limitation is the ability to check, explain, probe or examine the veracity of 
responses (Denscombe, 2007; Frith and Gleeson, 2008). The research survey 
questionnaire is contained within Appendix E.  
3.8.1 Likert scale 
 
The survey questionnaire utilises the Likert scale to gather responses and develop 
understanding of a participant’s assessment or opinion. This popular scale is is 
simple to configure, creating a robust scale that offers improved reliability for an 
equivalent number of scale items (Cummins and Gallone, 2000; Page-Bucci, 2003; 
Tittle and Hill, 1967). Whilst the question design and Likert anchors enhance the 
scale responsiveness and validity, consideration must also be given to the scale 
range. 
 
As a scale range increases, its sensitivity and therefore accuracy to record a greater 
variance in response increases (Diefenbach et al.,1993). This increased scale 
moderates skew effect and ‘extreme score bias’, reducing inhibited responses 
created by insufficient scalar points (Dawes, 2007, Finstad, 2010). Arguably, whilst 
larger scales may be more accurate, the difference is not statistically significant with 
a diminishing reliability return (Dawes, 2007; Nunally, 1978; Revilla et al.,2014). 
Dawes (2007) further argues 5, 7 or 11 point scale are comparable as each display a 
similar kurtosis or skewness characteristics and ‘no scale format produced data with 
markedly lower variance about the mean’ (Dawes, 2007, p.75). 
 
While some participants are consciously aware of their opinion, others have yet to 
consider or form a view on it. Research indicates a ‘don’t know’ or ‘not applicable’ 
option may be selected even if participants have an opinion (Bishop et al., 1983; 
Schuman and Presser, 1981). Influencing factors include limited information within 
question or Likert anchors, the participant’s ability to process the information or even 
time restrictions.  Contrasting the burden of a considered response to choosing the 
effortless option, ‘satisficing’ creates a loss of data (Kronsick et al., 2002). 
Conversely, where participants are consciously unaware of their opinion, they may 
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still support one viewpoint and by omitting the ‘don’t know’ option it encourages a 
decisive response (Bradburn & Sudman, 1988).  
 
Reviewing the literature and supervisor feedback the researcher considered including 
a ‘not applicable’ option for selected questions (Converse, 1964; 1970; Krosnick et 
al., 2002; Oppenheim, 1992). Police officers will, in the right circumstances, freely 
communicate their opinion (Reiner, 2010; Selisny, 2015; Waddington, 1999). 
However, the researcher considered this may also inhibit an officer’s ability to 
accurately communicate tactical responses; therefore, by including this ‘not 
applicable’ option, it increases validity by preventing participants being compelled to 
select an inappropriate response. 
 
As officers were surveyed during mandatory training attendance, there were practical 
time constraints considered during the design of the survey questionnaire. 
Completing a larger scale survey questionnaire is considered more challenging and 
time consuming. Acknowledging the benefits of a larger scale; in smaller sample 
sizes, data distributed across this larger range may reduce the effective quantity 
required for some statistical tests. This may necessitate an aggregation process to 
group the sample into suitable quantities for analysis, effectively rendering the 
rationale for choosing a larger scale invalid. 
 
3.8.2 Survey draft 
Using a standardised question and style approach prevents the influence of personal 
or other factors which may ‘contaminate’ the results (Denscombe, 2007). To increase 
completion rate and reduce issues created by poor questions, phrasing or layout, the 
survey questionnaire and instructions were proof read by peers and the researcher 
prior to use (Braun and Clarke, 2013).  
The use of both open ended and closed qualitative or quantitative question styles 
was considered within the draft, allowing the participant to enter free text qualitative 
detail where necessary. Whilst this combines two methods concurrently to examine a 
problem, it does not permit answers to be easily coded within a singular software 
solution e.g. SPSS or NViVO, increasing the time factor for the researcher (Braun 
and Clarke, 2013; Creswell, 2009; Denscombe, 2007; Morris and Mathers, 2009).  
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By examining other comparable research and using the literature review, an initial 
draft survey questionnaire was developed to meet the research objectives.  
 
The survey questions were adapted from Hendy (2019) (Appendix I), a study into the 
use of force in New Zealand and modified by the researcher for the E&W policing 
context. Hendy’s (2019) research studied the effect of conflict and coercive resolution 
methods as the New Zealand police transitioned from an unarmed to an armed 
service. In comparison with other international studies, the New Zealand system 
identified closer with the E&W policing context. Adapting Hendy’s (2019) study, this 
developed a framework for a draft survey questionnaire, examining the response to a 
variety of scenarios and analysing the behavioural, situational or conflict stimulus 
characteristics of the sample.  
The draft survey questionnaire was tested on officers (n=10), with feedback 
assessing suitability for content and question style. Revisions were made to 
moderate the complexity and survey questionnaire length. Acknowledging the survey 
questionnaire may be considered challenging to complete, in comparison with other 
approaches, the use of a detailed questionnaire and greater number of participants 
was considered necessary to achieve the research aims.  
The aim in using a mixed method approach is to minimise any limitations and 
therefore required the survey design to permit the participant to provide the fullest 
possible answer (Barnett, 2002; Bell, 2010; Bryman, 2008). The choice of survey 
questions was based upon the central research and sub-questions; to examine police 
decision making and understand the officer’s use of force in a range of scenarios, 
and this is discussed in the next section.  
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3.8.3 Question structure and rationale 
 
This section will discuss the structure and rationale for adopting questions within the 
research survey questionnaire, which is contained in Appendix E. 
 
A number of demographic questions (Q1 to Q13) were set in this survey 
questionnaire to establish if certain factors affected an answer or opinion. By collating 
demographic data and comparing a number of the demographic features of the 
sample with the population it also provides a rudimentary check on the validity and 
reliability of the sampling method.  
 
A range of the most encountered ‘everyday’ role related tasks the sample group 
could be expected to perform were analysed.  Using the Likert scale to score 
satisfaction Q14 to Q16 sought to understand the reaction or relationship to a 
stimulus or conflict situation and whether this met any established behavioural 
typology for police officers (Hendy, 2019; Hochstedler, 1981; Muir, 1977). Where 
officers spontaneously respond to a developing incident, Q17 and Q18 intended to 
analyse the heuristic or behavioural characteristics which may influence decision 
making or subsequently contributed to their proficiency in resolving conflict (Bayley & 
Garofalo 1989; Braithwaite 1998; Hendy, 2019). Q19 to Q21 sought to identify 
commonality of tactical responses between groups, positive or negative implications 
of certain strategies or approaches and identify any limitations.  
 
The literature review identified the subject’s role within a conflict situation and how 
the label or language used to denote a subject may affect the officer’s response; 
especially if there is a change in status from witness to suspect, or conversely if 
reversed (Hendy, 2019; Lipsky, 1980; Snipes and Mastrofski, 1990). Therefore, Q21 
analyses the response to conflict and whether this differs between sample groups 
when presented by a witness, victim or an offender. 
 
Continuing, the next four questions (Q22-Q25) each presents a scenario which 
increases in scale of threat or risk, either presented by an individual or towards 
another. This was used to define and understand the scaled response but also 
enable analysis between the groups. Using the National Decision Model tactical 
options as a basis, it required the participant to rank the tactical response option 
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chosen in order of use (College of Policing, 2019). In Q22 the subject was defined as 
a ‘suspect’ and in Q23 as a ‘victim’. This format was repeated for questions Q24 and 
Q25, however the question was reversed, requesting participants to only select 
options not utilised. This was used to statistically verify if there was any inconsistency 
when compared to questions Q22 and Q23 (Hendy, 2019; Lipsky 1980; Snipes and 
Mastrofski, 1990). 
 
The final question (Q26) comprised of four sub-questions used to identify issues 
training or equipment enabling direct examination between the groups. This also 
permitted a comparison with other questions, enabling associations to be made 
which may have an influence on decision making or ability in resolving conflict e.g. 
training or equipment. 
 
3.9 Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity will inform how suitable a test is within a specific context, whilst reliability 
suggests how dependable a test result is.  
  
Validity refers to an objective ability to test the credibility of a characteristic and 
measure the analytical claims made about it. There is not a single measure of validity 
for a scale, but the construct, criterion and content are some of the methods used to 
analyse its validity (Cresswell, 2017; Creswell and Poth, 2017; Denzin and Lincoln, 
2011; Silverman, 2016). The intention of the survey questionnaire is to examine 
police decision making and understand an individual’s use of force in specific 
circumstances. Using correlation to analyse internal consistency of the responses, 
where participant’s answer questions in a constant manner it can establish construct 
validity. The survey questionnaire broadly examines the role satisfaction, motivation 
to intervene in an incident and training level for each group; with the majority of 
questions focussing on role related responses to a number of escalating scenarios. 
By examining these behaviours and measuring the difference in responses due to 
role, training or equipment, it provides content related validity.  
 
Based upon responses, this research seeks to identify and measure any difference 
between the sample sub-groups. Statistically testing the responses to identical 
scenarios between the groups enables any relationship between sub-groups to be 
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understood and confirms the underlying criterion-related validity. The survey 
questionnaire broadly compares the role satisfaction, motivation to intervene in an 
incident and training level for each sub-group; the focus of the survey questionnaire 
was upon role related responses to a number of escalating scenarios. By examining 
these behaviours and establishing if there is a difference in responses due to role, 
training or equipment, it provides content related validity. 
 
Reliability indicates the consistency of an instrument in measuring an attribute. This 
may be determined by the amount of stability displayed when the test is replicated in 
identical circumstances or how unconstrained it is from random error. There are a 
number of methods to examine this, including retesting participants on different 
occasions using the same scale, alternating the scale wording or through the use of 
‘internal consistency’ measurement of attributes; and then establishing a correlation 
coefficient to statistically evaluate the reliability of any scale used. An instrument with 
a higher internal consistency reliability coefficient implies the test scale is 
homogeneous and comparable to the content of other items within it (Cresswell, 
2017; Creswell and Poth, 2017; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Pallant, 2016; Silverman, 
2016). 
The Chronbach’s Alpha () test was utilised to provide a statistical indication for the 
internal consistency reliability coefficient of scale elements within this survey 
questionnaire. Although this measures how the items complement each other, it 
underestimates the lower bound for the true reliability. Whilst there are other 
estimators, Chronbach’s Alpha is a less complex indicator to employ when the scale 
elements are larger. There is debate about the actual Chronbach’s Alpha value 
required for particular sample and scale sizes; lower scores may be defined ‘good’ 
(participants <100, scales <10 items), however within this thesis a =0.7 score value 
is utilised as a minimum to indicate the stability of each set of questions (Briggs and 
Cheek, 1986; DeVillis, 2012; Heppner et al. 1992; Kaplan and Saccuzzo 1997; 
Nunnally, 1978). 
To understand and measure any relationship between STTO and AFO this research 
seeks to statistically test the responses to identical scenarios between the sub-
groups. This process will confirm the underlying criterion-related validity.  
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3.10 Ethical concerns 
This study respected the research ethical values, established by the British Society of 
Criminology within the Code of Ethics approved by the Institute of Criminology 
Research Ethics Committee.  
An Ethics application was submitted in accordance with stringent guidance set by the 
Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) Faculty Board. This submission was 
compliant with the relevant British Society of Criminology Code of Ethics (2015). This 
research received initial approval from CCCU Faculty Board on 5th November 2018 
(Appendix F).  
3.10.1 Organisational and Individual Informed consent 
The researcher completed an Information Sharing Agreement (ISA) between the 
MPS and CCCU. This detailed requirements for accessing MPS data and outlined 
the timescales and dissemination of research findings. Specifically addressing data 
security, GDPR and FOIA arrangements, the agreement was signed by the MPS, 
CCCU and the researcher.   
Following CCCU Ethics protocols, during attendance at the training centre each 
officer was given a verbal briefing detailing the extent of the research.  Each 
participant confirmed their individual voluntary participation, by completing a 
Participant Information Sheet and separate ‘opt-in’ CCCU consent form. This process 
met British Society of Criminology Code of Ethics protocols.  
The researcher maintained a secure master register within an encrypted file, 
allocating a unique reference number (URN) to each survey questionnaire and 
removed the consent form with the participants name. This enabled an ‘opt-out’ 
process, permitting an officer to subsequently have their survey questionnaire 
responses removed from the dataset at any stage.  
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3.11.2 Role Conflict 
 
The researcher is aware of their ethical positioning in conducting this study. There is 
a likelihood that some participants have worked with the researcher in a previous 
professional capacity and how this may influence the outcome (Braun and Clarke, 
2013; Garton and Copeland, 2013). However, to demonstrate transparency or 
prevent coercion any contact was organised via senior MPS managers. To create the 
correct environment the researcher wore civilian clothing. No reference was made to 
the researchers rank and only first names were used. This aimed to minimise the 
impact of any previous working relationship, enabling the participant to express their 
thoughts freely and not give any answer they perceived the researcher wanted 
(McLeod, 2007).  
 
3.11.3 Data Protection and Storage 
 
This research was subject to a specifically authorised ISA and Research permission 
protocol between the MPS and CCCU. The MPS legally held this data granting 
express permission for it to be utilised for the purpose of this research. The data was 
accessed and processed in the manner agreed within the ISA, cognisant of GDPR 
and FOIA requirements. The ‘raw’ MPS electronic record data related to TASER, 
Baton Gun and Firearms discharges. The data was processed with fields extracted 
from MPS systems onto an Excel sheet for subsequent analysis using SPSS 
software. Any personal data was redacted with only the URN retained to permit a 
more detailed examination of the record if required. Transfers or storage away from 
the MPS system, were conducted in accordance within the MPS agreement. No 
paper copies were created. 
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3.13.4 Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
This is vital and significantly important. With the exception of force and role, no data 
identifying any officer concerned in the use of force or any other individual who 
completes a survey questionnaire will be disclosed, without a specific requirement to 
reveal and only with explicit authorisation. A full risk assessment was compiled, 
assessed by the researcher’s academic supervisor and authorised the CCCU head 
of department. With the exception to the sensitivities referred to previously, there 
were no anticipated physical risks to any person involved in this research. 
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3.12 Limitations and Assumptions  
3.12.1 Researcher Bias 
This research will be analysed within the context and culture of policing within United 
Kingdom. This has a democratic system of government where by consent the 
population is policed by a largely unarmed service within the law and legal principles.  
The insider role enabled valuable relationships with the MPS and officers to be 
developed easier than an outsider. In comparison with an outside researcher, whilst 
officers may be candid with an experienced peer, they may not fully explain 
experiences or actions in sufficient detail. To reduce personal bias or subjectivity, a 
pre-prepared rationale was read out to participants prior to commencing the survey 
questionnaire. As a serving police officer, it is acknowledged personal beliefs may 
affect this research, but may also be ‘interpreted through the researcher's frame’ 
(Brown, 1996, p.16). Therefore, by ascribing meaning to the elements of any data 
and then determining, whether consciously or unconsciously the relevance and 
importance of it, it may always have an element of subjectivity.  
As the researcher became close to the data and literature relating to this study, any 
judgement or assessments were left to the researcher to make. In selecting data to fit 
personalised pre-existing theories, opinions or presumptions; that subjectivity or bias 
may influence the inclusion or exclusion of data or literature, to balance a particular 
theory or evidence favoured by the researcher and therefore compromise the validity 
of it (Brown, 1996; Maxwell, 2012; Mehra, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
As part of the insider-outsider dilemma, ethical integrity is an essential trait to 
maintain the validity of any research. As an insider conducting research, it is critical 
to maintain credible objectivity; not manipulating data to fit a research objective or 
individual bias, but using the context to understand and enable valued accurate 
judgements of what is ‘seen and heard’ (Brown, 1986; Maxwell, 2005; Mehra, 2002). 
Whilst there may be personal, situational or cultural influences present, removing 
them entirely is almost impossible (Maxwell, 2005). The researcher recognises the 
influence bias has on the objective interpretation of data and subsequent impact this 
has on validity.  
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Particular to law enforcement or use of force, specific operational components may 
require judgment by the researcher and their experience was viewed as an asset to 
assist this study. Characterised as researcher subjectivity, as an ‘insider’ it may be 
difficult to remain totally objective in navigating through complex information or 
context which otherwise may not be understood. The research methodology and use 
of a survey questionnaire provide additional benefits, by removing the subjectivity in 
interpreting answers and use of statistical data analysis.  
3.12.2 Limitations and Assumptions within this Research 
The scope and interpretation of any research questions may be considered a 
limitation of any study. The research intention was to understand whether there was 
a difference in decision making and subsequent use of force between the groups in 
dealing with a PMI.  Whilst the survey questionnaire approach was limited by the 
question style, as discussed earlier a benefit was the removal of researcher 
subjectivity. By employing this balanced approach, it aimed to generate a broader 
understanding of the officer’s decision-making process through statistical analysis.  
 
Whilst statistical correlations may be calculated, without further examination causal 
associations cannot be assumed. The significant amount of MPSUoF quantitative 
data limits contextual understanding of the encounter and range of tactical options 
utilised or discounted. The analysis of the MPSUoF dataset is constrained by the 
variable fields and quality of data recorded within it. The quality and completeness of 
the MPS dataset is reliant on working practices or policies, some of which may have 
previously resulted in certain variables not being recorded. The introduction of an 
electronic version, requiring entries in specific fields, appears to have minimised the 
quantity of missing variables. When combined with enhanced internal and external 
public scrutiny, it is considered improbable a use of force encounter would not be 
recorded.   
To enhance the validity, the researcher evaluated their own processes against 
comparable studies to benchmark consistency (Waddington et al., 2009). Assisted by 
the officers voluntary participation, after answering the survey questionnaire they 
consciously engaged with the researcher on the subject matter. Officers willingness 
to understand the phenomenon may be considered beneficial to the integrity of the 
research and therefore enhancing the validity of it. 
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The time-consuming nature of a sequential design approach may create difficulties 
for the researcher, especially during the qualitative phase to interpret complicated or 
unclear results and relate these to the quantitative findings. Due to time constraints, it 
was not feasible to test any findings within a controlled environment e.g. training. 
This provides future research opportunities to analyse officer performance during 
scenario-based incidents and enhance training curriculum or policy. A working 
hypothesis is there is not a significant difference in STTO and AFO performance their 
role (Garcia, 2003; Kakar, 2002; Nickel, 2015; Waddington, 2009). Role specific 
functions may limit an officer’s operational capability and subsequently any response 
to threat or risk may slightly differ. 
 
The next section will present the findings from the qualitative survey questionnaire 
and analysis of the MPS use of force quantitative data.   
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4. Findings and Analysis 
 
This thesis is seeking to examine the UoF on a vulnerable ‘high risk’ subject, in 
mental crisis and be presenting a threat to themselves or another. Where the risk of 
harm presented by that subject is significant, police may have to use force and on 
rare occasions this may be lethal.  
 
This thesis comparatively analyses UoF by the sample sub-groups. This first section 
of this chapter will report the findings of the research survey questionnaire. Officers 
motivation and behavioural reaction to conflict stimulus and the effectiveness of any 
tactical response will be categorised. Using the research survey questionnaire, it will 
seek to understand how officers develop an operational proficiency to resolve 
conflict. The second section will analyse the MPSUoF dataset. The research findings 
will be discussed and contrasted against existing literature in Chapter 5. 
 
Where appropriate, hypothesis tests will be employed to test for significant statistical 
differences between the STTO and AFO sub-groups e.g. arithmetic mean. Therefore, 
within this analysis, the null hypothesis (Ho) states there is no difference in the 
response between STTO and AFO trained officers; whilst the alternate hypothesis 
(H1) is there is a difference between the sample groups. Only ‘statistically significant’ 
results will be reported, analysed and interpreted within this section. The specific 
tests applied to the data are detailed within the statistical analysis section (3.10). All 
test results are reproduced within Appendix G. 
 
4.1 Demographic Analysis 
 
The survey questionnaire requested participants demographic data to analyse the 
sample for representativeness against the STTO population. Comparing the 
demographic features also enables a rudimentary check on the random nature of the 
sampling method, comparison between groups and analysis of variation between 
them. The Home Office (2018b) publishes limited police workforce demographic 
data, which reduced the ability to directly compare against the sample. Wherever 
possible MPS data will be used and if this is unavailable relevant E&W data will be 
used a proxy for comparison to the sample.  
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4.1.1 Gender, Rank and Ethnicity 
Through the MPS Information Sharing Agreement the researcher accessed STTO 
demographic data. Whilst this is fragmented over a number of databases the quality 
of the data appears complete and is considered of sufficient quality for use as a valid 
comparator.  
 
Gender: MPS data indicates the STTO population of Male officers is 85% (n=4141) 
and Female offices is 14.9% (n=728) (MPS, 2019a). In comparison, the research 
sample was 96% Male (STTO n=66, AFO n=236) and 3% Female (STTO n=3, AFO 
n=6) officers. It is unclear whether the sample itself or general limited representation 
of women within this type of specialist role supports both anecdotal information and 
extant research of this issue (Brown and Sargent, 1995). However, Home Office data 
indicates that 27% of MPS officers are Female with only 7% the proportion of Female 
AFOs is significantly lower in comparison to the MPS workforce (Home Office, 2018; 
MPS, 2019a). The sample appears over-represented by Male and under-represented 
by Female officers.  
 
Rank: Survey participants indicated that 91% were Constable (n=283) rank, 7% were 
Sergeant (n=23) and 2% Inspector rank (n=5). MPS STTO population data 10 
indicates the following percentage at each rank; 89.1% Constable (n=4324), 
Sergeant 6% (n=290) and 1% Inspector (n=47) (MPS, 2019a). The sample appears 
representative of the MPS STTO population for rank.  
 
Ethnicity: The proportion of BME officers within the sample was 9.2% (n=29). MPS 
STTO data indicates the population is comprised of 79.1% White (n=3830), 7.2% 
declared as BME (n=351) with 13.7% not stating their self-defined ethnicity (n=663) 
(MPS, 2019a). In comparison, 14.2% of the MPS workforce are defined as BME 
(Home Office, 2018). The sample appears representative of the MPS STTO 
population for ethnicity.  
 
  
                                                 
10
 Above Inspector rank, additional staff are STTO trained supplementing the total number within the MPS. 
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4.1.2 Role, Age and length of service in role or police 
 
The MPS is fundamentally an unarmed police service, where 92% of officers patrol, 
interact with the public and respond to emergency incidents ‘unarmed’ (Home Office, 
2018). STTO qualified staff perform this unarmed patrol function, but have received 
additional training in the use of TASER. The MPS has 2500 (circa) AFOs, each are 
armed with conventional firearms and perform a variety of role related functions. 
Unarmed officers, which may include STTO, will deploy and may be the initial 
response to a potential suicide by cop incident. Dependant on the subject’s 
capability, intent and considering the threat or risk, where authorised AFOs will be 
specifically deployed to protect the public, support unarmed colleagues and resolve 
the incident.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the sample which contained 6.14% of the MPS STTO population 
(n=4889) (Home Office, 2018); comprising of 23% (n=74) ‘unarmed’ STTO and 77% 
(n=241) AFO. The sub-groups represented 3.1% of the overall MPS ‘unarmed’ STTO 
workforce (n=2369) and 9.6% of the overall MPS AFO workforce (n=2520). 
 
  
Table 2.  MPS unarmed STTO, AFO and total STTO trained population. 
 
A mean age comparison between the sample and E&W data (M=39.4) was similar for 
AFOs (M=39.6), but 7.1 years younger for STTO (M=32.3).  
 
When officer age is also examined and compared with the mean length of service for 
E&W (M=12.38); STTO (M=9.3) indicated a significantly lower mean service than for 
AFO (M=14.2). Data is not publicly available the for length of service in role and the 
survey questionnaire indicated minimal difference between STTO (M=5.5) or 
AFO(M=5.3).  
 
  
Population Sample
(n ) (n )
 'Unarmed' STTO 2,369 74 3.12%
AFO 2,520 241 9.56%
Total STTO population 4889 315 6.44%
MPS STTO trained % Pop.
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4.1.3 Demographic Summary 
 
There were a number of participants who did not complete some of the demographic 
questions, which may have a small effect on the overall representativeness of the 
sample. The MPS STTO demographic data appears complete and is considered of 
sufficient quality for use as a valid comparator to provide an indication of the 
research sample representativeness. Acknowledging the under-representation of 
female officers, it is argued this sample appears a valid representation of the MPS 
STTO population. 
 
Each survey question has been statistically tested for consistency. As officers 
attended training the ‘random cluster’ sampling method meant each STTO or AFO 
had the same probability of being selected to participate in the research.  Whilst the 
proportion of STTO to AFO participants is lower, the nature of the police service 
means that every officer will have had some career experience in the unarmed role.  
 
The role, age and length of police or role related service appears representative of 
the published data, with a small variance between the sample and E&W data. This 
survey questionnaire identifies that AFOs are approximately seven years older with 
approximately five years more police service than STTO.  This may be attributable to 
recent MPS surges in recruitment for both the police service and specialist roles e.g. 
STTO or AFO. There is an anecdotal evidence that officers will not apply for a 
specialist role unless they have gained some ‘general policing’ experience. This may 
be due to a perception of the nature of the specialist training or operational role, 
which can also influence an officer’s ability to respond in challenging incidents or 
critical decision making.  
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4.2 Survey Questionnaire Analysis 
The survey sought to understand a broad range of influencing factors that may 
contribute to an officer’s response and their subsequent use of force. Role related 
functions, with the satisfaction and motivation to perform them were initially explored. 
To understand how differing techniques and methods may be applied in resolving 
conflict; the influence of behavioural reaction to stimulus, tactical application and role 
related proficiency were also examined. Lastly, the effect of labelling upon threat 
assessment was utilised to analyse the tactical and response options selected by 
each sub-group.  
 
4.2.1. Satisfaction 
Thirteen of the most frequent ‘everyday’ tasks that either an STTO or AFO may 
perform were analysed to understand an officer’s satisfaction and therefore 
motivation to perform specific functions.  The responses indicated a high reliability of 
consistency (∝=0.828). Comparing groups (Table 3) a statistically significant higher 
level of satisfaction is reported when performing a limited number of role related 
tasks.  
 
Table 3. Q14 Task related satisfaction 
  
STTO indicated satisfaction scored higher for three ‘crime’ orientated tasks gained 
through ‘Searching suspects’, ‘Detecting crime’ and ‘Public Order’. Each were 
statistically significant and in accepting H1, STTO was greater than for AFO, albeit for 
each the effect was small and negative. Conversely, AFO indicated higher 
statistically significant satisfaction value for ‘Helping vulnerable people’ and ‘Firearms 
Crime’ and in accepting H1 was higher for AFO compared to STTO, with a small 
positive effect. 
 
The correlation coefficient between groups for satisfaction gained from role related 
tasks showed a high degree of similarity was present. There were numerous strong 
positive associations for satisfaction indicated between variables e.g. helping 
vulnerable persons and preventing crime (STTO r=.466, AFO r=.695, n= 315, p < 
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.01); violent crime and firearms crime (STTO r=.69, AFO r=.772 n=315, p < .01); 
arresting suspects and violent crime (STTO r=.664, AFO r=.635, n=314, p < .01).  
 
However, there were differences when comparing satisfaction and association within 
groups. There was strong crime related (detecting, reporting, investigating, firearms, 
violent), public order and mental health correlations within the AFO group; in contrast 
to STTO who did not record any correlation within these variables.  The statistical 
analysis is detailed in Appendix G_Q14. 
 
4.2.2. Motivational indicators  
Eight motivational indicators were examined with Q15_9 removed to improve the 
reliability of consistency (∝=0.815).  
  
Table 4. Q15 Motivational Indicators 
 
Comparing median ranks (Table 4) motivational indicators through ‘Recognition’, 
‘Learning/ career development’, ‘Appreciation’ and ‘Excitement or Enjoyment, were 
each statistically significant and in accepting H1 were higher for STTO than for AFO 
with a small negative effect.  
 
There were numerous medium and strong positive motivational intercorrelations 
indicated between variables, specifically: personal challenge and learning/ career 
development (STTO r= .334, AFO r= .489, n= 315, p < .01); personal challenge and 
excitement or enjoyment (STTO r= .495, AFO r= .573, n= 315, p < .01); personal 
challenge and personal pride (STTO r= .592, AFO r= .797, n= 315, p < .01). 
However, whilst the correlation coefficient between groups for motivation indicators 
showed a high degree of similarity was present, the effect was stronger for AFO than 
STTO. Comparing the correlation within groups, between recognition from managers 
with appreciation, public expectation, personal pride or challenge there was a greater 
association or influence for AFO than STTO, who in contrast did not record any 
motivational correlation between these variables (Appendix G_Q15). 
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4.2.3 Behavioural reaction to stimulus 
 
To appreciate the reaction to stimulus or conflict situation, Q16 sought to understand 
whether this met any established behavioural typology for police officers. It indicated 
a high reliability of consistency across sub-questions (∝=.836).  
 
 
Table 5. Q16 Reaction to stimulus 
 
Comparing the observed values for each significant result (Table 5), an identifiable 
pattern emerges. Under the null hypothesis of no difference between the two sub-
groups; the STTO willingness to ‘Always’ engage was, overall, statistically 
significantly higher than AFO.  
 
For Q16_5 Person pushing another in the 
chest was statistically significant and therefore 
H1 accepted, indicating stimulus gained was 
higher for STTO (M= 4.8) than AFO (M=4.6) 
with a small negative effect. 
 
 
 
Q16_6 Known person with mental health 
issues pushing another individual in the chest 
was statistically significant and therefore H1 
accepted, indicating stimulus gained was 
higher for STTO (M= 4.9) than for AFO 
(M=4.6) with a small negative effect.  
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Q16_6 Known person with mental health issues 
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0
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1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_11 Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
 
However, where the conflict stimulus within the question escalated in threat, the 
observed responses for both groups have an extreme positive skew, indicating that 
both groups would ‘Usually’ or ‘Always’ engage with the subject. In the last two 
questions, the subject’s capability (firearm) and intent (harm) became clearer.  
 
Q16_11 Person armed with a weapon (firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another was 
statistically significant and therefore H1 accepted, 
indicating stimulus gained was higher for AFO 
(M=4.9) than for STTO (M= 4.2) with a medium 
positive effect.  
 
 
Q16_12 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another was statistically 
significant and therefore H1 accepted, indicated 
stimulus gained was higher for AFO (M=4.9) than 
for STTO (M= 4.2), with a medium positive effect.  
 
 
 
Under the null hypothesis of no difference between the two sub-groups; the observed 
responses may reflect the differing operational and role related capability between 
the groups, to either protect themselves or ability to intervene to protect others. When 
presented with an armed threat, STTO observed values were unsurprising lower than 
expected when compared with AFO responses. In contrast, indicated by a higher 
observed value, AFOs had a ‘conflict impetus’ or positive reaction to the escalating 
threat.  
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the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_12 Known person with mental health issues armed with a 
weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
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4.2.4 Developing proficiency to resolve conflict  
Where officers spontaneously respond to a developing incident, there are heuristic or 
behavioural influences which may have affected decision making or have 
subsequently contributed to an officer’s proficiency in resolving conflict. The survey 
sought to understand how officers initially learned to resolve conflict when dealing 
with members of the public. To increase the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability score to an 
acceptable level (∝=.795) and as shown in Table 6, only Q17_1 and Q17_2 were 
included in the analysis.  
 
 
Table 6. Q17 Developing proficiency 
 
 
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) indicated the 
effectiveness of classroom-based training was 
statistically significant and in accepting H1 was 
higher for AFO (M=2.7) than for STTO (M= 2.4), 
with a small positive effect.  
 
 
Q17_2 Training (practical based) indicated the 
effectiveness of practical based training was 
statistically significant and in accepting H1 was 
higher for AFO (M=3.6) than for STTO (M= 3.3), 
with a small positive effect.  
 
 
 
The correlation coefficient between groups for Q17_1 and Q17_2 showed a high 
degree of similarity was present (STTO r= .694, AFO r= .637 n= 310, p < .01). 
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 The contribution of learning environments to decision making or influencing an 
officer’s proficiency in resolving conflict were examined in Q18 (Table 7). It indicated 
a high reliability of consistency across all sub-questions (∝=.795).  
 
Table 7. Q18 Contribution of learning environments 
 
Both Training (classroom based) and Training (practical based) were statistically 
significant and in accepting H1 indicated the contribution of practical based training 
was higher for AFO than for STTO, with a small positive effect 
 
There were numerous positive intercorrelations indicated between variables and sub-
groups, implying how differing types of learning contribute to an ability in resolving 
conflict (Appendix G_Q18). The correlation coefficient between groups showed a 
high degree of similarity was present for and practical training (STTO r=.702, AFO 
r=.639, n=314, p < .01); observing colleagues and practical training (STTO r=.347, 
AFO r=.361, n=314, p < .01); observing and working with colleagues (STTO r=.851, 
AFO r=.833, n=313, p < .01) or via their own life experience and personal abilities 
(STTO r=.837, AFO r=.721, n=305, p < .01).  
 
Between groups there were differences when comparing the contribution of either 
training environment or experiential factors. AFO showed a strong correlation 
between the contribution of classroom-based training with a practical based training 
(r= .639, n=240, p < .01) and experiential learning through observing (r= .229, n=240, 
p < .01) or working with colleagues (r= .129, n=240, p < .01). In contrast, for the 
same variables, STTO only showed a correlation between practical based training 
and experience through observing colleagues (r= .347, n=74, p < .01). 
 
In summary, the effectiveness of classroom and practical based training in 
influencing an officer’s development and behaviour to resolve conflict appears higher 
for AFO than for STTO. This ‘experiential learning’ is reinforced whether through 
practical scenarios, observation or working with colleagues. In comparison, there was 
only a small association for STTO in practical training and experience through 
observing colleagues.  
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4.2.5 Tactical Responses and Effectiveness 
 
Contrasting AFO and STTO responses, a series of questions (Q19 to Q21) sought to 
compare the tactical commonality between groups, identify positive or negative 
implications of certain strategies or approaches and identify any limitations. Broadly 
categorised, participants were requested to consider effective and ineffective tactical 
responses.  
 
Effective Tactics- Thirteen of the most common types of the incident were available 
for participants (n=315) to consider. There were 512 entries, with some participants 
submitting more than one incident descriptor per question. Chart 1 visually indicates 
the responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1. Q19 What type of incident was this? 
 
AFOs proportionally nominated ‘Firearms’ incidents more than STTOs; with the 
volume of incidents selected by both groups being ‘Mental Health’ (STTO n= 36, AFO 
n=70), Arresting suspects (STTO n= 29, AFO n=67) and ‘Violent Crime’ (STTO n= 
13, AFO n=58).  
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A 2x2 contingency table enabled analysis of the statistically significant responses for 
Q19_7 and Q19_10 shown below: 
 
 
Mental Health (=9.744, p<.01, df=1, n=315) was statistically significant, with a 
higher observed expected value for STTO and lower for AFO. 
 
 
Firearms crime (=13.886, p<.001, df=1, n=315) was statistically significant, with a 
higher observed value than expected for AFO and conversely lower for STTO.  
 
Linked to an associated sub-question (Q19_a), this requested officers to rate the 
effectiveness of specific tactics to resolve the incident. Nine tactics were available for 
officers to select, escalating in a use of force, with a ‘not applicable’ option included. 
Q19_a_10 ‘Other’ was removed from further analysis to improve the reliability of 
consistency across all sub-questions (∝=.78).  
 
Chart 2 summarises the effectiveness of tactics for STTO and AFO. Dependant on 
the type of incident, threat or risk, officers may have indicated ‘not applicable’, 
altering their tactical approach or escalating use of force.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Mental Heath 36 24.902 70 81.098 106
Not applicable 38 49.098 171 159.902 209
Total 74 241 315
Q19_7 Mental Health
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Firearms crime 1 11.746 49 38.254 50
Not applicable 73 62.254 192 202.746 265
Total 74 241 315
Q19_10 Firearms crime
STTO AFO
Total
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Chart 2. Q19_a. How effective were the following tactics?  
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Table 8. Tactical effectiveness 
 
The reported effectiveness of ‘communication’ and ‘time or space to de-escalate’ 
(Table 8) was statistically significant, and in accepting H1 was higher for AFO than for 
STTO, each producing a small positive effect.  
 
However, whilst the effectiveness of firearms 
was statistically significant; and in accepting 
H1, was higher for STTO than for AFO with a 
small negative effect, a prominent outlier for 
both was the ‘not applicable’ option.  The 
observed frequencies from both groups related 
to the incident envisaged by the participant in 
Q19 are lower than expected under the null 
hypothesis. There was a small divergence between responses; with AFO indicating 
the effectiveness of Firearms was ‘Very Effective’ whereas STTO responses had a 
negative skew signifying ‘Very Ineffective’ or ‘Rarely Effective’.  
 
The correlation coefficient between groups showed a high degree of similarity was 
present between Firearms with Baton Gun (STTO r=.930, AFO r=.556, n=289, p < 
.01). However, AFO observed responses were skewed at one end of the scale, 
indicating the association of effectiveness of Firearms with Baton Gun as a tactic was 
generally negative or ‘not applicable’. This would require further examination, but as 
STTO are not trained to use Firearm or Baton Gun their responses may be 
attributable to a perception of effectiveness rather than an informed opinion. 
 
There were numerous positive intercorrelations indicated between variables and both 
groups, implying the effectiveness of differing tactics (Appendix G_Q19_a).  
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The correlation coefficient between groups showed a high degree of similarity was 
present between communication with de-escalation (STTO r=.608, AFO r=.626, 
n=295, p < .01); OST and restraint (STTO r=.451, AFO r=.553, n=292, p < .01); and 
firearms with, ASP (STTO r=.369, AFO r=.346, n=295, p < .01), CS Spray (STTO 
r=.422, AFO r=.413, n=295, p < .01); and TASER (STTO r=.368, AFO r=.557, n=295, 
p < .01). 
 
Chart 3: Observed frequencies for Q19_5 ASP and Q19_6 CS Spray. 
 
The intercorrelation between ‘ASP’ (=.223, df=4, n=292) and ‘CS Spray’ (=.807, 
df=4, n=288) was significant (r=.824, n=288, p < .01). However, as shown in Chart 5 
when analysing responses further, ‘not applicable’ was a prominent outlier for both 
AFO and STTO each with low observed frequencies and a negative skew (Chart 3). 
There was a significant association between STTO and AFO responses, implying 
that ASP (rs=.714, p <.05, AFO n= 383, STTO n= 120) or CS Spray (rs =.886, p <.05, 
AFO n= 378, STTO n= 117) were not an effective or appropriate tactical response to 
the incident selected in Q19. 
 
When comparing the correlation of tactical effectiveness between groups there were 
statistically significant differences. AFO showed a statistically significant 
intercorrelation between TASER and OST techniques (r=.239, n=221, p < .01), 
restraint (r=.191, n=221, p < .01) and CS Spray (r=.503, n=221, p < .01). In contrast, 
for the same variables STTO only showed a intercorrelation between TASER and CS 
Spray (r= .289, n=74, p < .05). However, the correlation coefficient between groups 
in the effectiveness of TASER showed a high degree of similarity was present (rs 
=.986, p <.05, STTO n= 124, AFO n= 381). 
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Ineffective Tactics- To understand the complete use of force response, participants 
were requested to rate ineffective tactics they had witnessed or used and the type of 
incident. Chart 4 illustrates the responses to Q20. 
 
Chart 4. Q20 What type of incident was this? 
 
Twelve of the most common types of incidents were offered for selection and, with 
434 entries, some participants (n=315) submitted more than one incident descriptor. 
 
Violent Crime (=.005, p < .01, df=11, STTO n= 25, AFO n=56) was the only 
statistically significant result accounting for 11% of the responses.   
 
The results and order in which ineffective tactics were applied (STTO n=232, AFO n 
=739) are visually represented in Chart 5, with Q20_a produced a high degree of 
reliability (∝=.903). Analysis indicated no results were considered statistically 
significant.  
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Chart 5. Q20_a. Ineffective conflict resolution tactics by group and order of use. 
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In summary, contrasting AFO and STTO tactical responses to a series of scenarios 
(Q19 to Q21) sought to compare commonality between groups, identify positive or 
negative implications of certain strategies or approaches and identify any limitations. 
AFOs proportionally nominated ‘Firearms’ incidents more than STTOs, and the 
volume of incidents related to ‘Mental Health’, ‘Arresting suspects’ and ‘Violent 
Crime’. The tactical approaches for both sub-groups were similar with 
‘Communication’ and ‘Time or space to de-escalate’ identified as being more 
effective for AFO than STTO. The correlation coefficient between groups showed a 
high degree of similarity was present across the range of tactics (n=9). Both groups 
indicated an aversion to using Baton or CS Spray. Discussed later this may be 
attributable to the increased reliance on TASER and the proficiency in using Baton or 
CS Spray with tactical limitations in engaging a subject at close range. 
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4.2.6 Approaches to resolving conflict 
Participants were requested to consider personal techniques or approaches they 
employed or believed were effective in resolving a confrontational situation. There 
were eight approaches to choose from, with Q21_7 removed from further analysis to 
increase the overall Chronbach Alpha score (∝=.705).  
 
The use of ‘Character- imposing authoritative 
personality as a police office’ (=.062, df=4, 
n=303). M-WU test (p=.008, U= 9793, z=32.632, 
r= .151) was statistically significant result and in 
accepting H1 effectiveness was higher for AFO 
(M= 3.3) than for STTO (M= 3) with a small 
positive effect. 
 
Both groups expressed strong correlation between time to de-escalate with rapport 
(STTO r=.506, AFO r=.62, n=303, p < .01), communication (STTO r=.302, AFO 
r=.472, n=300, p < .01) and temperament (STTO r=.242, p < .05; AFO, r=.626, p < 
.01, n=303). Further correlations between knowledge with temperament (STTO 
r=.340, AFO r=.449, n=306, p < .01) and experience (STTO r=.344, AFO r=.507, 
n=308, p < .01) were identified. There were differences when comparing the 
association of tactical effectiveness between groups. AFO showed a statistically 
significant correlation between experience with time to de-escalate (r=.195, n=233, p 
< .01), communication (r=.344, n=231, p < .01) and temperament (r=.443, n=234, p < 
.01); and also, between communication and knowledge (r=.255, n=234, p < .01). In 
contrast, STTO did not record any correlation between the same variables.  
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4.2.7 The effect of labelling 
The literature review identified the subject’s role within a conflict situation and the 
influence a label or the language used to denote a subject may affect the officer’s 
response; especially if there is a change in status from witness to suspect, or 
conversely if reversed. This sought to understand the order in which a tactical option 
would be employed and whether the label affected the response. It asked two broad 
questions; what option would be immediately considered or not used. 
 
To analyse the conflict response, a series of questions (Q22 to Q25) examined 
whether this differs between sample groups when the subject is labelled as a witness, 
victim or an offender. The Spearman Rank correlation coefficient (rs) was used to 
determine the strength and direction of the relationship for the chosen tactical option 
between AFO and STTO groups. A coefficient reports a value from +1 to -1, where 
zero is no correlation and close to 1 indicates the ‘rankings’ between the two groups 
are very similar i.e. no difference between groups, therefore retaining the null 
hypothesis (Ho). 
 
Tactics utilised - From a defined range of tactics or options, Q22 and Q23 requested 
participants to indicate the use and order of application e.g. 1= first used, 2= second 
or 3= third etc., with not used/applicable being collated. This sought to understand 
the order in which a tactical option would be applied against the labelled individual. 
Any ‘not applicable’ responses were excluded from the analysis of Q22 and Q23 but 
included within the responses for Q24 and Q25 respectively.  
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Table 9. Q22 UoF options labelled as ‘Suspect’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Q23 UoF options labelled as ‘Victim’ 
 
The result for each of the sub-questions within Q22 and Q23 where the individual 
was labelled as a ‘Suspect’ (Table 9) or as a ‘Victim’ (Table 10) were statistically 
significant, with a large positive effect; therefore accepting Ho the responses of STTO 
and AFO are highly linearly correlated suggesting a high degree of similarity.  
 
  
Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
STTO AFO
Q23_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm Victim 0.853 0.668 318 1093
Q23_a
A Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.879 0.728 314 1135
Q23_b For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 0.870 0.698 299 1065
Q23_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) 0.804 0.579 321 1175
Q23_d
For a Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.797 0.567 315 1183
Q23_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.834 0.638 322 1197
Q23_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another 0.800 0.638 317 1150
Q23_g
Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(firearm) presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.815 0.607 316 1154
Note. 
Q23. Spearmans Rank correlation STTO * AFO
Responses 
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p  < .001 (2 tailed), AFO 
n= 245, STTO n =70, df  =99.
Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
STTO AFO
Q22_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect 0.828 0.686 391 1230
Q22_a
A Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.876 0.767 387 1247
Q22_b For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 0.846 0.716 354 1171
Q22_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a weapon 
(not firearm) 0.816 0.666 382 1252
Q22_d
For a Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.812 0.659 352 1247
Q22_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) 0.815 0.665 364 1240
Q22_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another 0.756 0.571 337 1221
Q22_g
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another 0.739 0.546 338 1222
Note. 
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p  < .001 (2 tailed), AFO 
n= 245, STTO n =70, df  =99.
Q22. Correlation STTO * AFO
Responses 
(n )
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Tactics not utilised– Similar to the two previous sub-questions, Q24 and Q25 sought 
to understand tactics or options which would not be utilised or considered, and 
therefore discounted by the officer. Any ‘not applicable’ responses excluded from 
Q22 and Q23 were included within the analysis for Q24 and Q25 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Q24 UoF options not used against individual labelled as ‘Suspect’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Q25 UoF options not used against individual labelled as ‘Victim’ 
 
The result for each of the sub-questions within Q24 and Q25 where the individual 
was labelled as a ‘Suspect’ (Table 11) or as a ‘Victim’ (Table 12) were statistically 
significant, with a large positive effect; therefore accepting Ho the responses of STTO 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
STTO SFO
Q24_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect 0.983 0.967 207 600
Q24_1_a
A Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.966 0.934 173 486
Q24_1_b
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect
1.000 0.749 196 554
Q24_1_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) 0.928 1.000 150 393
Q24_1_d
For a Suspect presenting threat of violence 
towards another armed with a weapon (not 
firearm) 0.814 0.667 130 395
Q24_1_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.886 0.787 142 364
Q24_1_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed 
suspect armed with a weapon (firearm) 
presenting threat of violence towards another 0.852 0.729 180 485
Q24_1_g
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another 0.852 0.729 188 474
Note. 
STTO * AFO
Responses 
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p < .05 level (2 
tailed) (N=315, AFO n=215, STTO n=70, df=9).
Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
STTO AFO
Q25_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm Victim 0.996 0.992 173 508
Q25_a A Victim presenting threat of violence towards another 0.924 0.854 142 416
Q25_b For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 0.983 0.967 168 495
Q25_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon (not 
firearm) 0.967 0.934 120 343
Q25_d
For a Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.895 0.802 121 348
Q25_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) 0.924 0.854 122 320
Q25_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim armed 
with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another 0.867 0.751 144 406
Q25_g
Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(firearm) presenting threat of violence towards another 0.946 0.894 151 402
Note. 
STTO * AFO
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p < .05 level (2 
tailed) (N=315, AFO n=215, Unarmed n=70, df=7).
Responses 
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and AFO are highly linearly correlated suggesting a high degree of similarity.  
 
In summary, the correlation coefficient between groups showed a high degree of 
similarity was present across this set of four sub-questions.  Discussed later, there 
appears minimal difference between the STTO and AFO response to the range of 
scenarios presented to them, whether the subject was labelled as a witness, victim or 
an offender.  
 
4.2.8 Training and Equipment 
 
An officer’s training or equipment may impact upon or influence their overall 
capability to respond and any subsequent use or restraint of force.  Comprising of 
four sub-questions, Q26 enabled associations to be considered which may have an 
influence on decision making or ability in resolving conflict e.g. training or equipment. 
Using the Likert scale to measure each response, the sub-question additionally 
permitted a free text response to qualitatively analyse answers.  
  
 
Table 13. Training and Equipment 
 
  
The only statistically significant response was 
for Q26_2 - How does your current training 
adequately prepare you to deal with individual’s 
in mental crisis? (Table 13), which indicated the 
mean rank was higher for AFO (M= 3.6) than for 
STTO (M= 3.0).  
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Qualitative responses - A total of 570 free text replies were recorded, as described in 
section 3.6.8, each response was manually examined and coded for analysis. A code 
and initial classification was assigned to each line (Table 14). On completion of the 
open coding process, each were grouped into larger ‘selective’ codes to thematically 
categorise the data. Each qualitative response, with open coding, is contained 
Appendix G. 
 
 
Table 14. Q26 Open and selective coding 
 
 
Across the sample and in-between sub-groups, broad themes emerged which are 
displayed in Chart 6. 
  
Code Initial Classification Open Code Theme
1 Equipment related 2,3,7,8,15 Training - OST, Tactical, Role related
2
Training- +ve (regular /constant/ realistic 
training) 11,12 Less Lethal Options
3
Trainiung-ve (too little/ infrequent/not 
realistic) 4,6,9 Role - Response. -Tactics, Experience, NDM
4 Firearms related (training, storage, tactics) 1,10,13,14 Equipment - Uniform, BodyArmour
5 Neutral response 5,16 Other responses
6 Police role as 1st responder v NHS 17 Not Entered
7 Tactics- -ve
8 Tactics- +ve
9 Use Experience/ NDM 
10 BodyArmour -ve
11 Less Lethal -ve
12 Less Lethal - +ve
13 Uniform  +ve
14 Uniform -ve
15 OST- ve
16 Other
17 Blank
Q26 Open coding Q26 Selective coding
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 Chart 6. Q26. Current training and issued equipment. 
 
Role related training (Q26_1) - the ability of training to prepare officers to fulfil the 
requirements their role accounted for 83% of the responses (N=130); with each 
subgroup proportionately indicating both positive (STTO n =6, AFO n =43) and 
negative (STTO n =17, AFO n=64) critique.  
 
Participants stated ‘The current training is very applicable and as realistic as it can be 
(5A, AFO)’ and ‘It gives us the knowledge of the capabilities of the weapon to give 
better understanding when it would be effective in certain situations (17C, STTO)’. 
Whilst others were critical ‘Training is very rushed and there seems to be a high 
expectation on us to perform despite little contact time we have (33B, AFO)’ or 
‘Training is basic and very artificial compared to real life scenarios (3B, STTO)’.  
 
Mental Health training (Q26_2) - Again, 71% of the comments (N= 105) were 
associated with training and how this prepares officers to deal with individual’s in 
mental health crisis. The results were largely negative and critical of the current 
STTO AFO STTO AFO STTO AFO STTO AFO
Q26_1 Q26_2 Q26_3 Q26_4
Other responses 7 7 3 5 21 48 7 20
Role - Response. -Tactics, Experience, NDM 3 7 12 24 0 9 10 21
Training - OST, Tactical, Role relat ed 30 109 31 78 0 5 5 8
Less Lethal Options 0 0 0 0 9 11 13 23
Equipment - Uniform, BodyArmour 1 4 0 0 3 27 2 7
0
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140
Q26. Current training and issued equipment. 
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training provided; with positive (STTO n =1, AFO n =17) opinion being outweighed by 
negative (STTO n =27 , AFO n=60) critique. 
 
The only positive STTO comment was ‘Mental crisis is incorporated into training 
scenarios (15C, STTO)’ with an AFO stating ‘Training provides situations of dealing 
with 'suspects' who are displaying crisis (21F, AFO)’ and ‘We aren't mental health 
experts, there's always room for improvement, but I feel we receive enough training 
(42A, AFO). 
 
Some of the critical comments included ‘I can't remember having any training. You're 
either effective at communication or you're not. Training will only prepare you for 
contingencies if the suspect won't co-operate (5C, STTO)’, to ‘Little input other than 
NCALT computer packages. Occasional scenario in practical training (344B, AFO)’ 
and ‘Not medically trained to assess there, working off assumption and best guess 
(20E, STTO)’.  
 
Role related equipment (Q26_3) - This sought to understand how issued equipment 
may be an influence on the participant’s role.  
 
The results were unremarkable and accounting for 52% broadly split between a 
‘neutral’ or ‘other’ coded response. The neutral comments included ‘Our kit has 
always been very good. Better facilities for quick name checks etc would be good 
(7A, AFO)’; ‘A uniformed PC has enough equipment to defend themselves from 
incidents they are likely to attend (48, STTO)’; ‘Taser, Asp, Handcuffs and your 
comms [communication] skills cover most things (188, STTO)’ and ‘Operational 
equipment available gives me the ability to deal with more serious incidents (23E, 
AFO)’. The ‘other’ responses were too broad to thematically analyse, but ranged from 
building entry equipment, to IT related issues or a non-specific lack of investment. 
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Mental health related equipment (Q26_4) - This examined how issues equipment 
may influence a response to an individual with mental health issues.  
 
Comments (N=36) were critical and related to the availability or capability of Less 
lethal options; with positive (STTO n =0, AFO n =1) opinion being outweighed by 
negative (STTO n =13, AFO n=22) critique. 
 
The only positive comment was ‘Good range of non-lethal options (20A, AFO)’, but 
the 40% of the comments were critical.  
 
The negative critique included ‘There is no specific equipment for persons suffering 
MH within the Met that I am aware of (178, STTO)’; ‘As above [Taser is a great tool 
but CS is useless and batons are ineffective] (10C, STTO)’ and ‘Gives me an ability 
to deal with more serious incidents in a less lethal way. Access to more readily 
available AEP11 would give me distance and time to react and deescalate incident 
without having a person too close (23E, AFO)’. 
 
The police role as first responders to mental health crisis was articulated where 
participants stated ‘We do not have access to people’s mental health history. Often 
taking people to places (hospitals) they are not known to (22B, STTO)’ and ‘I feel 
police are heavily relied on for mental health and need more support from other 
agencies (11E, STTO)’ 
 
In summary, the Likert responses indicated that mental health training and role 
related equipment was perceived more adequate for AFO than STTO. The free text 
responses were mixed and with opinion divided between the sub-groups and 
required a thematic analysis to appreciate the issues. Role related training identified 
as a core topic, with some participants being supportive whilst others were critical of 
the quality, frequency and lack of realism in exercises. Both STTO and AFO were 
significantly critical of mental health training and the issues this presents responding 
operationally to a person in crisis. There was a clear indication from the sample, 
there is a limited range of ‘equipment’ to safely deal with a person in mental health 
crisis who has ‘capability’ and is violent or at risk of harm.  
 
                                                 
11
 AEP is an acronym for Attenuating Energy Projectile, commonly referred to as Baton Gun or Plastic Bullets. 
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4.3 MPS Use of Force (MPSUoF) Dataset Analysis  
 
As previously discussed, the entire MPSUoF dataset is substantial and worthy of a 
future study. For the purpose of this thesis it will only be used to bring operational 
context to the research survey questionnaire, permitting a comparative analysis of 
unarmed versus armed paradigm to contrast the tactical approaches between STTO 
and AFO.  
 
To analyse the raw MPSUoF data, the researcher coded the MPS Excel sheet 
transfering the complete MPSUoF dataset onto SPSS (Coding key is shown in 
Appendix D). The complete MPSUoF 2018/19 dataset contained a total of 132,410 
entries with 222,136 UoF tactics reported. The statistical analysis conducted on the 
MPSUoF dataset is contained within Appendix H.  
 
4.3.1 Analysis of MPSUoF variables  
 
A number of contextual Yes/No variables were recorded and multiple combination 
entries were permitted to indicate more than one subset variable. These include:  
 
Primary Conduct 
Defines conduct from compliant, to verbal, active or passive resistance and 
active, aggressive or aggravated resistance.  
 
Impact Factor 
These are factors the officer believes may have influenced the incident and 
include alcohol, drugs, mental health, previous knowledge, possession of a 
weapon, acute behavioural disorder and size gender build. 
 
Outcome 
Includes arrested, escaped, detained at hospital or mental health facility and 
fatality.  
 
Reason for Force  
Broadly classified as Protection (of public, self, another), Prevention (offence, 
harm, escape), Effect (arrest, search) or other.  
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Primary Conduct. 
MPS officers are able to record the ‘Primary Conduct’ of the subject within six 
categories; compliant, passive resistance, verbal resistance or gestures, active 
resistance, aggressive resistance and serious or aggressive resistance. For the 
purposes of this thesis, these are broadly categorised as ‘compliant’ or ‘non-
compliant’ (Chart 7) and when analysed were statistically significant (=1167.01, p 
<.001, df=2).  
 
 
Chart 7. MPSUoF Primary Conduct (MPS, 2019). 
 
 
In comparison to STTO, the Primary Conduct of ‘compliant’ subjects was 
proportionally higher for AFO (Compliant - STTO 49.1% n=33887, AFO 72.3% 
n=4248; Non-compliant - STTO 50.9% n=25162, AFO 27.7%, n=1629).  
  
Compl iant Passive resist
Verbal
resist/gestures
Active resist Aggressive resist Serious/Agg resist
Compl iant
Non-
compl iant
STTO 17708 7257 8922 16875 14009 4278
AFO 3042 742 464 995 483 151
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The STTO and AFO tactical response options were analysed for both ‘compliant’ 
(rs=.732, p < .001, df=25, STTO n=33887, AFO n=4248) and ‘non-compliant’ subjects 
(rs=.918, p < .001, df=25, STTO n=35162, AFO n=1629). Analysing the type of 
conduct against STTO and AFO tactical options, each are highly linearly correlated 
suggesting a high degree of similarity. Chart 8 visualises the range of tactical options 
employed, where a subject’s conduct is indicated as ‘compliant’ or ‘non-compliant’. 
 
 
 
The nearly complete ring indicated the STTO sub-group use a wider range of options 
for both ‘compliant’ and ‘non-compliant’ subjects. The AFO sub-group did not use 
some of the tactics and therefore this is not recorded on the chart. Discussed later, 
whilst the tactics used for a ‘non-compliant’ subject were statistically similar, the AFO 
range of tactics were narrower with the ‘use’ of TASER or Firearms dominant. 
Compared to STTO which employed more options broadly and specifically the use of 
restraint for a ‘compliant’ subject.  
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Impact Factors. 
 
MPS officers are able to record nine ‘Impact Factors’; these are Alcohol, Acute 
Behavioural Disorder, Drugs, Mental Health, Crowd, Other, Possession of a Weapon, 
Prior Knowledge and Size, Gender or Build. For the purposes of this thesis these are 
categorised as ‘Individual’ or ‘Physical’ type risk factors (Chart 9).  
 
 
Chart 9. MPSUoF Impact Factor (MPS, 2019). 
 
 
The ‘Individual’ (STTO 40.6%, n=35096; AFO 21.7%, n=1385) and ‘Physical’ (STTO 
59.8%, n=51444; AFO 78.3%, n=4983) factors were statistically significant 
(=878.79, p <.001, df=2; N=92908). 
  
Alcohol
Acute Behavioural
Disorder
Drugs Mental Health Crowd Other
Possesion of a
weapon
Prior K'wledge Size/Gender/Build
Individual Physical
STTO 12099 944 14875 7178 6128 3432 13213 13157 15514
AFO 435 58 512 380 323 249 2785 954 672
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
MPSUoF  Impact Factors
STTO AFO
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Table 15. MPSUoF ‘Individual’ Impact Factor 
 
The STTO/ AFO tactical options employed were analysed against the four ‘Individual’ 
risk impact factors and statistically significant results (n=25, df=2, p < .001) were 
reported for Alcohol, Drugs, Acute Behavioural Disorder (ABD) and Mental Health in 
Table 15. Strong and statistically significant associations (df=25, p < .001) in the 
similarity of tactical response options for STTO and AFO were identified with each 
reporting a high linear correlation suggesting a high degree of similarity for each.  
 
 
 
 
Table 16. MPSUoF ‘Individual’ Impact Factor 
 
Table 16 shows the tactical response for ‘Possession of a weapon’ (n=25, df=2, p < 
.001) was also statistically significant and linearly correlated suggesting a high 
degree of similarity; and notably this accounted for 43.7% of the recorded AFO 
‘Impact Factors’.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis; specifically analysing a subject’s ‘Primary Conduct’ 
with ‘Mental Health’ as an ‘Impact Factor’ was statistically significant and linearly 
correlated suggesting a high degree of similarity in STTO and AFO response 
(rs=.848, p < .001, df=25, STTO n=13393, AFO n=653) across the range of tactical 
options. Discussed later, although statistically significant, when categorised as 
‘Compliant’ (rs=.775, p < .001, df=25, STTO n=4376, AFO n=366) it was not as 
Impact Factor
Total 
(n)
Spearmans 
(rs)
ChiSq
STTO 21459
AFO 728
STTO 24634
AFO 815
STTO 13393
AFO 629
STTO 2075
AFO 104
860.680.911
ABD
Mental Health
Drugs
32.280.895
263.980.832
Alcohol
1115.460.924
Impact Factor
Total 
(n)
Spearmans 
(rs)
ChiSq
STTO 22540
AFO 4418 263.98
Possession
Weapon
0.665
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strong as the identified ‘non-compliant’ correlation (rs=.949, p < .001, df=25, STTO 
n=9017, AFO n=287), which indicated the similarity of a trained response.  
 
Outcome. 
 
MPS officers are able to record five Outcomes for the incident; these ‘Made off/ 
escaped’, ‘Arrested’, ‘Hospitalised’, ‘Detained- Mental Health Act’ and ‘Other’. 
Analysis of the incident Outcome (Chart 10) was statistically significant 
(=86522.526, p < .001, STTO n=42532, AFO n=3764) and strongly associated 
(rs=1.000, p < .001, df=5). The outcome was proportionally similar between the STTO 
and AFO sample.  
 
 
Chart 10. MPSUoF Outcome (MPS, 2019). 
 
  
Made off/escaped Arrested Hopital ised
Detained - Mental Health
Act
Other
STTO 345 32174 1141 1131 7741
AFO 35 2850 79 88 711
1
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100
1000
10000
100000
MPSUoF Outcome
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Reason for Force 
 
Analysis of Reason for Force (RfF) was intentionally restricted in scope to answering 
the research questions. With multiple entries permitted per incident, thirteen variables 
were available for the officer to record the Reason for Force. These may be broadly 
classified as ‘Protection’ (public, self or another), ‘Prevention’ (offence, harm or 
escape), ‘Effect’ (arrest or search) or ‘Other’. Chi-Square test identified each of these 
variables was statistically significant (p <.001, df=25, N= 300403) and for 
completeness this is reported in Appendix H.  
 
Comparative analysis was conducted on RfF records against those containing 
‘Impact Factors’ involving risk to the ‘Individual’ e.g. ‘Alcohol’, ‘ABD’, ‘Drugs’, ‘Mental 
Health’ or where the subject was in ‘Possession of a Weapon’. A total of 300,403 
variables were identified, with strong and statistically significant associations 
identified across the analysed variables (rs=.929, p < .001, df=12, STTO n=272111, 
AFO n=28292). Chart 11 visualises the similarity in RfF between STTO and AFO.  
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10000
Protect Public
Protect Subject
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Prevent Offence
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Effect Search
Effect Arrest
Method of Entry
Remove H/Cuffs
Prevent Harm
Prevent Escape
Other
Reason for Force - AFOMH
Alcohol
Drugs
ABD
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Drugs
ABD
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Chart 11. Comparison of STTO and AFO Reason for Force * Impact Factor. 
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Table 17 shows that for each RfF variable there were statistically significant and 
linearly correlated associations identified; suggesting a high degree of similarity for 
Impact Factors namely ‘Alcohol’, ‘ABD’, ‘Drugs’, ‘Mental Health’ and ‘Possession of a 
Weapon’. Whilst RfF is statistically significant and similar, AFO cite the RfF as ‘Other’ 
across the complete range of analysed Impact Factor variables, whilst this is not 
used by STTO. Conversely, STTO use ‘Prevent Harm’ significantly more than AFO 
as a reason for using force.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Correlation of RfF Impact Factors 
 
 
  
Total 
(n)
Spearmans 
(rs)
STTO 38306
AFO 2564
STTO 63490
AFO 2693
STTO 82388
AFO 3257
STTO 5842
AFO 403
STTO 82085
AFO 19375
Note: N =300403,  p  < .001, df =25
Impact Factor
MH
0.857
0.963
0.861
0.889
0.923
Possession
Weapon
ABD
Drugs
Alcohol
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4.3.2 Tactical Effectiveness 
 
This section will discuss the STTO and AFO tactical ‘effectiveness’. STTO 
(n=42,532) reported 32.1% of the total MPSUoF incidents with AFO (n=3,764) 
accounting for 2.8%. The complete range of differing tactics employed by both 
sample sub-groups (STTO n=73,208; AFO n=6,081) was analysed and found to be 
statistically significant (=8.529, p <.01, df=1, STTO n=42532; AFO n=3764).  
 
Officers record their use of force against a singular or range of tactics employed and 
include the order in which they were applied. Against each tactical option, officers 
indicate ‘effective’ or ‘non-effective’, which enables a percentage calculation to define 
the ‘effectiveness’ for comparison between sub-groups. e.g. TASER-aimed by STTO: 
Effective = 718, Non-Effective= 282 equals a 72% effective use of TASER when 
aimed by STTO. This enables an examination of proficiency in either selecting the 
option or applying it. Contextual factors e.g. primary conduct, impact, reason for force 
were analysed against each other to identify if there were any measurable 
associations for both STTO and AFO.  
 
There are twenty-five tactics available for officers to record and these may be broadly 
characterised as complaint, force presented not used, restraint, physical force and 
TASER or Firearms tactics. 
 
Chart 12 visualises the overall percentage effectiveness between the sample sub-
groups across each tactic. With the outer ring indicating 100% effective, as the AFO 
sub-group did not report use of some of the tactical options the chart converges on 
the centre at 0% e.g. no reported use of ‘Firearms Fired’.  This chart visualises the 
broader range of options used by STTO but also visualises the narrower or ‘tactically 
focussed’ use of firearms related options by AFO. 
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Chart 12. Overall percentage effectiveness of UoF tactics (MPS, 2019). 
 
Examining each of the 25 tactics individually enabled the effectiveness or proficiency 
between STTO and AFO to be statistically established. Comparing across all of the 
options (n=25) there are statistically significant associations in tactical effectiveness 
between STTO and AFO. When analysing all the UoF tactics employed by STTO 
(n=73208) they were 81% effective in their use compared to AFO (n=6081) at 92% 
effective. The association of effectiveness between groups was statistically 
significant and linearly correlated suggesting a high degree of similarity (Effective 
rs=.709, non-effective rs=.548, n=79289, p < .001, df=25). 
 
Analysing the dataset, STTO and AFO tactical approaches can be determined and 
the observed effectiveness statistically compared. The MPSUoF dataset collated the 
tactics and order they were applied. Illustrated by Table 18 below, the cumulative 
proportion of ‘effective’ tactics is similar between STTO and AFO, with approximately 
95% of encounters being resolved after three tactical options. 
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Table 18. Comparison of STTO and AFO UoF effectiveness. 
 
Analysing the broad approach between STTO and AFO, it was statistically significant 
and linearly correlated suggesting a high degree of similarity in effectiveness within 
the first three tactics reported.  Whilst there is still a statistically significant association 
in the use of Tactic 4, the observed count for AFO was significantly lower than 
expected. 
 
Baton and Irritant Spray. 
 
In comparison with other options, the observed use of Irritant spray and Baton for 
both groups was low and employed in only 0.95% (N=753) of all UoF incidents. This 
low usage was also reflected in the survey questionnaire.  
 
 
Table 19. Baton and Irritant spray use - Observed use and correlation 
 
Table 19 shows that Irritant spray (=1, df=2, STTO n= 199, AFO n=0), was 
reported ‘used’ or ‘drawn’ in only 0.25% of UoF incidents. AFO did not report any 
usage of Irritant Spray, with STTO indicating it was effective in 63% of encounters; 
with a small statistically significant association was identified between STTO and 
AFO when ‘used’.  
 
STTO SFO
(n ) (n )
Effective 
%
Cumulative 
%
Effective 
%
Cumulative
% Y N
Tactic 1 42532 3764 58.10% 58.10% 61.90% 61.90% 0.737 0.650
Tactic 2 18890 1569 25.80% 83.90% 25.80% 87.70% 0.779 0.698
Tactic 3 7627 544 10.42% 94.32% 8.95% 96.65% 0.767 0.696
Tactic 4 2880 161 3.93% 98.25% 2.65% 99.29% 0.390 0.114
Note: (Tactics 1-4) N =77967,  p  < .001, df =25
Spearman  
coefficient(rs)
AFOSTTO
Yes 
(n )
No
(n )
Effective % Total
Yes 
(n )
No
(n )
Effective % Total Yes No
Irritant spray - CS drawn 64 45 59% 109 0 0 0% 0 0.000 0.000
Irritant spray - CS used 61 29 68% 90 0 0 0% 0 0.273 -0.115
Baton drawn 224 104 68% 328 4 0 100% 4 0.891 0.000
Baton used 136 79 63% 215 7 0 100% 7 0.805 0.000
Note: p < .001, df =2
STTO AFO
Correlation (rs)
STTO/ ARV
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The use of Baton (=.019, df=2, STTO n= 543, AFO n=11) was statistically 
significant and reported in only 0.7% of incidents. Again, AFO usage was very small, 
with an overall effectiveness of 67% for Baton drawn or used.  
 
 
 
TASER. 
 
 
Table 20. TASER - Observed use and correlation 
 
The two sub-groups observed use and correlation of TASER as a tactical option was 
compared (Table 20). This indicated the higher reported percentage effectiveness for 
AFO compared to STTO when the TASER was ‘Aimed’, ‘Drawn’, ‘Fired’ or ‘Red-
Dotted’. The use of TASER between STTO and AFO was statistically significant and 
linearly correlated suggesting a high degree of similarity.  
 
Tactical Communication and Unarmed Skills. 
The effectiveness of tactical communication between STTO and AFO was 
statistically significant (=564.519, p < .001, df=1), with STTO (n=14247) reporting 
this was only 40% effective, compared to AFO (n =1088) at 77%.  
 
The use of unarmed skills between STTO and AFO was statistically significant 
(=23.816, p < .001, df=1), with STTO (n=10619) reporting this was only 89% 
effective, compared to AFO (n =659) at 95%.  
 
Yes 
(n )
No
(n )
Effective
%
Total
Yes 
(n )
No
(n )
Effective 
%
Total Yes No
CED (Taser) aimed 718 282 72% 1000 116 11 91% 127 0.980 0.834
CED (Taser) drawn 1788 722 71% 2510 38 12 76% 50 0.996 0.935
CED (Taser) fired 496 369 57% 865 62 19 77% 81 0.718 0.724
CED (Taser) red-dotted 2919 387 88% 3306 631 29 96% 660 0.999 0.776
Note: p < .001, df =2
STTO AFO
Correlation 
(rs)
STTO/ ARV
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4.3.3 Selection of tactical options 
 
Each tactical option was ranked (Table 21) identifying a statistically significant 
association in tactics employed across the sample (rs=.968, p < .001, df=25, STTO 
n=73208, AFO n=6074). 
 
 
Table 21. STTO and AFO ranked use of force options. 
 
Discussed later, whilst the tactical options are statistically similar there is a small 
difference in the ranking between the STTO or AFO options selected; where STTO 
appear to utilise ‘Restraint’ earlier in comparison to AFO who employ ‘TASER or 
Firearms’ tactics.  
 
There are two police firearms discharges (Table 21) reported within the 2018/19 
MPSUoF dataset. This thesis will not discuss the context as both incidents are still 
subject to an ongoing investigation.  
 
Nicholas FRANCIS 
 
113 
 
Table 21. Reported MPS Firearms discharges (MPSUoF, 2019). 
 
Other than ‘possession of a weapon’ there are no other ‘high-risk’ impact factors 
indicated. Both incidents were recorded on the MPSUoF database by an STTO and 
not the AFO utilising force, potentially creating inaccuracy in the recording of risk 
factors. 
 
 
 
  
Incident 1 2
Date 09/09/2018 Not Recorded
Time (hrs) 16:50 17:47
Borough Not Recorded Not Recorded
Type of Location Public area Public area
Ethnicity White Black
Gender Male Male
Age 18-34 25-49
Impact Factor Possesion of a  Weapon Prior Knowledge
Primary Conduct
Serious/ Aggravated 
Resist. Active Resist
Reason for Force Protect Self Effect Arrest
Protect other Officers Prevent Escape
Effect Arrest
Prevent Escape
Outcome Arrested Arrested
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5. Discussion 
 
This chapter will discuss the findings and as part of this examine the sample for 
representativeness.   
 
Split into broad sections, this chapter will examine motivation and behavioural 
reaction to conflict stimulus and the effectiveness of tactical response. Analysis of the 
research survey questionnaire and MPSUoF dataset will be compared against the 
STTO or AFO sample sub-groups. Examining the research survey questionnaire to 
understand how officers develop operational proficiency in conflict resolution. The 
findings from this research are contrasted against existing literature to enable 
contextually relevant inferences to be drawn examining themes relating to the core 
and sub-research questions, specifically:  
RQ1: ‘How does an Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) compared with unarmed 
Specially Trained TASER Officer (STTO) policing affect decision making?’. 
 
RQ1a: Do routinely unarmed (STTO) officers respond differently to their routinely 
armed counterparts during (conflict?) interactions with the public?  
RQ1b: Is there any difference in decision making or the subsequent application of 
force between an AFO and unarmed officer to resolve an incident with a PMI? 
RQ1c: Do ‘high risk’ groups mean officers are more likely to use certain strategies? 
RQ1d: How does the AFO response to those they perceive are intent on self-harm 
differ to unarmed officers?  
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5.1 Analysis of Satisfaction or Motivation factors  
 
Participants were asked to consider a variety of daily role and task related functions 
to understand the satisfaction or motivation each provides.  
 
AFO’s reported a statistically significant association in satisfaction was obtained 
when helping ‘Vulnerable Persons’, completing crime or role (firearms) specific 
related tasks. Whilst the STTO group indicated they gained satisfaction from specific 
role related tasks e.g. searching suspects, detecting crime and public order; and 
when compared with AFO, no statistical motivational association was established 
within the STTO group for the same variables or tasks. Overall, both groups share a 
majority of motivational associations and these appear to be gained through 
recognition, learning, enjoyment and personal stimulus. However, when comparing 
sub-groups, the results indicate a broader shared association within AFO responses 
and an inconsistent correlation within the STTO group.  
Applying general strain theory, Hendy (2019) argues a ‘failure to achieve positively 
valued goals’ (Agnew 1992, p.51) creates an aspirational driven motivational strain 
between intended and actual outcome. This may lead to negative emotions in ‘events 
or conditions that are disliked by individual’s’ (Agnew 2006, p.4) creating goal-driven 
conflict (Agnew 1992, 2006; Hendy, 2019). There appears a contrast between the 
perception of doing ‘real police work’ with danger, excitement and the actual reality of 
the role, where officers frequently perform a function as a social service (Newburn, 
2007; Pogrebin and Poole, 2003; Van Maanen, 1973; Waddington, 1999). 
The survey questionnaire results indicate motivational factors which may be 
influenced by role. Where the STTO sample is drawn from the wider MPS workforce, 
the role related remit and tasks performed by an unarmed STTO is broad; with 
functions which they must perform but may consider mundane or gain little ‘goal-
driven satisfaction’ from completing. In contrast the AFO sample is taken from a 
small number of specialist units, with a specific and reduced remit e.g. dealing with 
Firearms Crime and the results indicate they gain ‘goal-driven satisfaction’ from 
completing these role related tasks.  
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5.2 Behavioural typology and reaction to stimulus 
 
Similar to later survey questions, Q16 listed a number of scenario where the neutrally 
labelled ‘person’ posed an escalating threat or risk. This sought to understand if there 
was a relationship between the reaction to stimulus or a conflict situation and 
contrasts this with established behavioural typology for police officers. The results will 
also be compared later using the same scenarios, with differing terms of ‘suspect’ or 
victim’.   
  
Officer’s attitudinal or behavioural responses may be classified within numerous 
theoretical frameworks developed to examine police culture e.g. Terrill and Reisig 
(2003), Muir (1977) or Brown, (1981). There appears a strain between operational 
and organisational pressure (Terrill and Reisig, 2003). In an occupational setting, 
officers manage danger with a coercive influence by being distrustful or maintaining 
an ‘edge’ over the citizen (Rubinstein, 1973; Terrill and Reisig, 2003; Skolnick, 1994; 
Van Maanen, 1973). Whilst the broad nature of police work may create an 
organisational and potentially punitive procedural strain for the officer; in response 
they may avoid contentious police work or focus on less ambiguous incidents e.g. 
crime orientated roles where a response is more clearly defined (Brown,1988; 
Herbert, 2006; Skolnick, 1994, 2011; Van Maanen, 1973). 
 
Muir (1977) studied the function and variability in officers’ characteristics arguing this 
influenced the use of coercive tactics or force.  Where a professional is confident to 
use force, conversely the enforcer uses a ‘good/ bad’ binary assessment with a ready 
ability to use force to resolve encounters. The reciprocator is reluctant and cautious 
in using force or coercion, whilst the avoider is anxious in using force or coercion and 
any public facing duties. 
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Brown (1981) inductive approach similarly defines four operational officer typologies 
(Fig. 6) based upon aggressiveness and selectivity. For example, Brown (1981) 
argues the ‘aggressive’ officer, considers their efficacy or function as proactive crime 
control with selective recourse to legal or legitimate norms (Worden, 1995).  
 
 Aggressiveness 
Selectivity High Low 
Selective Old-Sytle 
Crime Fighter 
Service Style 
Non-selective Clean-Beat 
Crime Fighter 
Professional 
Style 
Figure 6. Browns (1981) typology (Worden, 1995, p.55). 
 
The survey questionnaire identified a statistically significant difference in reaction 
between groups. It appears at the point where the threat or risk increases, AFO 
showed a stronger reaction to the conflict stimulus, compared to the STTO group 
where there is no identifiable association. At a lower threat or risk, STTO inclination 
to ‘always’ engage was generally higher than for AFO. This may be attributable to 
role, where the STTO function is to initially respond and resolve the incident. The 
survey questionnaire indicates where the level of threat posed by the subject is 
deemed insignificant, the AFO appears reluctant to engage. Anecdotally, in an 
operational context, there is a likelihood the AFO would request for unarmed support 
to assist and deal with the incident instead.   
 
However, as the risk or threat increases, the operational capability gap between 
STTO and AFO to resolve a significant threat also increases and the survey 
questionnaire responses differ. In accepting the alternative hypothesis e.g. there is a 
difference in response, a lack of association within the STTO group may attributable 
to their role related limitations and operational capability. As initial ‘unarmed’ 
responders, the STTO group will expect tactical support and an AFO led response in 
incidents which may exceed their capability.  The survey questionnaire response 
from the AFO group concurs with the literature; as the subject’s capability (firearm) 
and intent (harm) became clearer, AFOs have a ‘conflict impetus’ or positive reaction 
to the escalating threat. Developed through heuristics, whether in training, by 
operational experience or exposure, it enables AFO’s to exploit a ‘recognition primed’ 
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response to mitigate an increased threat or risk earlier (Gladwell, 2007; Bryant et al., 
2016; Klein, Calderwood and McGregor, 1989; Burrows, 2007). Whilst a central 
police function is to intervene and prevent conflict, it requires a combination 
persuasion or coercive control to find a resolution in difficult or complex incidents 
(Herbert, 2006). There are similarities between STTO survey responses to engage 
with the subject to maintain an ‘edge’ (Terrill and Reisig, 2003) and the non-selective 
‘professional’ style indicated by the averse AFO responses to lower risk scenarios 
(Brown, 1981; Muir, 1977). 
 
5.3 Influencing and developing proficiency in conflict resolution 
Whilst police have the unique power to use force or coercion, a capable or skilful 
officer has the ability to avert its necessity (Bittner, 1974; Muir, 1977). The ‘crude law 
of social relations’ (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000) considers the reciprocal 
behavioural influence within conflict resolution. Cooperative (compliant) relationships 
develop when the aims of each party are clearly associated, whilst competitive 
(defiant) situations arise when the aims are contradictory or disparate (Braithwaite 
1998; Deutsch and Coleman, 2000) Where parties employ or implement ‘strategies 
which involve power or use coercive tactics, threats, or deception’ (Hendy, 2019, 
p.30) this may affect the ability to resolve a conflict. A reciprocal breakdown occurs 
when either party determines due to behavioural influence of the other their goals are 
not being realised (Alpert and Dunham, 2004).  
The survey questionnaire sought to understand how officers resolve conflict and what 
influences or contributes to their proficiency in resolving it. As previously discussed, 
an officer’s role and responsibilities are complex and wide-ranging, requiring them to 
deal with people whose behaviour may be considered either compliant or defiant. 
Turk (1969), applying Norm resistance theory, suggests conflict arises from the issue 
of authority and how the law is implemented, especially where there is a cultural 
variance between the authorities or affected party. Increasing and refining training or 
experience of the actors decreases the likelihood of conflict (Boulton and Cole, 2016; 
Turk, 1969).   
 
The survey questionnaire indicated a difference of the influence that training has 
between the sub-groups in developing an ability to resolve conflict. It appears the 
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influence of training was lower for STTO than the AFO group, with the later more 
reliant on the application of classroom and practical based theory. In addition to 
‘normal’ policing skills, there are technical aspects for AFOs to consider e.g. weapon 
handling, firearms tactics etc. The survey questionnaire suggests AFO supplement 
training with both classroom and experiential learning, to consolidate and contribute 
to their ability to resolve conflict. It may be inferred using this survey questionnaire 
and analysis of MPSUoF data, an AFO’s enhanced training influences their 
performance and operational ability in resolving conflict.  
 
5.4 The proficiency of tactical responses 
 
To understand the implications of using certain tactics, the survey included a set of 
inter-related questions to compare AFO and STTO responses. This set of questions 
each consisted of two parts; the incident type and the tactical options employed.  
 
Using the research survey questionnaire and MPSUoF data this section will discuss 
and define the ‘effectiveness’ of any tactical response for both sample sub-groups. 
When an officer records the use of force within the MPSUoF database, they note the 
range of tactics and order of use, indicating ‘effective’ or ‘non-effective’ against each 
particular tactical option. In practise, this signifies whether the tactical option 
achieved its intended aim in mitigating the threat or risk posed by the subject. A 
percentage calculation of both the recorded ‘effective’ or ‘non-effective’ tactical 
options was used to compare sub-groups. To develop and define understanding on 
how effective a tactical option was in the mitigation of threat or risk; MPSUoF data 
was used to validate and quantify the survey questionnaire responses of ‘effective’ or 
‘non-effective’ e.g. TASER-aimed by STTO: Effective = 718, Non-Effective= 282 
equals a 72% effective use of TASER when aimed by STTO. 
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5.4.1 Effective tactical responses 
 
The survey questionnaire indicated proportionally more ‘firearms’ incidents were 
nominated by AFO than STTO, with ‘mental health’ (STTO n= 36, AFO n=70), 
‘arresting suspects’ (STTO n= 29, AFO n=67) and ‘violent crime’ (STTO n= 13, AFO 
n=58) also selected by both groups. This appears attributable to role related 
operational responsibility e.g. STTO will be the initial police responders to mental 
health calls, whilst only AFOs will be specifically directed to firearms related 
incidents.  
 
The MPSUoF dataset indicated the overall effectiveness of all tactical options used 
by STTO and AFO was 82% (n=79829). In comparison, AFO were 91% (n=6081) 
effective compared to STTO at 81% (n=73208). Although some of the variables 
contained within the survey questionnaire are not specifically listed within the 
MPSUoF dataset, inferences may be drawn. MPSUoF data indicates a strong 
association in the tactical options used and order they are employed by the sample 
sub-groups. However, the officer’s role and capability e.g. unarmed STTO vs AFO, 
with the specific situational or behavioural ‘Impact Factors’ (Table 22) may influence 
the effectiveness of that initial option.  
 
 
Table 22. Impact Factors - MPSUoF 2018/19 dataset. 
 
In comparison with the survey questionnaire, reported Impact Factors for possession 
of a weapon (STTO 31.1%, n= 13213; AFO 74%, n= 2785) and mental health (STTO 
16.9%, n= 7178; AFO 10.1%, n= 380) appear to proportionally reflect the survey 
questionnaire results.  
% %
Alcohol 12099 14.0% 435 6.8%
Acute Behavioural Disorder 944 1.1% 58 0.9%
Drugs 14875 17.2% 512 8.0%
Mental Health 7178 8.3% 380 6.0%
Crowd 6128 7.1% 323 5.1%
Other 3432 4.0% 249 3.9%
Possesion of a weapon 13213 15.3% 2785 43.7%
Prior K'wledge 13157 15.2% 954 15.0%
Size/Gender/Build 15514 17.9% 672 10.6%
Total 86540  - 6368  - 
Impact Factor
MPSUoF recorded Impact Factors
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The subject’s Primary Conduct was recorded within the MPSUoF dataset (Table 23).  
 
 
Table 23. Primary Conduct - MPSUoF 2018/19 dataset. 
 
Violent crime may be inferred from the subject’s recorded Primary Conduct and 
compared to the survey questionnaire results. Aggregating the frequencies for 
aggressive, active and serious or aggravated resistance (STTO 20.7%, n= 8822; 
AFO 8.9%, n= 334) it suggests the survey questionnaire results are reflective of the 
MPSUoF dataset in dealing with non-compliant subjects.  
 
Within the survey questionnaire, the effectiveness of ‘communication’ and ‘time or 
space to de-escalate’ was higher for AFO than for STTO. The effectiveness of 
‘tactical communication’ reported in the MPSUoF dataset again differed between 
groups, with STTO encounters (n=14247) reporting a 40% effectiveness, compared 
to AFO (n =1088) at 77% effective.  
 
Whilst there was a strong statistically significant correlation in effectiveness between 
sample groups, the efficiency in using TASER was higher for AFO (96%, n =660) 
than for STTO (88%, n=3306). The choice to ‘use’ a tactical option is subjective with 
training, experiences, or contextual circumstances influencing use and potentially its 
effectiveness. Again, this result appears attributable to a number of contextual or role 
related proficiency factors; including weapon handling (ability or familiarity) or the use 
of TASER as part of a prearranged tactical option.  
 
For AFO, the survey questionnaire and MPSUoF results appear to reflect the 
literature. AFOs receive enhanced communication training, including basic crisis 
negotiation and to achieve compliance AFOs train to provide the subject ‘time or 
n % n %
Passive resistance 4483 10.5 443 11.8
Compliant 14234 33.5 2151 57.1
Verbal resistance/gestures 6033 14.2 300 8
Active resistance 8960 21.1 536 14.2
Aggressive resistance 6858 16.1 258 6.9
Serious or aggravated resistance 1964 4.6 76 2
40568  - 3688  -
Compliant
Non-Compliant
Total
STTO AFO
Primary Conduct
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space’ to de-escalate confrontation (Garner et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011; Kesic, 
Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Klein, 2006; Lord, 2014; McKenzie, 2006; Parent and 
Verdun-Jones, 1998; Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 2005; Ruiz and Miller, 2004; Van 
Zandt, 1993). AFO’s will usually have sufficient resources immediately at the scene 
to physically negate a threat. A resultant effect of training or operational experience is 
an enhanced ‘recognition primed’ response to threat or risk (Burrows, 2007; Bryant et 
al., 2017; Gladwell, 2007; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989).  
 
Within the context of the survey questionnaire, STTO perceive that ‘firearms’ and 
‘baton gun’ were more effective in de-escalating or resolving incident than the AFO 
sub-group. The MPSUoF data also reflected the survey questionnaire, with STTO 
reporting the effectiveness of Firearms (aimed/ fired) was higher than for AFO (STTO 
98.8%, n= 88; AFO 97%, n= 1264). However, the use of AEP12 Baton Gun (STTO 
58%, n= 12; AFO 91%, n= 11) indicated it was effective in mitigating the threat or risk 
in a smaller percentage of STTO reported incidents, with a low overall observed 
count. As STTO are not trained to use firearm or baton gun their survey 
questionnaire responses may be attributable to a perception of effectiveness rather 
than an operationally based informed opinion. 
 
5.4.2 Non-effective tactical responses 
 
The survey questionnaire identified both sub-groups proportionally selected 64% of 
the same incident types, where tactics that had been utilised were ineffective. These 
included ‘violent crime’ (11%, STTO n= 25, AFO n=56), ‘public order’ (16%, STTO n= 
14, AFO n=56), ‘mental health’ (19%, STTO n= 24, AFO n=55) and ‘arresting 
suspects’ (19%, STTO n= 25, AFO n=56). Four specific tactics represented 80% of 
the total reported as ineffective and when examined further account for 61% of the 
first or second option chosen. These were, ‘communication’ (n= 265; STTO= 6.5%, 
AFO= 19.9%), ‘de-escalation’ (n= 169; STTO= 3.4%, AFO= 12.8%), ‘OST 13 
techniques’ (n= 144; STTO= 12.8%, AFO= 2.1%) and ‘restraint’ (n= 199; STTO= 
3.3%, AFO= 6.5%). There may be specific situational or context related factors which 
have influenced this decision or ineffectiveness.   
 
                                                 
12
 AEP is an acronym for Attenuating Energy Projectile, commonly referred to as Baton Gun or Plastic Bullets. 
13
 OST is an acronym for Officer Safety Training. 
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Communication. 
Comparing the survey questionnaire to MPSUoF data it gives an indication of the 
overall effectiveness of ‘communication’ (STTO 40%, n= 14247; AFO 77%, n= 1088). 
There are large differences reported between STTO and AFO effective use of 
‘communication’ within the first three tactics used; with STTO effectiveness in Tactic 
1 at 35% (n=11660), Tactic 2 at 65% (n=1766) and Tactic 3 at 53% (n=533), and 
AFO Tactic 1 72% (n=785), Tactic 2 at 90% (n=249) and Tactic 3 at 89% (n=44). 
Discussed previously, it is recognised that due to situational or environmental factors 
the use of communication may not be as effective on each occasion. There appears 
an interdependency with the subject and their cognitive ‘ability to coherently interpret 
visual or auditory stimuli’ (Hendy, 2019, p.34). Where this reciprocal ability is 
impaired through alcohol, drugs or mental health, the likelihood of a coercive 
response increases (Hendy, 2019; Mastrofski et al., 2016).  
 
However, the reported effective use of communication appears a factor in reducing 
the necessity for the use of coercive tactics. Through regular training and feedback, 
skills can be taught, rehearsed and refined. An enhanced knowledge of crisis 
negotiation improves the recognition of stress or other indicators, priming and pre-
empting the officer’s response to mitigate threat or risk (Burrows, 2007; Boulton and 
Cole, 2016; Bryant et al., 2017; Gladwell, 2007; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 
1989, Turk, 1969). 
 
Less Lethal options. 
In contrast with the survey questionnaire findings, the MPSUoF data indicated the 
effectiveness of ‘unarmed skills’ (OST techniques) (STTO 89%, n= 10619; AFO 95%, 
n= 659) and ‘restraint’ (Ground /Limb) (STTO 94%, n= 6902; AFO 98%, n= 269) were 
high and similar across the sample sub-groups. 
 
Both groups indicated in the survey questionnaire a reluctance to use ‘baton’ or 
‘irritant spray’ (CS or equivalent), where the observed use in the MPSUoF dataset 
was low and employed in only 0.95% reported UoF incidents. The MPSUoF data 
indicates the effectiveness for both ‘baton’ (STTO 66%, n= 543; AFO 100%, n= 11) 
and ‘Irritant spray’ (STTO 63%, n= 199; AFO 0%, n= 0) is low with mixed results 
between sub-groups. Whilst these may be referred to as a ‘less lethal’ options, their 
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use appears to create a tactical limitation for the responder, placing them in closer 
proximity to a subject or threat. An additional consequential effect of ‘irritant spray’ is 
the officer may also be potentially incapacitated. As AFO’s do not train to use 
personal issue ‘CS incapacitant spray’ within a firearms context and this was not 
utilised in over 6000 recorded UoF tactics, it may be implied this is not a feasible 
option for AFO use. For STTO, at 0.25% its limited use would need further 
examination. Whilst this disinclination removes two effective available options, with 
more unarmed officers being trained as STTO, it also infers a preference for the use 
of restraint or TASER.  
Dependant on the circumstances less lethal options may be more proportionate and 
give a ‘differentiated use of force’ (Burrows, 2007, p.280). They are broad ranging 
options from communication, physical restraint to baton, irritant spray, TASER or 
even AEP (plastic bullet) rounds and dependant on the context each have limitations. 
Usually deployed by AFO’s in parallel with conventional firearms, less lethal options 
form part of a holistic strategy; however, use is subjective and employed either pre-
emptively or reactionary in order to prevent crime or potentially save life (Burrows, 
2007; Sharf and Binder, 1983; Thomas, 1972).  
5.4.3 Summary 
 
The survey questionnaire is reflective of MPSUoF dataset analysis which identified 
strong statistically significant associations in both STTO and AFO (N= 79289, df=25) 
application of tactical options. The research survey questionnaire and MPSUoF 
dataset indicates the tactical option(s) and order in which they are employed are 
statistically similar. Both sub-groups report the initial use of compliance through 
communication, where STTO appear to use restraint earlier than AFO which employ 
TASER or Firearms before restraint type options. As discussed before, this may be 
role or task specific, necessitating using the full AFO capability earlier within an 
incident e.g. firearms aimed. The data indicates the AFO sub-group are more 
proficient or ‘effective’ in the range of tactical options applied.  
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5.5 Approaches to resolving conflict 
 
Officers will naturally apply heuristic techniques or erudite methods which they 
consider effective in resolving a confrontational situation. This question sought to 
understand how an officer’s behavioural reaction to stress affects their response to 
an individual who is confrontational or intimidating. 
Entitlement theory defines how belief structures or ‘working models’ influence an 
expectation of entitlement for ‘care and regard’ throughout an individual’s life 
(Ainsworth, 1973; Lieberman, 1977; Kingshott et al., 2004). These ‘working models’ 
are basic cognitive processes that offer some structure and security to an individual’s 
existence (Wolfe, 1998). Each person will ‘ultimately find[..] their ‘place’ in the world 
relative to others – who ‘counts’ and who does not, who is entitled to care’ (Kingshot 
et al., 2004, p.193).  The evaluation of an individual’s ‘service-entitlement’ (Hendy, 
2019, p.63) may change during an encounter (Lipsky, 1980). For example, an officer 
may assess an individual’s position and therefore their ‘service-entitlement’; which 
may alter as they transition from victim or witness to suspect, or conversely, suspect 
to victim (Holstege et al., 2009; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Lipsky, 1980; 
Patton and Fremouw, 2016; Wolfgang, 1957;).  
Discussed earlier, an officers naturally distrustful nature may affect their ability to 
sympathise or act in a mutually respectful way towards an individual, who is not be 
behaving in a ‘conventional manner’. The police culture of ‘us against them’ 
(Kingshott, 2004, p.189) may also encourage more of a heuristic response and as a 
‘street-level bureaucrat’, generate an illiberal or authoritarian response (Brown, 1992; 
Hendy, 2019; Kingshott, 2004; Lipsky, 1980).  
In response to the survey questionnaire question ‘What do you think is the best way 
to deal with them?’, the only statistically significant response was ‘character – 
imposing authoritative personality as a police officer’, scoring higher for AFO. 
Arguably, until a confrontational or intimidating stimulus is mitigated, the AFO may 
need to initially employ an authoritarian response or reduce the individual’s level of 
‘service-entitlement’.  Associations across the sample groups were identified in the 
survey questionnaire for the use of time to de-escalate with rapport, communication 
or temperament. Where AFO showed an association between experience with time 
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to de-escalate, communication and temperament, in contrast STTO did not record 
any correlation between the same variables. 
Indicated within the MPSUoF dataset active, aggressive or serious/aggravated 
resistance was identified as Primary Conduct in 41.8% STTO (n= 17782) and 23.1% 
AFO (n=870) encounters; the overall effectiveness of tactical communication for AFO 
of 77% (n=1088) and a successful reported use within the 1st Tactic of 72%. As 
previously discussed, AFO’s receive enhanced training in the application and use of 
effective communication. Through training AFO’s calm and composed response 
reduces the potential for confrontation, with the use of ‘time or space’ to de-escalate 
an incident (Garner et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; 
Klein, 2006; Lord, 2014; McKenzie, 2006; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; 
Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 2005; Ruiz and Miller, 2004; Van Zandt, 1993). 
The results from this set of survey questionnaire questions are largely inconclusive 
for both sub-groups. However, in the AFO role, the use of personal (calm, 
communication) or police officer role related attributes (authoritarian, coercive) may 
be an effective technique to influence or resolve a confrontational situation. 
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5.6 The effect of labelling  
 
The individual, contextual and situational factors mean that each use of force incident 
is potentially unique and developing an understanding is challenging. A set of survey 
questionnaire four questions each containing eight scenario based sub-questions, 
were used to analyse the sample responses. All questions were similar in style, with 
the subject label either being described as a ‘suspect’ or ‘victim’.  The scale of threat 
or risk posed by a subject increased from passive to potentially violent towards 
another and their mental condition was defined. Participants were requested to rank 
using a 1-9 scale the order tactical options were either used or not utilised. The four 
question sets generated 33,905 variables responses. Where the individual in the 
survey questionnaire was labelled as a ‘suspect’ or ‘victim’ or in a neutral term, STTO 
and AFO survey questionnaire responses and tactical options chosen were broadly 
similar; this applied for tactics for both utilised tactics and those not employed.  
 
In each set of questions as the threat, risk or capability of the subject increased, the 
results between the sub-groups became less similar and the STTO responses 
deviated from AFO. In comparison to other results within this survey questionnaire 
and as discussed previously, this difference between STTO and AFO may be due to 
role and operational capability. However, whilst this slight variation may be 
attributable to increase in threat from the subject and a difference in operational 
capability between sub-groups; in contrast with the literature the change in labelling 
or status from a ‘suspect’ to a ‘victim’ the did not appear to influence the responses 
for either group (Holstege et al., 2009; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Patton 
and Fremouw, 2016, Wolfgang, 1957;).  
 
The MPSUoF data does not identify the subject’s status as a suspect or victim. 
Analysis of the MPSUoF dataset identified an overall strong association in the 
application and effectiveness of tactical options selected by both STTO and AFO 
(rs=.968, p < .001, df=25, STTO n=73208, AFO n=6074). In addition, further analysis 
of each individual tactical option revealed equally significant associations in STTO 
and AFO use. This operational use of force reflects and validates the survey 
questionnaire results.  
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5.7 Equipment and training 
 
5.7.1 Training 
 
Whilst the AFO group indicated their training prepared them to deal with an individual 
in mental crisis, in contrast STTO indicated there was a requirement for more reality-
based scenarios and theory based ‘training’ to enhance their operational 
performance. Officers requested an increased frequency of time allocated to both 
STTO and AFO training. It appears the expectations from officers to receive role 
related, effective and realistic training were high and whilst being met for some this 
was apparently not the case for others. STTO and AFO indicated a requirement for 
enhanced mental health training and for STTO to have the ability to operationally 
deploy with NHS mental health counterparts. 
 
5.7.2 Equipment 
The survey questionnaire responses relating to role equipment were unremarkable, 
broad and split both within the sub-groups and across the sample as a whole. 
However, the survey questionnaire responses did identify a strong negative critique 
of specific equipment which may influence their response to an individual in mental 
health crisis. In analysing the free text responses and MPSUoF data, STTO indicate 
a requirement for accessing more coercive equipment; compared to AFO who have 
access to extra equipment but are seeking to de-escalate the incident by using 
‘distance, time and space’. 
 
5.8.3 Summary 
Discussed earlier, a ‘recognition primed’ decision model enhances awareness of 
critical environmental indicators reducing the cognitive challenge during an incident 
(Boulton and Cole, 2016; Fiore et al., 2012; Lipshitz et al., 2001; Loveday et al., 
2013). Excluding operational exposure; training is a safer and relatively risk-free 
method of enhancing a responder’s heuristic or cognitive decision making ability in 
environments that are potentially hazardous or where the risk to others is significant 
e.g. aviation (Boulton and Cole, 2016; Klein and Militello, 2001; Orasanu and Fischer, 
1997; Seamster et al., 1993). Clearly, there is a balance for the MPS, in providing 
sufficient training to be recognised as ‘occupationally competent’ (College of Policing, 
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2019) and a perception of the quantity of training an officer may personally require. 
Through experiential learning or exposure to operational deployments, officers will in 
time develop heuristic shortcuts or ‘adaptive expertise’ (Boulton and Cole, 2016, 
p.292) and regular assessments ensures the standard is maintained (Burrows, 
2007).  
There is a difference between STTO and AFO roles, where generally AFO indicate 
satisfaction with the equipment the survey questionnaire results appear to divide 
opinion within the AFO group.  Based on role specific training e.g. AFO, ARV etc. 
there are conflicting responses on whether additional mental health training is 
required. Similarly, STTO indicate they require more equipment and training to better 
respond to individual’s in mental health crisis.   
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5.8 Inferences 
 
Discussed earlier, much of the survey questionnaire data is ordinal in nature and with 
a small sample size, caution should be applied to any inferences drawn from this 
research. However, the MPSUoF data is a valid comparator to understand, develop 
upon and give an operational context to the survey questionnaire results. 
 
Reflecting the literature and survey questionnaire, both sub-groups contrast their 
attitudinal perception of doing ‘real police work’ with some of the more mundane daily 
tasks required from the police service. However, within the survey questionnaire both 
indicate a there is a motivational satisfaction gained from helping vulnerable people 
and crime related tasks. For officers performing a specialist role e.g. AFO, it may be 
inferred the goal-driven or role related tasks act as an additional stimulus to their 
motivation or performance. An indication of the overall performance for both sub-
groups may be measured and calculated by the use of ‘effective’ or ‘non-effective’ 
tactical options applied within the MPSUoF. In comparison to STTO, the overall AFO 
effective performance is higher across the complete range of reported tactical 
options.  
 
The survey questionnaire indicated a behavioural difference in response to the threat 
or risk posed by the subject; STTO intervened to a point where the threat exceeded 
their operational capability, whereas AFO responses revealed a selective 
engagement threshold only as the threat or risk increased.  This may be attributable 
to role related factors where, dependant on risk, there is an implied mutual 
expectation of support from the ‘unarmed’ STTO or AFO responders. 
 
To discuss some of the research questions and inferences which may be drawn from 
this research: 
RQ1b: Is there any difference in decision making or the subsequent application of 
force between an AFO and unarmed STTO to resolve an incident with a Person with 
Mental Illness (PMI)? 
The research survey questionnaire and MPSUoF data indicate the tactical response 
to a person with mental illness (PMI), tactical options selected and effectiveness is 
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statistically similar. Whilst the range of options available creates a capability 
difference between STTO and AFO, the data implies there is minimal difference in 
the actual operational response or use of force between the sample sub-groups.  
 
The MPSUoF dataset records the subject’s ‘Primary Conduct’ within a range of 
options and for this research this was categorised as ‘compliant’ (compliant, verbal, 
active or passive resistance) and ‘non-compliant’ (active, aggressive or aggravated 
resistance). Analysis of a ‘non-compliant’ PMI, indicated a strong association in the 
type of tactical options utilised by both sample sub-groups. However, when a 
compliant PMI was analysed, there was a variation between the sample sub-groups 
in tactics and response. In comparison, the range of options utilised by AFO was 
narrower than STTO. It may be inferred this variance is a result of the role specific 
AFO function e.g. Firearms aimed and the appropriate effective use of specific 
tactical options to mitigate the threat or risk.  
RQ1c: Do ‘high risk’ groups mean officers are more likely to use certain strategies?  
There are moderate differences in reported behavioural or impact factors that high-
risk groups initially present. However, the sub-group responses to a subject 
displaying risk ‘Impact Factors’ (alcohol, ABD, drugs, mental health) were strongly 
associated across the range of tactics to suggest there is minimal difference in the 
application of force between STTO and AFO. Where a subject was in possession of 
a weapon, there is a variation between sub-groups, with AFO using a combination of 
‘firearms’ and ‘TASER’ tactics in over 42% of reported encounters. 
 
By examining each of the individual risk ‘Impact Factors’ against the tactical option 
used, ‘communication’ is ranked as the first option used by both STTO and AFO to 
seek compliance. There is a variation in effectiveness, where AFO report 77% 
success when using ‘communication’ compared to STTO at only 40%. There also 
appears a small variation in the type of tactical options employed between the 
sample. In comparison with STTO, the percentage use 14  of TASER by AFO is 
proportionally twice as much where risk ‘Impact Factors’ are reported; and similarly, 
percentage of restraint by STTO was used in almost twice the number of incidents 
compared to AFO.  
 
                                                 
14
  ‘Use’ includes drawn, red-dotted, aimed or fired. 
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For STTO the recorded primary conduct appeared evenly split between ‘passive’ or 
‘aggressive’, in comparison to AFO where over 70% of conduct was ‘Passive’. The 
association and tactical response between STTO and AFO to an ‘aggressive’ subject 
was statistically similar.  However, where the subject’s behaviour was initially 
reported as ‘passive’ there was a difference between the sample in association and 
tactics used. This appears attributable to contextual factors and use of AFO role 
specific tactics e.g. firearms aimed; compared to STTO who utilise the broadest 
range of available options in their ‘unarmed’ response.  
 
Whilst this research and MPSUoF data indicate small difference, the response 
strategies are statistically similar between both sub-groups. The use of ‘compliance’ 
or ‘force presented not used’ appear to be the main tactical approaches employed to 
gain the subject’s compliance. However, where a subject is in possession of a 
weapon, both sub-groups utilise TASER and restraint options. 
RQ1d: How does the AFO response to those they perceive are intent on self-harm 
differ to unarmed officers?  
There is minimal difference in the tactical response to a person intent on self-harm. 
The AFO remit appears to marginally influence the order tactical options are utilised 
and their effectiveness; where STTO may use restraint earlier, AFO may use 
Firearms or TASER tactics. Whilst this response may be attributable to the type of 
threat or risk encountered, it may also be inferred the difference in STTO 
performance is a resultant effect of limited training. AFO’s benefit from enhanced and 
regular practical or theory-based training, providing an iterative improvement to 
augment a ‘professional’ response to a PMI or in resolving conflict e.g. effective use 
of communication and/or selective use of coercion.  
Nicholas FRANCIS 
 
133 
In answering the main research question - RQ1: ‘How does an Authorised Firearms 
Officer (AFO) compared with unarmed Specially Trained TASER Officer (STTO) 
policing affect ‘conflict’ decision making?’. 
 
The research survey questionnaire and MPSUoF data indicates STTO and AFO 
responses are strong and statistically associated, suggesting there is minimal 
difference in the application of force. It may be also inferred from this the decision-
making processes of the sample sub-groups is similar. However, the role, associated 
enhanced capability and training appears to improve the AFO ability to respond. The 
training appears to improve the proficiency of any response, effective decision 
making and reduces the cognitive burden to react in constantly evolving situations 
(Alison et al., 2007; Flin and Arbuthnot, 2002). Rapid evaluation of an incident is 
enhanced by erudite knowledge and the responder’s skill level to dynamically make 
or adapt decisions to mitigate a changing threat (Boulton, 2016; Alison et al., 2007; 
Hastie, 2001; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989; Yates, Venott and Patalano 
2003). Intuitive processing of key situational or behavioural indicators may also be 
improved through heuristics, developing role proficiency to become ‘recognition 
primed’ or ‘conditioned’ through experiential learning (Burrows, 2007; Klein, 
Calderwood and MacGregor 1989). 
 
The survey questionnaire indicated that STTO would engage a subject up to a 
certain threshold until their capability (weapon) and intent (harm) were clearer. 
Contradicting the literature, survey responses did not alter whether the subject was 
labelled as mentally ill, a ‘suspect’ or a ‘victim’, but were consistent and focussed on 
the threat or risk (Hendy, 2019; Holstege et al., 2009; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 
2000; Lipsky, 1980; Patton and Fremouw, 2016; Snipes and Mastrofski, 1990;  
Wolfgang, 1957). An ‘unarmed’ officer has a capability limit and where the threat or 
risk exceeds this ability to protect themselves or another, the ‘perception’ of danger 
to engage a subject beyond this threshold appears understandable (Homant, 
Kennedy and Hupp, 2000). Police officers have to adapt and employ different 
techniques within this unarmed paradox to engage with a dangerous subject and due 
to this perception or ‘dangerousness’ bias may use more coercive methods to 
resolve it (Alpert, 1989; Garner et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011; Knutsson and Strype, 
2003; MacDonald et al., 2001; Miller, 2015; Ruiz and Miller, 2004; Short et al., 2014; 
Watson, Corrigan and Ottati, 2004; Wood, Watson and Fulambarker, 2016). 
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The initial interaction point, communication and direct series of events thereafter are 
all equally influential to the probability of lethal force being used (Fridell and Binder, 
1992). AFOs enhanced and live training practise, is reflected within the MPSUoF 
data, where the reported and effective use of communication is significantly higher 
than for STTO, restraining the need for more coercive strategies (Azizi, 2010; Best 
and Quigley, 2003; Garner et al., 1996; Johnson, 2011; Lord, 2014; McKenzie, 2006; 
Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Pinizzotto et al., 2012; Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 
2005). 
 
An additional consequence of the enhanced AFO’s training and/or role related 
capability is where coercive strategies are employed, in comparison to STTO the 
AFO sub-group are more proficient in the application of all tactical options. This 
enhanced AFO demonstrates an operational ability as an ‘expert practitioner’ in 
resolving conflict (Burrows, 2007; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor 1989). 
Therefore, whilst there is a marginal difference in decision-making ability this appears 
attributable to the enhanced training that AFOs receive. 
 
The next section concludes this thesis, examines the research methodology, findings 
and makes recommendations for consideration to improve current knowledge and 
operational practise. 
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to broaden academic and operational awareness of a 
unique and complex area.  The ‘Suicide by Cop’ (SbC) phenomenon is a rare 
occurrence and has been described as a ‘high impact low probability’ type of event. 
There is a duty for the police to intervene (and potentially use force) in instances 
where a vulnerable person, with ‘lethality of means’, initiates self-destructive violent 
conduct and presents a significant risk or threat to him/herself or another.  
 
This research seeks to develop an understanding of the use of force paradigm within 
the England & Wales (E&W) policing context. The majority of SbC research is 
generated within the United States of America (USA) and whilst informative, there 
are obvious differences in both culture and policing context with E&W. It is believed 
this type of research in E&W is necessary, not only to sustain public confidence or 
police legitimacy, but to enhance an awareness for responders or support services in 
nullifying a vulnerable individual’s SbC ideation. Using a mixed method approach, 
this research sought to understand the use of force paradigm within an E&W policing 
context. This used the literature review to act as a framework for the design of a 
survey questionnaire of operational MPS STTO and AFO officers. Analysis of 
MPSUoF data was used to validate and add value to the survey questionnaire 
qualitative responses.  
 
The research survey questionnaire (N=315) and MPSUoF (N=132410) data indicate 
there is minimal difference in the application of force between STTO and AFO 
officers. The overall range of tactics used by AFO was narrower than STTO and 
appeared centred around firearms tactics. Individually analysing the tactics, AFO 
indicated a better proficiency with a higher percentage of effective use when 
compared to STTO.  This appears attributable to the enhanced training which 
influencing AFO decision-making ability and producing a more effective performance 
in conflict resolution.  
 
The research survey questionnaire indicates the sample sub-groups obtain 
motivational satisfaction form helping vulnerable people and role related involvement 
in crime orientated duties e.g. searching suspects. Where officers specialise within a 
specific role e.g. AFO, the survey questionnaire results suggest the tasks may act as 
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an additional stimulus, enhancing their overall motivation and/or performance. Whilst 
the survey questionnaire indicates a similarity in the tactical options selected, there 
appears a difference in response based upon the threat or risk presented by the 
subject. AFO were selective in responding to ‘lower threat’, with a conflict stimulated 
response as the threat or risk increased. Conversely, while STTO intervened in the 
lower level incidents earlier than AFO, their responses altered as the threat increased 
or exceeded their operational capability. However, the influence of organisational 
culture should not be discounted, as there is a mutual unspoken silo belief of 
remaining within role specific functions, whether in an ‘unarmed’ STTO or AFO role. 
Therefore, this ‘selective engagement threshold’ may also be attributable to role 
related characteristics. 
 
The MPSUoF data indicated the STTO and AFO response to a PMI or ‘high risk’ 
subject was statistically similar and there was a minimal difference in operational 
response or use of force across the sample. Minor variations in the application of 
tactics or range of options employed were identified, notably where the subject was 
reported as ‘Passive’. This variance between AFO and STTO appears to be a 
resultant effect of role specific functions and within this, appropriate and effective 
tactical options are selected to mitigate any threat or risk. The survey questionnaire 
and MPSUoF data also indicate the selection of tactical options and the order in 
which they are utilised may influence the effectiveness of the option, requiring the 
officer to utilise additional UoF options to resolve the encounter.  
 
Whilst the type of threat or risk may denote a specific response, the training and 
capability of the responder influences performance. Where AFO’s receive enhanced 
frequent practical or theory-based training, this appears to indicate an enhanced 
response and associated performance e.g. effective use of communication and/or 
selective use of coercion. The survey questionnaire results and MPSUoF data 
suggest by limiting STTO initial or refresher training this may impact upon their 
overall tactical ability and their skill level or proficiency. Additionally, where STTO 
capability is limited they may use restraint earlier compared to AFO who have the 
ability to select and apply both Firearms or TASER tactics. As discussed earlier, this 
research appears to reflect the literature; in that training conditions a ‘primed’ 
response to stimulus and has subsequent influences on critical decision making. In 
comparison to STTO; AFO selection, training and continual assessment enhances 
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the individual decision-making capability, enabling effective use of tactics to de-
escalate or respond to conflict stimulus appropriately. 
 
In considering the central SbC topic area: What inferences relating to SbC and the 
police use of force may be drawn from this research?  
 
The mode of arming to police within E&W is reflective of the unarmed public they are 
tasked to serve. The MPS policing model is replicated across E&W, where response 
to incidents are largely unarmed. Any response is threat or risk dependant and may 
necessitate additional support from STTO or AFO trained staff, providing ‘scale of 
response’ and an increased capability should it be required. The policing context in 
E&W may be described as an ‘unarmed paradox’ (Knutsson and Strype, 2003) where 
unarmed officers operate within a ‘restraint paradigm’ (Squires and Kennison, 2010, 
p.1) using minimal force, within the law and against a citizen. This model advocates 
the legitimacy of the police to serve the public. Within this model, armed officers may 
be utilised to respond to protect the public where the threat or risk exceeds the 
capability of the unarmed police officer. The literature discussed the significance of 
heuristics upon decision making, especially where there is a physiological reaction to 
a perceived threat or harmful stimulus. Discussing the literature, enables an 
understanding of the effect that training has upon conditioning a ‘primed’ response to 
mitigate threat (Burrows, 2007; Klein, Calderwood and MacGregor, 1989). 
Familiarisation with stress reduces cognitive burden or ‘task saturation’ for the 
responder and where possible may permit the use of conflict resolution tactics to de-
escalate an incident. 
 
Officers patrol and respond to incidents within their training, force policy and law, but 
the nature of their response within this operating framework is fundamentally 
autonomous. Where an incident exceeds the capability of unarmed officers, firearms 
operations are commanded by a senior officer directing any AFO response to 
mitigate the threat or risk. However, even within these incidents, the operational 
effectiveness is reliant on the proficiency of the firearms officer and their decision-
making abilities to subsequently implement tactical options. This research has 
examined two groups of officers who have received enhanced training and have 
additional coercive capability to resolve incidents. In comparing the sub-groups 
Nicholas FRANCIS 
 
138 
survey questionnaire and MPS use of force data, there are marginal differences in 
their response or tactical effectiveness to a person with mental illness.  
 
In comparison to the USA where every police responder is armed, the mode of 
arming and initial police response in E&W differs. The scaled ‘mode of arming’ e.g. 
unarmed to STTO to AFO, with diverse range of ‘unarmed’ tactics innately restrains 
any operational response. This appears to remove the immediate capability and limit 
a subject’s ability to fulfil their suicidal ideation by using this SbC proxy method.  
 
Where a vulnerable individual, who poses a substantial risk or threat to himself or 
another, engages in a course of conduct, the research results imply the initial 
‘unarmed’ response, ‘mode of arming’, training and application of tactics may be 
responsible in effectively ‘restraining’ a police response.  The occurrence of SbC or 
similar ‘near miss’ type incidents which are averted is not currently measured and is 
reliant on post-incident investigations to improve operational practise. Arguably, this 
‘normalisation of deviance’ (Haddon-Cave, 2006) and acceptance of events as they 
stand does little to develop or understand the causal chain within an E&W context. 
This research may only predict the operational response in E&W to a potential SbC, 
but though analysis of UoF data it is able to understand the response options 
employed by STTO and AFO to a subject displaying ‘high risk’ factors. Further case 
study analysis of E&W police shootings or averted incidents is required, to develop a 
fuller understanding.  
 
Critical analysis of the literature identifies the multitude of suicide definitions create a 
challenge to define SbC which may be described as a complex and ‘wicked problem’ 
(Grint, 2008). The combination of sociological strain, vulnerability and risk factors 
may increase the likelihood of suicidal ideation. The stark challenge in researching 
SbC is validating any hypothesis, as if suicidal ideation has been achieved the 
person is deceased. With limited accounts from individuals who have attempted SbC 
and survived, the main developments in understanding SbC have been made using 
post-incident case studies.  Where an individual with suicidal ideation, utilises the 
police as a means of realisation, it creates a no-win situation for responders and an 
operational dilemma in assessing the subject’s intent whilst mitigating their threat. 
The next section discusses some of the recommendations generated by this 
research.  
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7. Recommendations 
 
The findings from this research generate six recommendations. These are 
categorised in themes and Table 24 references the research or supporting literature.  
 
Recommendation 1. Research: Proactive research programme 
An active research programme should be considered a priority to identify 
preventative strategies for both suicide and SbC. It is suggested a collaborative multi-
discipline research approach with the involvement of both public health and police 
professionals is required. Supported by accurate data records, practitioner field-
based research is required to innovatively exploit opportunities and support those in 
mental crisis. Since Best and Quigley (2003) the ‘lessons’ from fatal encounters have 
enhanced police understanding of SbC, evolving the SbC operational response in 
England and Wales (E&W). Whilst improvements are welcomed, these are a reactive 
response to criticism following fatal encounters. Commissioning a proactive research 
study will develop a deeper understanding of all encounters with the mentally ill, 
including key risks and context when force is likely to be used in a SbC. This 
recommendation would seek to research the demand placed upon the police service, 
review the operational responses and the scale of force used by police in E&W.  
 
Recommendation 2. Definition:  Develop suicide and SbC classifications 
Defining SbC is critical to establish a common understanding and advancing 
research of this phenomenon. The definition of suicide needs to be simplified. Within 
this, limited classification types e.g. SbC to provide a workable multi-discipline 
definition which may assist in establishing Coronial verdicts or be commonly used in 
research across a number of fields. This thesis did not examine Religious or Terrorist 
inspired suicide, ‘Murder Suicide’ or ‘Rampage’ suicide incidents. These events 
appear to support the ‘victim precipitated suicide’ hypothesis (Wolfgang, 1957) and 
contemporary research may present opportunities to influence prospective studies or 
establish new theories which may be aligned with SbC. 
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Recommendation 3. Education and Influence:  Increase public awareness  
There are global and national preventative strategies or ‘action plans’ to reduce the 
number of suicides. Considered a public health problem, both mental health and 
suicide have commonly held stigmas attached to them. This recommendation 
suggests a research programme supported by a pragmatic suicide definition will 
assist in influencing or educating public opinion. There is a cultural stigma attached 
to suicide. Through an education and public engagement strategy expose under-
reporting and risk factors which increase the ‘hidden’ nature of suicidal ideation.  SbC 
requires the implementation of a pro-active and pre-emptive approach to support 
vulnerable persons prior to any crisis point. Academics are able to influence policy, 
training, and operational practice, through research to move away from the existing 
‘learning by mistakes’ approach. Developing an evidence base to examine methods 
of preventing a vulnerable person reaching the point of ideation or achieving SbC.  
 
Recommendation 4. Assessment:  SbC assessment tool  
This research indicates the nature of each incident is unique, with differing 
approaches or responses and proficiency in conflict resolution. Police response to 
mental health adds to the significant operational strain, where accountability is 
inadvertently transferred to the police to manage, respond and mitigate the risk of 
suicidal ideation. Using comparative analysis of the personal, risk and intent factors, 
this recommendation would seek to develop a practitioner’s assessment tool to 
understand the effect of mental health on suicidal ideation and likelihood of 
realisation. It is envisaged all practitioners would use this, whether community mental 
health specialists, first line police responders or armed officers.  
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Recommendation 5. Tactical restraint:  Selective coercion tactics. 
Practitioner led and supported by academics, this recommendation would seek to 
understand circumstances which influence the order tactical options are utilised, their 
effectiveness and what may be attributable to the type of threat or risk encountered. 
Within the E&W context, the officer’s perception of “dangerousness” and recognition 
of ‘Primary Indicators’ needs to be explored; with development training to ‘prime’ the 
operational response. Where police restrain the use of (lethal) force preventing self-
harm, suicide or SbC, the creation of a national database investigating ‘near-miss’ 
incidents would measure and evidence pragmatic strategies. Where officers have 
‘restrained’ themselves from firing, this should be investigated to develop 
understanding of the ‘perception of danger’ and the influence tactical restraint has 
upon the decision to use force. This research identified a performance difference 
between sub-groups which appears an effect of limiting conflict resolution training for 
STTO’s. This recommendation would further seek to understand and develop upon 
the E&W AFO response model in resolving conflict e.g. effective use of 
communication and/or selective but proficient use of coercion.  
 
Recommendation 6. Development:  Equipment, tactics and operational practise 
This research identified the equipment and training to manage those in mental health 
crisis is lacking. A national review of ‘less lethal’ options is required to understand 
officer’s proficiency, effective use of tactics and training. To minimise the use of lethal 
force at the point of SbC crisis, research is needed to understand what additional 
positive options e.g. equipment or tactics are available. All front-line responders 
require enhanced mental health training; supplemented with role specific practical 
based training and tactics to de-escalate incidents with ‘high-risk’ individuals. 
Developing upon the mental health triage scheme, a collaborative multi-agency 
practise should be implemented, where mental health professionals attend incidents 
to support first responders with an individual in crisis.  
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Recommendations. 
 Recommendation Source Reference 
 
1 
Research: Development of a 
proactive research programme 
Literature 
review 
Azizi, 2010; Best, Quigley and Bailey. 2004; Culhane, Boman and Schweitzer, 2016; Dewey et al., 
2013; Homant and Kennedy, 2000; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Hutson et al., 1998; Kesic, 
Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Kingshott, 2009; Klinger, 2001; Lankford, 2015; Lord, 2014; Lord, 2012; 
Lord and Sloop, 2010; McKenzie, 2006; McLeod, Thomas and Kesic 2014; Miller, 2015; Mohandie, 
Meloy and Collins, 2009; Neitzel and Gill, 2011; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; Patton and Fremouw, 
2016; Pillay and Thomas, 2015; Sarno and Van Hasselt, 2014; Van Zandt,1993. 
 
 
2 
Definition:  Develop academic 
consensus to characterise a 
workable multi-discipline definition for 
suicide and SbC research 
parameters. 
Literature 
review 
Azizi, 2010; Best, Quigley and Bailey. 2004; Culhane, Boman and Schweitzer, 2016; Dewey et al., 
2013; Homant and Kennedy, 2000; Homant, Kennedy and Hupp, 2000; Hutson et al., 1998; Kesic, 
Thomas and Ogloff, 2012; Kingshott, 2009; Klinger, 2001; Lankford, 2015; Lord, 2014; Lord, 2012; 
Lord and Sloop, 2010; McKenzie, 2006; McLeod, Thomas and Kesic 2014; Miller, 2015; Mohandie, 
Meloy and Collins, 2009; Neitzel and Gill, 2011; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; Patton and Fremouw, 
2016; Pillay and Thomas, 2015; Sarno and Van Hasselt, 2014; Van Zandt,1993. 
 
3 
Education and Influence:  Using 
research to increase public 
awareness and influence debate 
Literature 
review 
Squires and Kennison, 2010; McKenzie, 2006; Best and Quigley, 2003; Azizi, 2010; Morabito and 
Socia, 2015; Kesic, Thomas and Ogloff, 2010 Pinozzotto et al., 2012; Squires and Kennison, 2010; 
Best and Quigley, 2003; Lord, 2014. 
 
 
4 
Assessment:  Through comparative 
analysis of the personal, risk and 
intent factors develop an assessment 
tool to understand the effect of MH 
on suicidal ideation and likelihood of 
realisation. 
Literature 
review; 
Research 
survey 
questionnaire 
Drylie, 2006; Lindsay and Lester, 2004; Mohandie & Meloy, 2010; Parent and Verdun-Jones, 1998; 
Pillay and Thomas, 2015; Wilson et al., 1998; Hutson et al.., 1998; Lord, 2000; Homant and Kennedy, 
2000; Mohandie et al., 2009; Booth et al., 2010; Miller, 2015; Ogloff et al., 2013. 
 
5 
 
Tactical restraint:  Develop a method 
to record ‘near miss’ incidents where 
police restrain the use of (lethal) 
force preventing self-harm, suicide or 
SbC. Research to understand the 
key risks and context when force is 
likely to be utilised on PMI and when 
shots are likely to be fired. 
Literature 
review, 
Research 
survey 
questionnaire, 
MPSUoF data 
Best and Quigley, 2003; Pinizzotto et al., 2012; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Azizi, 2010; Garner et al., 
1996; Johnson, 2011; McKenzie, 2006; Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 2005; Lord, 2014; Parent and 
Verdun-Jones, 1998; Azizi, 2010; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; Ho et al., 2007; Kesic, Thomas and 
Ogloff, 2012; Miller, 2015; Squires and Kennison, 2010;; Morabito and Socia, 2015;  
 
 
6 
 
Development:  Equipment, tactics 
and operational practise 
Literature 
review, 
Research 
survey 
questionnaire, 
MPSUoF data 
Pillay and Thomas 2015; Brown et al., 2004; Silverman et al., 2007; Mohandie and Meloy, 2010; 
MacDonald et al., 2001; Pescosolido et al., 1999; Socall and Holtgraves, 1992; Alpert, 1989; Miller, 
2015; Garner et al., 1996. 
Table 24. Thematic recommendations.  
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Appendix C - MPS Use of Force dataset - recorded variables.         (Source: MPS, 2019). 
1 IncidentDate 51 SingleCrewed 101 CED Fired 151 CED2 Front 5 250 CED4 Back K
2 IncidentTime 52 TrainedCED 102 CED Fired 5 Secs Cycle Interrupted 152 CED2 Front 6 251 Firearms Aimed
3 Incident Location: Street/Highway 53 CarryingCED 103 CED Fired Repeat Cycle Same Cartridge 153 CED2 Front 7 252 Firearms Fired
4 Incident Location: Public Transport 54 Tactic 1 104 CED Fired Total Number Of Cycles 154 CED2 Front 8 253 SubjectAge
5 Incident Location: Retail Premises 55 Coding Tactic 1 105 CED Fired Cycle Extended Beyond 5 Secs 155 CED2 Front 9 254 SubjectGender
6 Incident Location: Open ground (e.g. park, car park, field) 56 Effective 1 106 CED Fired Miss With One Probe 156 CED2 Front 10 255 SubjectEthnicity
7 Incident Location: Licensed Premises 57 Tactic 2 107 CED Fired Miss With Both Probes 157 CED2 Front 11 256 Coding- SubjectEthnicity
8 Incident Location: Sports or Event Stadia 58 Coding Tactic 2 108 CED Front 1 158 CED2 Front 12 257 PhysicalDisability
9 Incident Location: Hospital/A&E (2n-mental-health setting) 59 Effective 2 109 CED Front 2 159 CED2 Front 13 258 MentalDisability
10 Incident Location: Mental Health Setting 60 Tactic 3 110 CED Front 3 160 CED2 Front 14 259 StaffInjured
11
Incident Location: Police vehicle with prisoner handling 
cage 61 Coding Tactic 3 111 CED Front 4 161 CED2 Front 15 260 StaffInjuryIntentional
12
Incident Location: Police vehicle without prisoner handling 
cage 62 Effective 3 112 CED Front 5 162 CED2 Back A 261 StaffInjuryLevel
13 Incident Location: Dwelling 63 Tactic 4 113 CED Front 6 163 CED2 Back B 262 StaffMedProvided
14 Incident Location: Police station (excluding custody block) 64 Coding Tactic 4 114 CED Front 7 164 CED2 Back C 263 SubjectInjured
15 Incident Location: Custody Block 65 Effective 4 115 CED Front 8 165 CED2 Back D 264 SubjectNatureOfInjury
16 Incident Location: Ambulance 66 Tactic 5 116 CED Front 9 166 CED2 Back E 265 SubjectMedOffered
17 Incident Location: Other 67 Coding Tactic5 117 CED Front 10 167 CED2 Back F 266 SubjectMedProvided
18 Borough 68 Effective 5 118 CED Front 11 168 CED2 Back G 267 Outcome: Made off/escaped
19 Coding -Borough 69 Tactic 6 119 CED Front 12 169 CED2 Back H 268 Outcome: Arrested
20 PrimaryConduct 70 Coding Tactic 6 120 CED Front 13 170 CED2 Back J 269 Outcome: Hospitalised
21 Coding - PrimaryConduct 71 Effective 6 121 CED Front 14 171 CED2 Back K 270 Outcome: Detained - Mental Health Act
22 AssaultedBySubject 72 Tactic 7 122 CED Front 15 172 CED3 Drawn 271 Outcome: Fatality
23 ThreatenedWithWeapon 73 Coding Tactic 7 123 CED Back A 173 CED3 Aimed 272 Outcome: Other
24 Coding- ThreatenedWithWeapon 74 Effective 7 124 CED Back B 174 CED3 ArCED3
25 AssaultedWithWeapon 75 Tactic 8 125 CED Back C 175 CED3 Red-Dotted
26 Coding- AssaultedWithWeapon 76 Coding Tactic 8 126 CED Back D 176 CED3 Drive Stun
27 Impact Factor: Possesion of a weapon 77 Effective 8 127 CED Back E 177
CED3 Drive Stun Repeat 
Application
28 Impact Factor: Alcohol 78 Tactic 9 128 CED Back F 178 CED3 Angle Drive Stun
29 Impact Factor: Drugs 79 Coding Tactic 9 129 CED Back G 179 CED3 Fired
30 Impact Factor: Mental Health 80 Effective 9 130 CED Back H 180 CED3 Fired Cartridge Number
31 Impact Factor: Prior K2wledge 81 Tactic 10 131 CED Back J 181 CED3 Fired 5 Secs Cycle Interrupted
32 Impact Factor: Size/Gender/Build 82 Coding Tactic 10 132 CED Back K 182
CED3 Fired Repeat Cycle Same 
Cartridge
33 Impact Factor: Acute Behavioural Disorder 83 Effective 10 133 CED2 Drawn 183 CED3 Fired Total Number Of Cycles
34 Impact Factor: Crowd 84 Tactic 11 134 CED2 Aimed 184
CED3 Fired Cycle Extended Beyond 
5 Secs
35 Impact Factor: Other 85 Coding Tactic 11 135 CED2 ArCED2 185 CED3 Fired Miss With One Probe
36 Reason for Force: Protect self 86 Effective 11 136 CED2 Red-Dotted 186 CED3 Fired Miss With Both Probes
37 Reason for Force: Protect Public 87 Tactic 12 137 CED2 Drive Stun 187 CED3 Front 1
38 Reason for Force: Protect Subject 88 Coding Tactic 12 138 CED2 Drive Stun Repeat Application 188 CED3 Front 2
39 Reason for Force: Protect Other Officers 89 Effective 12 139 CED2 Angle Drive Stun 189 CED3 Front 3
40 Reason for Force: Prevent Offence 90 Tactic 13 140 CED2 Fired 190 CED3 Front 4
41 Reason for Force: Secure Evidence 91 Coding Tactic 13 141 CED2 Fired 5 Secs Cycle Interrupted 191 CED3 Front 5
42 Reason for Force: Effect Search 92 Effective 13 142 CED2 Fired Repeat Cycle Same Cartridge 192 CED3 Front 6
43 Reason for Force: Effect Arrest 93 CED Used 143 CED2 Fired Total Number Of Cycles 193 CED3 Front 7
44 Reason for Force: Method of Entry 94 CED Drawn 144
CED2 Fired Cycle Extended Beyond 5 
Secs 194 CED3 Front 8
45 Reason for Force: Remove Handcuffs 95 CED Aimed 145 CED2 Fired Miss With One Probe 195 CED3 Front 9
46 Reason for Force: Prevent Harm 96 CED Arced 146 CED2 Fired Miss With Both Probes 196 CED3 Front 10
47 Reason for Force: Prevent Escape 97 CED Red-Dotted 147 CED2 Front 1 197 CED3 Front 11
48 Reason for Force: Other 98 CED Drive Stun 148 CED2 Front 2 198 CED3 Front 12
49 MainDuty 99 CED Drive Stun Repeat Application 149 CED2 Front 3 199 CED3 Front 13
50 Coded- MainDuty 100 CED Angle Drive Stun 150 CED2 Front 4 200 CED3 Front 14
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Questions.  
 
Variable 
Information
Variable Position Label
Measurement 
Level Role
Q1 1 Q1- URN Nominal Input
Q2 2
Deciding whether to participate – Approval from both the MPS and CCCU Ethics boards 
has been granted to conduct this research. If you have any questions or concerns about 
the nature, procedures or requirements for participation do not hesitate to contact Ordinal Input
Q3_1 3 ARV Course Ordinal Input
Q3_2 4 ARV Refresher Training Ordinal Input
Q3_3 5  AFO Course Ordinal Input
Q3_4 6 AFO Refresher Training Ordinal Input
Q3_5 7 Medic Training Ordinal Input
Q3_6 8 TASER Course Ordinal Input
Q3_7 9 TASER Refresher Training Ordinal Input
Q4_Rank 10 Q4 Rank- summary Ordinal Input
Q4_1 11 Rank? - PC Ordinal Input
Q4_2 12 Rank? - Sgt Ordinal Input
Q4_3 13  Rank? - Insp Ordinal Input
Q5_Role 14 Q5 Primary Role- summary Ordinal Input
Q5_1 15 Primary Role - BCU Ordinal Input
Q5_2 16 Primary Role - BCU-Taser Ordinal Input
Q5_3 17  Primary Role - TSG-Taser Ordinal Input
Q5_9 18 Primary Role - Other Ordinal Input
Q5_NonAFO 19 Q5 Unarmed - Non AFO summary Ordinal Input
Q5_AFO 20 Q5 Authorised Firearms Officers -AFO summary Ordinal Input
Q5_4 21 Primary Role - TSGAFO Ordinal Input
Q5_5 22 Primary Role - AFO Ordinal Input
Q5_6 23 Primary Role - ARV Ordinal Input
Q5_7 24 Primary Role - CTSFO Ordinal Input
Q5_8 25 Primary Role - Firearms Instructor Ordinal Input
Q5_CRole 26 Q5_a Firearms Command Role- summary Ordinal Input
Q5_a_1 27 Firearms Command role? - OFC Ordinal Input
Q5_a_2 28 Firearms Command role? - TFC Ordinal Input
Q5_a_3 29 Firearms Command role? - SFC Ordinal Input
Q5_a_4 30 Firearms Command role? - FTA Ordinal Input
Q5_a_5 31 Firearms Command role? - N/A Ordinal Input
Q6_1 32 Current OCU: - Barking and Dagenham 1 Ordinal Input
Q6_2 33 Current OCU: - Barnet 2 Ordinal Input
Q6_3 34 Current OCU: - Bexley 3 Ordinal Input
Q6_4 35 Current OCU: - Brent 4 Ordinal Input
Q6_5 36 Current OCU: - Bromley 5 Ordinal Input
Q6_6 37 Current OCU: - Camden 6 Ordinal Input
Q6_7 38 Current OCU: - City of Westminster 7 Ordinal Input
Q6_8 39 Current OCU: - Croydon 8 Ordinal Input
Q6_9 40 Current OCU: - Ealing 9 Ordinal Input
Q6_10 41 Current OCU: - Enfield 10 Ordinal Input
Q6_11 42 Current OCU: - Greenwich 11 Ordinal Input
Q6_12 43 Current OCU: - Hackney 12 Ordinal Input
Q6_13 44 Current OCU: - Hammersmith and Fulham 13 Ordinal Input
Q6_14 45 Current OCU: - Haringey 14 Ordinal Input
Q6_15 46 Current OCU: - Harrow 15 Ordinal Input
Q6_16 47 Current OCU: - Havering 16 Ordinal Input
Q6_17 48 Current OCU: - Hillingdon 17 Ordinal Input
Q6_18 49 Current OCU: - Hounslow 18 Ordinal Input
Q6_19 50 Current OCU: - Islington 19 Ordinal Input
Q6_20 51 Current OCU: - Kensington and Chelsea 20 Ordinal Input
Q6_21 52 Current OCU: - Kingston upon Thames 21 Ordinal Input
Q6_22 53 Current OCU: - Lambeth 22 Ordinal Input
Q6_23 54 Current OCU: - Lewisham 23 Ordinal Input
Q6_24 55 Current OCU: - Merton 24 Ordinal Input
Q6_25 56 Current OCU: - Newham 25 Ordinal Input
Q6_26 57 Current OCU: - Out of Force 26 Ordinal Input
Q6_27 58 Current OCU: - Redbridge 27 Ordinal Input
Q6_28 59 Current OCU: - Richmond upon Thames 28 Ordinal Input
Q6_29 60 Current OCU: - Southwark 29 Ordinal Input
Q6_30 61 Current OCU: - Sutton 30 Ordinal Input
Q6_31 62 Current OCU: - Tower Hamlets 31 Ordinal Input
Q6_32 63 Current OCU: - Waltham Forest 32 Ordinal Input
Q6_33 64 Current OCU: - Wandsworth 33 Ordinal Input
Q6_34 65 Current OCU: - SCO19 34 Ordinal Input
Q6_35 66 Current OCU: - PaDP 35 Ordinal Input
Q6_36 67 Current OCU: - RaSP 36 Ordinal Input
Q6_37 68 Current OCU: - AP 37 Ordinal Input
Q6_38 69 Current OCU: - NOT RECORDED 99 Ordinal Input
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Questions.  
 
Variable 
Information
Variable Position Label
Measurement 
Level Role
Q7_1 70 Operational? - Yes Ordinal Input
Q7_2 71 Operational? - No Ordinal Input
Q8_Age 72 Q8 Age- summary Ordinal Input
Q8_1 73 Age - 18-24 Ordinal Input
Q8_2 74 Age - 25-34 Ordinal Input
Q8_3 75 Age - 35-44 Ordinal Input
Q8_4 76 Age - 45-54 Ordinal Input
Q8_5 77 Age - 55-64 Ordinal Input
Q9_Gender 78 Q9 Gender- summary Ordinal Input
Q9_1 79 Gender - Male Ordinal Input
Q9_2 80 Gender - Female Ordinal Input
Q9_3 81 Gender - TransGender Ordinal Input
Q9_4 82 Gender - Other Ordinal Input
Q9_5 83 Gender - Prefer not to say Ordinal Input
Q10 84 Length of Police Service: (Yrs) Scale Input
Q11 85 Length of service in current role: (Yrs). Scale Input
Q12_Ethnicity 86 Q12 How would you describe your ethnic group? - summary Ordinal Input
Q12_1 87 How would you describe your ethnic group? - White Ordinal Input
Q12_2 88 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Black/Black British Ordinal Input
Q12_3 89 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Asian/Asian British Ordinal Input
Q12_4 90 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Mixed Ordinal Input
Q12_5 91 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Chinese Ordinal Input
Q13_Ethnicityx 92 Q13 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Detailed summary Ordinal Input
Q13_1 93 How would you describe your ethnic group? - White British Ordinal Input
Q13_2 94 How would you describe your ethnic group? - White Irish Ordinal Input
Q13_3 95 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Any other white background Ordinal Input
Q13_4 96 How would you describe your ethnic group? - African Ordinal Input
Q13_5 97 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Caribbean Ordinal Input
Q13_6 98 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Any otherBlack background Ordinal Input
Q13_7 99 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Indian Ordinal Input
Q13_8 100 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Pakistani Ordinal Input
Q13_9 101 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Bangladeshi Ordinal Input
Q13_10 102 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Any other Asian background Ordinal Input
Q13_11 103 How would you describe your ethnic group? - White & Asian Ordinal Input
Q13_12 104 How would you describe your ethnic group? - White & Black African Ordinal Input
Q13_13 105 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Any other mixed background Ordinal Input
Q13_14 106 How would you describe your ethnic group? - White and Black Caribbean Ordinal Input
Q13_15 107 How would you describe your ethnic group? - Chinese Ordinal Input
Q14_1 108 Preventing Crime Ordinal Input
Q14_2 109 Helping Vulnerable People Ordinal Input
Q14_3 110 Searching Suspects Ordinal Input
Q14_4 111 Detecting Crime Ordinal Input
Q14_5 112 Traffic related Ordinal Input
Q14_6 113 Public Order Ordinal Input
Q14_7 114 Mental Heath Ordinal Input
Q14_8 115 Reporting Crime Ordinal Input
Q14_9 116 Investigating Crime Ordinal Input
Q14_10 117 Firearms Crime - involving the illegal use or possession of Ordinal Input
Q14_11 118 Violent crime Ordinal Input
Q14_12 119 Arresting Suspects Ordinal Input
Q14_13 120 Community Engagement Ordinal Input
Q15_1 121 Public service i.e. making a difference Ordinal Input
Q15_2 122 Recognition from peers or managers Ordinal Input
Q15_3 123 Learning or career development Ordinal Input
Q15_4 124 Appreciation from public or victims Ordinal Input
Q15_5 125 Excitement or Enjoyment Ordinal Input
Q15_6 126 Public expectation Ordinal Input
Q15_7 127 Personal pride Ordinal Input
Q15_8 128 Personal challenge Ordinal Input
Q15_9 129 Other please specify ___________________________ Ordinal Input
Q16_1 130 Person alone shouting Ordinal Input
Q16_2 131 Known person with mental health issues, alone shouting Ordinal Input
Q16_3 132 Person shouting at another person Ordinal Input
Q16_4 133 Known person with mental health issues shouting at another individual Ordinal Input
Q16_5 134 Person pushing another person in the chest Ordinal Input
Q16_6 135
Known person with mental health issues pushing another individual in the 
chest Ordinal Input
Q16_7 136 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking Ordinal Input
Q16_8 137
Known person with mental health issues armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
walking Ordinal Input
Q16_9 138
Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and aggressive towards 
another Ordinal Input
Q16_10 139
Known person with mental health issues armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another Ordinal Input
Q16_11 140
Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive towards 
another Ordinal Input
Q16_12 141
Known person with mental health issues armed with a weapon (firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another Ordinal Input
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Questions. 
 
Variable Information
Variable Position Label
Measurem
ent Level Role
Q17_1 142 Training (classroom based) Ordinal Input
Q17_2 143 Training (practical based) Ordinal Input
Q17_3 144 Observation of colleagues Ordinal Input
Q17_4 145 Working with colleagues Ordinal Input
Q17_5 146 Prior police experience Ordinal Input
Q17_6 147 Other experience(s) Ordinal Input
Q18_1 148 Training (classroom based) Ordinal Input
Q18_2 149 Training (practical based) Ordinal Input
Q18_3 150 Experience when observing colleagues Ordinal Input
Q18_4 151 Experience working with colleagues Ordinal Input
Q18_5 152 Practical policing experience Ordinal Input
Q18_6 153 Your own personal abilities Ordinal Input
Q18_7 154 Your own personal life experience Ordinal Input
Q19_1 to Q19_13 155
Please think about an encounter, where a range of conflict resolution tactics were used. 
(This can be either your own or an encounter you have observed). What type of incident 
was this? - Preventing Crime Ordinal Input
Q19_a_1 168 Communication to de-escalate Ordinal Input
Q19_a_2 169 Time or space to de-escalate Ordinal Input
Q19_a_3 170 OST ‘Open handed techniques’ Ordinal Input
Q19_a_4 171 Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood) Ordinal Input
Q19_a_5 172 ASP Ordinal Input
Q19_a_6 173 CS Spray Ordinal Input
Q19_a_7 174 Conductive electronic devices (CED or Taser) Ordinal Input
Q19_a_8 175 AEP Baton Gun rounds Ordinal Input
Q19_a_9 176 Firearms Ordinal Input
Q19_a_10 177 Other Ordinal Input
Q20_1 to Q20_13 178
Thinking about an encounter, where you witnessed ineffective conflict resolution tactics 
used. (This can be either your own or an encounter you have observed). What type of 
incident was this? - Preventing Crime Ordinal Input
Q20_a_1 191 Communication to de-escalate Ordinal Input
Q20_a_2 192 Time or space to de-escalate Ordinal Input
Q20_a_3 193 OST ‘Open handed techniques’ Ordinal Input
Q20_a_4 194 Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood) Ordinal Input
Q20_a_5 195 ASP Ordinal Input
Q20_a_6 196 CS Spray Ordinal Input
Q20_a_7 197 Conductive electronic devices (CED or Taser) Ordinal Input
Q20_a_8 198 AEP Baton Gun rounds Ordinal Input
Q20_a_9 199 Firearms Ordinal Input
Q20_a_10 200 Other Ordinal Input
Q21_1 201 Use of time to de-escalate Ordinal Input
Q21_2 202 Establish rapport Ordinal Input
Q21_3 203 Use of effective communication Ordinal Input
Q21_4 204 Temperament – calm and composed character Ordinal Input
Q21_5 205 Knowledge – situational and within own role Ordinal Input
Q21_6 206 Experience - learning from previous encounters to de-escalate Ordinal Input
Q21_7 207 Force - Use or threat of to resolve the incident Ordinal Input
Q21_8 208 Character– imposing authoritative personality as a police officer Ordinal Input
Q22_1_1 to  Q25_g_1_9 209 to 2080 1 - 'Communication' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_2 210 1 - 'Time or space to de-escalate' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_3 211 1 - 'OST techniques' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_4 212 1 - 'Physical Restraint ' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_5 213 1 - 'ASP' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_6 214 1 - 'CS Spray' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_7 215 1 - 'Taser' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_8 216 1 - 'AEP Baton Gun rounds' Ordinal Input
Q22_1_9 217 1 - 'Firearms' Ordinal Input
Q26_1 2081
Q26_1 How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of 
your role? Ordinal Input
Q26_1_a_1 2082
How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your 
role? - 1 'Poor' Ordinal Input
Q26_1_a_2 2083
How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your 
role? - 2 'Fair' Ordinal Input
Q26_1_a_3 2084
How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your 
role? - 3 'Average' Ordinal Input
Q26_1_a_4 2085
How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your 
role? - 4 'Good' Ordinal Input
Q26_1_a_5 2086
How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your 
role? - 5 'Excellent' Ordinal Input
Q26_2 2087
Q26_2 How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in 
mental crisis? Ordinal Input
Q26_2_a_1 2088
How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental 
crisis? - 1 'Poor' Ordinal Input
Q26_2_a_2 2089
How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental 
crisis? - 2 'Fair' Ordinal Input
Q26_2_a_3 2090
How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental 
crisis? - 3 'Average' Ordinal Input
Q26_2_a_4 2091
How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental 
crisis? - 4 'Good' Ordinal Input
Q26_2_a_5 2092
How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental 
crisis? - 5 'Excellent' Ordinal Input
Q26_3 2093
Q26_3 How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements 
of your role? Ordinal Input
Q26_3_a_1 2094
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of 
your role? - 1 'Poor' Ordinal Input
Q26_3_a_2 2095
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of 
your role? - 2 'Fair' Ordinal Input
Q26_3_a_3 2096
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of 
your role? - 3 'Average' Ordinal Input
Q26_3_a_4 2097
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of 
your role? - 4 'Good' Ordinal Input
Q26_3_a_5 2098
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of 
your role? - 5 'Excellent' Ordinal Input
Q26_4 2099
Q26_4 How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals 
in mental crisis? Ordinal Input
Q26_4_a_1 2100
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in 
mental crisis? - 1 'Poor' Ordinal Input
Q26_4_a_2 2101
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in 
mental crisis? - 2 'Fair' Ordinal Input
Q26_4_a_3 2102
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in 
mental crisis? - 3 'Average' Ordinal Input
Q26_4_a_4 2103
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in 
mental crisis? - 4 'Good' Ordinal Input
Q26_4_a_5 2104
How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in 
mental crisis? - 5 'Excellent' Ordinal Input
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Appendix D - Survey SPSS coding book (4/5).  
Coded Responses.  
 
  
Variable Values
Value Label Value Label Value Label
Q2 1 Yes Q5_CRole 1 OFC Q8_Age 1 18-24
Q3_1 1 ARV Course 2 TFC 2 25-34
Q3_2 1 ARV Refresher Training 3 SFC 3 35-44
Q3_3 1 AFO Course 4 FTA 4 45-54
Q3_4 1 AFO Refresher Training 5 N/A 5 55-64
Q3_5 1 Medic Training 99a Not entered Q8_1 1 18-24
Q3_6 1 TASER Course Q5_a_1 1 OFC Q8_2 1 25-34
Q3_7 1 TASER Refresher Training Q5_a_2 1 TFC Q8_3 1 35-44
Q4_Rank 1 Constable Q5_a_3 1 SFC Q8_4 1 45-54
2 Sergeant Q5_a_4 1 FTA Q8_5 1 55-64
3 Inspector Q5_a_5 1 N/A Q9_Gender 1 Male
99a Not entered Q6_1 1 Barking and Dagenham 1 2 Female
Q4_1 1 PC Q6_2 1 Barnet 2 3 TransGender
Q4_2 1 Sgt Q6_3 1 Bexley 3 4 Other
Q4_3 1 Insp Q6_4 1 Brent 4 5 Prefer not to say
Q5_Role 1 BCU Q6_5 1 Bromley 5 99a Not entered
2 BCU TASER Q6_6 1 Camden 6 Q9_1 1 Male
3 TSG-TASER Q6_7 1 City of Westminster 7 Q9_2 1 Female
4 TSG AFO Q6_8 1 Croydon 8 Q9_3 1 TransGender
5 AFO Q6_9 1 Ealing 9 Q9_4 1 Other
6 ARV Q6_10 1 Enfield 10 Q9_5 1 Prefer not to say
7 CTSFO Q6_11 1 Greenwich 11 Q12_Ethnicity 1 White
8 Firearms Instructor Q6_12 1 Hackney 12 2 Black/Black British
9 Other Q6_13 1 Hammersmith and Fulham 13 3 Asian/Asian British
99a Not applicable Q6_14 1 Haringey 14 4 Mixed
Q5_1 1 BCU Q6_15 1 Harrow 15 5 Chinese
Q5_2 1 BCU-Taser Q6_16 1 Havering 16 99a Not entered
99 NA Q6_17 1 Hillingdon 17 Q12_1 1 White
Q5_3 1 TSG-Taser Q6_18 1 Hounslow 18 Q12_2 1 Black/Black British
99 NA Q6_19 1 Islington 19 Q12_3 1 Asian/Asian British
Q5_9 1 Other Q6_20 1 Kensington and Chelsea 20 Q12_4 1 Mixed
99 NA Q6_21 1 Kingston upon Thames 21 Q12_5 1 Chinese
Q5_NonAFO 1 BCU Q6_22 1 Lambeth 22 Q13_Ethnicityx 1 White British
2 BCU-Taser Q6_23 1 Lewisham 23 2 White Irish
3 TSG TASER Q6_24 1 Merton 24 3 Any other white background
4 Other Q6_25 1 Newham 25 4 African
99 Not applicable Q6_26 1 Out of Force 26 5 Caribbean
Q5_AFO 1 TSG AFO Q6_27 1 Redbridge 27 6 Any otherBlack background
2 AFO Q6_28 1 Richmond upon Thames 28 7 Indian
3 ARV Q6_29 1 Southwark 29 8 Pakistani
4 CTSFO Q6_30 1 Sutton 30 9 Bangladeshi
5 Firearms Instructor Q6_31 1 Tower Hamlets 31 10 Any other Asian background
99 Not applicable Q6_32 1 Waltham Forest 32 11 White & Asian
Q5_4 1 TSGAFO Q6_33 1 Wandsworth 33 12 White & Black African
99 NA Q6_34 1 SCO19 34 13 Any other mixed background
Q5_5 1 AFO Q6_35 1 PaDP 35 14 White and Black Caribbean
99 NA Q6_36 1 RaSP 36 15 Chinese
Q5_6 1 ARV Q6_37 1 AP 37 99a Not entered
99 NA Q6_38 1 NOT RECORDED 99
Q5_7 1 CTSFO Q7_1 1 Yes
99 NA Q7_2 1 No
Q5_8 1 Firearms Instructor
99 NA
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coding book (5/5).  
 
Coded Responses. 
Variable Values
Value Label Value Label Value Label
Q13_1 1 11White British Q17_1 to Q17_6 1 1 'Poor' Q21_1 to Q21_8 1 1 'Poor'
Q13_2 1 12White Irish 2 2 'Fair' 2 2 'Fair'
Q13_3 1 13Any other white background 3 3 'Average' 3 3 'Average'
Q13_4 1 21African 4 4 'Good' 4 4 'Good'
Q13_5 1 22Caribbean 5 5 'Excellent' 5 5 'Excellent'
Q13_6 1 23Any otherBlack background Q18_1 to Q18_7 1 1 'Not much' Q25_g_1_9
Q13_7 1 31Indian 2 2 'Little' Q22_1_1 to Q22_1_1 1 'Communication'
Q13_8 1 32Pakistani 3 3 'Somewhat' Q22_1_2 1 'Time or space to de-escalate'
Q13_9 1 33Bangladeshi 4 4 'Much' Q22_1_3 1 'OST techniques'
Q13_10 1 34Any other Asian background 5 5 'A great deal' Q22_1_4 1 'Physical Restraint '
Q13_11 1 41White & Asian Q19_1 1 Preventing Crime Q22_1_5 1 'ASP'
Q13_12 1 42White & Black African Q19_2 1 Helping Vulnerable Person Q22_1_6 1 'CS Spray'
Q13_13 1 43Any other mixed background Q19_3 1 Searching Suspect(s) Q22_1_7 1 'Taser'
Q13_14 1 44White and Black Caribbean Q19_4 1 Detecting Crime Q22_1_8 1 'AEP Baton Gun rounds'
Q13_15 1 51Chinese Q19_5 1 Traffic related Q22_1_9 1 'Firearms'
Q14_1 to Q14_13 1 1 'Very dissatisfied' Q19_6 1 Public Order Q26_1 1 Poor
2 2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' Q19_7 1 Mental Heath 2 Fair
3 3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' Q19_8 1 Reporting Crime 3 Average
4 4 'Somewhat satisfied' Q19_9 1 Investigating Crime 4 Good
5 5 'Very satisfied' Q19_10 1 Firearms crime 5 Excellent
Q15_1 to Q15_9 1 1 'Strongly disagree' Q19_11 1 Violent crime 99a Not Entered
2 2 'Disagree' Q19_12 1 Arresting Suspects Q26_1_a_1 to Q26_4_a_5 1 1 'Poor'
3 3 'Neither agree nor disagree' Q19_13 1 Other Q26_1_a_2 1 2 'Fair'
4 4 'Agree' Q19_a_1 to Q19_a_10 1 1 'Very Ineffective' Q26_1_a_3 1 3 'Average'
5 5 'Strongly agree' 2 2 'Rarely Effective' Q26_1_a_4 1 4 'Good'
Q16_1 to Q16_12 1 1 'Never' 3 3 'Sometimes Effective' Q26_1_a_5 1 5 'Excellent'
2 2 'Seldom' 4 4 'Often Effective' Q26_2 1 Poor
3 3 'About half the time' 5 5 'Very Effective' 2 Fair
4 4 'Usually' 6 99 'Not Applicable' 3 Average
5 5 'Always' Q20_1 1 Preventing Crime 4 Good
Q20_2 1 Helping Vulnerable Person 5 Excellent
Q20_3 1 Searching Suspect(s)
Q20_4 1 Detecting Crime
Q20_5 1 Traffic related
Q20_6 1 Public Order
Q20_7 1 Mental Heath
Q20_8 1 Reporting Crime
Q20_9 1 Investigating Crime
Q20_10 1 Firearms crime
Q20_11 1 Violent crime
Q20_12 1 Arresting Suspects
Q20_13 1 Other
Q20_a_1 to Q20_a_10 1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 N/A
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Research Survey: 
 
 “How does being an AFO, compared with unarmed policing, affect decision making?”  
A research study is being conducted at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) by Nick Francis an 
operational MPS police officer. 
Background 
I am conducting research to deepen our understanding of how police officers spontaneously respond 
to incidents where individuals may have immediate access to lethal weapons with intent to harm 
themselves or induce officers to do it for them. The focus will be on how a mainly unarmed police 
service in England & Wales deals with these instances. Specifically, if firearms officers are 
subsequently called forward, how they respond (tactics, training, command structure) and make 
decisions to resolve the incident to maintain the safety of the public, police and individuals. 
 
What will you be required to do? - Participants in this study will be required to take part in a short 
questionnaire, which take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete.  
To participate in this research you must:  
฀ Be over 18 years. 
฀ Be English speaking. 
฀ Be an operational police officer. 
Confidentiality - All responses will be treated as confidential. All data and personal information will 
be stored securely within CCCU premises in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 
University’s own data protection requirements. The procedures adopted will meet the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  Only the named researcher can access data.  After completion of 
the study, all data will be made anonymous (i.e. all personal information associated with the 
questionnaire data will be removed), and records will be stored for a maximum of five years.  Please 
note that we will not be asking you to disclose any sensitive information, however should any such 
disclosures occur during this process, which indicate safeguarding risks or criminal behaviour, we 
may not be able to maintain strict confidentiality. 
Dissemination of results - The results of the study will be shared via a written thesis and possibly as a 
journal article. Anonymity of participants will be maintained at all times, including in the dissertation 
and in any subsequent articles. Please advise me whether you would like to receive a copy of this 
once complete. 
Deciding whether to participate – Approval from both the MPS and CCCU Ethics boards has been 
granted to conduct this research.  If you have any questions or concerns about the nature, 
procedures or requirements for participation do not hesitate to contact any of the researcher team 
via the details below. Following completion, if you wish to withdraw please contact the researcher 
with your URN to have any contributing data removed from this research. Please tick to confirm you 
are satisfied for this data to be used in a confidential and anonymous manner.    
 
Any questions? - Please contact the named lead researcher below. 
Lead Researcher:  Nick Francis  n.j.francis107@canterbury.ac.uk   07887824639  
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Demographic Data 
 
3. Course attending :     1. Unique Reference Number (assigned by researcher) 
                    
                    /              /2019 
4. Rank / Firearms Command role 
 (tick as appropriate) 
5. Primary Role (tick as appropriate) 
o PC    
o Sgt    
o Insp     
 
o OFC     
o TFC     
o SFC    
o FTA  
o BCU-Taser        
o TSG-Taser        
o TSGAFO      
o AFO        
o ARV                    
o CTSFO  
o Firearms Instructor      
o Other _________________ 
6. Current OCU: 
 
7. Operational?   Y  /  N 
8. Age (tick as appropriate) 9. Gender (tick as appropriate) 
o 18-24 
o 25-34 
o 35-44 
o 45-54 
o 55-64 
o Male                                
o Female   
o TransGender  
o Other Please Specify _______________ 
o Prefer not to say                      
10. Length of Police Service: (Yrs)___________  
 
11. Length of service in current role: (Yrs)._______ 
 
 
 12. How would you describe your ethnic group? Please Tick box 
White 
White British  White Irish  
Any other white background       
Black/Black British 
African                                         Caribbean                         
Any other background       
Asian/Asian British 
Indian                                           Pakistani                          
Bangladeshi                                   Any other Asian background    
Mixed 
White & Asian   White & Black African    
Any other mixed background   White and Black Caribbean   
Chinese Chinese                                            
Other Ethnic Group -  Please Specify _________________________ 
 
2. Please tick to confirm you are satisfied for this data to be used in a confidential and  
anonymous manner.    
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Please consider the following questions against your current role and the level of training you have 
received. 
 
14. Using the scale 1 to 5 please rate the following incidents for the satisfaction they usually give 
you as a police officer.    
 
(1= Little or no satisfaction 5= Very satisfied) 
Preventing Crime 1    2    3    4    5  
Helping Vulnerable People  1    2    3    4    5  
Searching Suspects 1    2    3    4    5  
Detecting Crime 1    2    3    4    5  
Traffic related 1    2    3    4    5  
Public Order 1    2    3    4    5  
Mental Heath 1    2    3    4    5  
Reporting Crime 1    2    3    4    5  
Investigating Crime 1    2    3    4    5  
Firearms Crime - involving the illegal use or possession of  1    2    3    4    5  
Violent crime 1    2    3    4    5  
Arresting Suspects 1    2    3    4    5  
Community Engagement 1    2    3    4    5 
 
15. In general terms, as a police officer what it is about these incidents that makes something 
satisfying when undertaking that role?  
 
(1= Strongly disagree   5= Strongly agree) 
Public service i.e. making a difference 1    2    3    4    5 
Recognition from peers or managers 1    2    3    4    5  
Learning or career development 1    2    3    4    5  
Appreciation from public or victims 1    2    3    4    5  
Excitement or Enjoyment 1    2    3    4    5  
Public expectation 1    2    3    4    5  
Personal pride 1    2    3    4    5  
Personal challenge 1    2    3    4    5  
Other please specify ___________________________        1    2    3    4    5 
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16. Imagine that you are on patrol, either on foot or in a vehicle, when you see an individual who 
is acting in the following manner.  
 
Whilst you would normally have access to further information or intelligence, how likely 
would the following events to cause you to stop and intervene?  
 
(1=Never   5=Always) 
Person alone shouting  1    2    3    4    5 
Known person with mental health issues, alone shouting  1    2    3    4    5 
Person shouting at another person  1    2    3    4    5 
Known person with mental health issues shouting at another individual  1    2    3    4    5 
Person pushing another person in the chest 1    2    3    4    5 
Known person with mental health issues pushing another individual in 
the chest  
1    2    3    4    5 
Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking  1    2    3    4    5 
Known person with mental health issues armed with a weapon (not 
firearm) walking 
1    2    3    4    5 
Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and aggressive 
towards another  
1    2    3    4    5 
Known person with mental health issues armed with a weapon (not 
firearm) shouting and aggressive towards another  
1    2    3    4    5 
Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive 
towards another  
1    2    3    4    5 
Known person with mental health issues armed with a weapon 
(firearm) shouting and aggressive towards another  
1    2    3    4    5 
 
 
 
 
17. How did you initially learn to resolve conflict when dealing with members of the public? 
 
Considering the following options, how effective were they in developing your ability to resolve 
conflict? 
 
(1= Poor  5= Excellent) 
Training (classroom based) 1     2    3    4    5  
Training (practical based) 1     2    3    4    5  
Observation of colleagues 1     2    3    4    5  
Working with colleagues 1     2    3    4    5  
Prior police experience 1     2    3    4    5  
Other experience(s) please specify____________________________ 1 2    3    4    5  
 
18. How did the following experiences contribute to your ability in resolving conflict? 
 
(1= Not at all  5= Very Much) 
Training (classroom based) 1    2    3    4    5  
Training (practical based) 1    2    3    4    5  
Experience when observing colleagues 1    2    3    4    5  
Experience working with colleagues 1    2    3    4    5  
Practical policing experience 1    2    3    4    5  
Your own personal abilities 1    2    3    4    5  
Your own personal life experience 1    2    3    4    5  
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19. Please think about an encounter, where a range of conflict resolution tactics were used. (This 
can be either your own or an encounter you have observed).  
 
What type of incident was this? 
 
(Tick most applicable box) 
Preventing Crime  
Helping Vulnerable Person  
Searching Suspect(s)  
Detecting Crime  
Traffic related  
Public Order  
Mental Heath  
Reporting Crime  
Investigating Crime  
Firearms crime  
Violent crime  
Arresting Suspects  
Other please specify __________________  
 
How effective were the following tactics? 
 
(1= Very Ineffective  5= Very Effective) 
Communication to de-escalate  1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
Time or space to de-escalate 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
OST ‘Open handed techniques’ 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood) 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
ASP 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
CS Spray 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
Conductive electronic devices (CED or Taser) 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
AEP Baton Gun rounds 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
Firearms 1     2    3    4    5    n/a 
Other please specify __________________ 1 2    3    4    5    n/a 
 
  
Nicholas FRANCIS 176 
Appendix E - Research Survey 
 6 
 
20. Thinking about an encounter, where you witnessed ineffective conflict resolution tactics used. 
(This can be either your own or an encounter you have observed).  
 
What type of incident was this? 
(Tick most applicable box) 
 
Preventing Crime  
Helping Vulnerable Person  
Searching Suspect(s)  
Detecting Crime  
Traffic related  
Public Order  
Mental Heath  
Reporting Crime  
Investigating Crime  
Firearms crime  
Violent crime  
Arresting Suspects  
Other please specify ________________________  
 
 
Which of the following tactics were used? (Place in the order of use within the encounter. Please use n/a if 
not used or not applicable)  
 
(1= First tactic, 2= second etc.) 
Communication to de-escalate   
Time or space to de-escalate  
OST ‘Open handed techniques’  
Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood)  
ASP  
CS Spray  
Conductive electronic devices (CED or Taser)  
AEP Baton Gun rounds  
Firearms  
Other please specify ___________________________________  
 
 
21. There are occasions where police officers deal with incidents where someone is either 
confrontational or tries to intimidate others.  
 
What do you think is the best way to deal with them?  
 
(1= Worst  5= Best) 
Use of time to de-escalate 1    2    3    4    5  
Establish rapport 1    2    3    4    5  
Use of effective communication 1    2    3    4    5  
Temperament – calm and composed character  1    2    3    4    5  
Knowledge – situational and within own role 1    2    3    4    5  
Experience - learning from previous encounters to de-escalate 1    2    3    4    5  
Force - Use or threat of to resolve the incident 1    2    3    4    5 
Character– imposing authoritative personality as a police officer 1    2    3    4    5  
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22. The next few questions ask you to consider a number of situations relating to suspects or 
victims; and then the options that you would immediately use or deliberately not use to 
resolve it. 
 
 
 
22.  
 
What tactics or options would you IMMEDIATELY 
consider using?  
 
 
(1= first, 2= second or 3= third etc.  n/a= not used/applicable) C
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For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect  
         
A Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another           
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect          
A Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a weapon 
(not firearm)          
For a Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm)          
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect armed 
with a weapon (not firearm)          
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another          
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another          
 
 
23. 
 
What tactics or options would you IMMEDIATELY 
consider using?  
 
(1= first, 2= second or 3= third etc.  n/a= not used/applicable) C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
G
iv
e
 T
im
e
 o
r 
sp
a
ce
 
O
S
T
 t
e
ch
n
iq
u
e
s 
P
h
y
si
ca
l R
e
st
ra
in
t 
A
S
P
 
C
S
 S
p
ra
y 
T
a
se
r 
A
E
P
 B
a
to
n
 G
u
n
 
ro
u
n
d
s 
F
ir
e
a
rm
s 
For a Suicidal or Self Harm Victim           
A Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another           
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim          
A Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(not firearm)          
For a Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm)          
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim armed 
with a weapon (not firearm)          
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another          
Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(firearm) presenting threat of violence towards 
another          
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24.  
 
What tactics or options would you NOT consider 
using?  
 
 
(Tick= not used/not applicable) C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
G
iv
e
 T
im
e
 o
r 
sp
a
ce
 
O
S
T
 t
e
ch
n
iq
u
e
s 
P
h
ys
ic
a
l 
R
e
st
ra
in
t 
A
S
P
 
C
S
 S
p
ra
y 
T
a
se
r 
A
E
P
 B
a
to
n
 G
u
n
 r
o
u
n
d
s 
F
ir
e
a
rm
s 
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect           
A Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another           
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect          
A Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a weapon 
(not firearm)          
For a Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm)          
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect armed 
with a weapon (not firearm)          
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another          
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another          
 
 
 
 
 
25. 
 
What tactics or options would you NOT consider 
using?  
 
(Tick= not used/not applicable) C
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For a Suicidal or Self Harm Victim           
A Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another           
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim          
A Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(not firearm)          
For a Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm)          
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim armed 
with a weapon (not firearm)          
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another          
Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(firearm) presenting threat of violence towards 
another          
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26. The next few questions would like to examine your current training and issued equipment. 
 
26a. How does your current training adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your role? 
 
(1= Unsatisfactory    5= Excellent) 
1      2       3       4       5 
 
Please explain your answer (it might be interesting to know either way)? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26b. How does your current training adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental crisis? 
 
(1= Unsatisfactory    5= Excellent) 
1       2       3       4       5 
 
Please explain your answer. What could be changed or improved? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26c. How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your 
role? 
 
(1= Unsatisfactory    5= Excellent) 
1       2       3       4       5 
 
Please explain your answer. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26d. How does your current equipment adequately prepare you to deal with individuals in mental 
crisis? 
 
(1= Unsatisfactory    5= Excellent) 
1       2       3       4       5 
 
Please explain your answer. What could be changed or improved? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your time and help - but most of all your patience in completing this survey.  
 
If there are any questions about this research I would be happy to answer them. Thanks once again. 
 
Kind Regards 
Nick Francis  n.j.francis107@canterbury.ac.uk  07887 824639  
(Adapted from Hendy, 2018) 
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Ethics Rev Checklist V13_July_18 
 For Research Office Use ONLY: 
  
Checklist No:  
  
Date Received:  
 
PROPORTIONATE ETHICAL REVIEW FORM 
ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST 
Your application must comprise the following four documents (please tick the boxes 
below to indicate that each section is complete): 
Ethics Review Checklist  ฀  
Consent Material(s)  ฀  
Participant Information Material(s)  ฀  
Risk Assessment Form  
(NB. This MUST be signed by your Head of Department/School) 
 ฀  
Please attach copies of any documents to be used in the 
study: (NB: These must be attached where they form part of your methodology) 
Relevant permission letter(s)/email(s)   ฀  
Questionnaire  ฀  
Introductory letter(s)  ฀  
Data Collection Instruments  ฀  
Interview Questions  ฀  
Focus Group Guidelines  ฀  
 
Other (please give details): 
Forms submitted to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) :- 
1. Information Sharing Agreement 
2. Research protocol Document. 
3. Initial email authorisation from T/Cmdr Rob Atkin & Ch Supt Andy Walker (CO19 Force 
Firearms Unit, MPS) granting permission to access data. 
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ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST - PROPORTIONATE ETHICAL REVIEW 
Sections A and B of this form must be completed for every research or knowledge 
exchange project that involves human or animal1 participants, or the processing of 
data not in the public domain.  These sections serve as a toolkit that will identify 
whether a full application for ethics approval needs to be submitted. 
If the toolkit shows that there is no need for a full ethical review, Sections D, E and F 
should be completed in full and the checklist emailed to red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk 
as described in Section C. 
If the toolkit shows that a full application is required, this checklist should be set aside 
and an Application for Faculty Research Ethics Panel Approval Form - or an appropriate 
external application form - should be completed and submitted.  There is no need to 
complete both documents. 
IMPORTANT 
Before completing this form, please refer to Ethics Policy for Research Involving 
Human Participants and the Code of Practice for the Use of Sentient Animals in 
Research and Teaching on the University Research website. 
Please note that it is your responsibility in the conduct of your study to follow the 
policies and procedures set out in the University’s Research Ethics website, and any 
relevant academic or professional guidelines.  This includes providing appropriate 
information sheets and consent Materials, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage 
and use of data.  Any significant change in the question, design or conduct over the 
course of the study should be notified to the Faculty and/or other Research Ethics 
Panel that received your original proposal.  Depending on the nature of the changes, a 
new application for ethics approval may be required. 
The principal researcher/project leader (or, where the principal researcher/project 
leader is a student, their supervisor) is responsible for exercising appropriate 
professional judgement in this review. 
N.B.  This checklist must be completed, reviewed, any actions taken and approved 
before potential participants are approached to take part in any research project. 
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Section B:  Ethics Checklist 
Please answer each question by choosing ‘YES’ or ‘NO’ in the appropriate box. 
Consider each response carefully: 
  Yes No 
1 Does the study involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or 
unable to give informed consent, or in unequal relationships?  
(N.B. The list of vulnerable groups is extensive, please consider the answer to 
this question carefully. If your own staff or students are participants within your 
research the answer to this question is ‘Yes’) 
฀  ฀  
2 Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access 
to any vulnerable groups or individuals to be recruited?  ฀  ฀  
3 Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without 
usual informed consent procedures having been implemented in 
advance?  
(including but not restricted to; covert observation, certain 
ethnographic studies, involve the capturing of data from social media 
sources) 
฀  ฀  
4 Will the study use deliberate deception?  
(N.B. This does not include randomly assigning participants to groups in an 
experimental design) 
฀  ฀  
5 Will the study involve discussion of, or collection of information on, 
topics of a sensitive nature personal to the participants? 
(including but not restricted to sexual activity, drug use) 
฀  ฀  
6 Are drugs, placebos or other substances (including but not restricted to 
food substances, vitamins) to be administered to human or animal 
participants? 
฀  ฀  
7 Does the study involve invasive or intrusive procedures such as blood 
taking or muscle biopsy from human or animal participants? ฀  ฀  
8 Is physiological stress, pain, or more than mild physical discomfort to 
humans or animals, beyond the risks encountered in normal, life likely 
to result from the study? 
฀  ฀  
9 Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm 
or negative consequences in humans (including the researcher) or 
animals beyond the risks encountered in normal life? 
฀  ฀  
10 Will the study involve interaction with animals?   
(N.B. If you are simply observing them - e.g. in a zoo or in their natural habitat 
- without having any contact at all, you can answer “No”) 
฀  ฀  
11 Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing? ฀  ฀  
12 Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and 
compensation for time) be offered to participants? ฀  ฀  
13 Is the study a survey or activity that involves University-wide 
recruitment or a representative sample of students from Canterbury 
Christ Church University?  
(N.B. The Student Survey Unit and the Student Communications Unit should be 
notified of plans for any extensive student surveys (i.e. research with 100 CCCU 
students or more)) 
฀  ฀  
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Section C:  How to Proceed 
 
Responses to 
Section B 
Next steps 
C1. ‘NO’ to 
all questions 
in Section B  
฀ Complete Sections D–F of this form, including attachments as 
appropriate, and email it to red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk.   
฀ Once your application is assessed, and any follow up action taken, if it 
is given approval you will receive a letter confirming compliance with 
University Research Governance procedures. No research can be 
undertaken until this letter is issued. 
฀ Master’s students should retain copies of the form and letter; the letter 
should be bound into their research report or dissertation.  Work that is 
submitted without this document will be returned un-assessed. 
C2. If you have answered ‘YES’ to any of the questions in Section B, you will need to 
describe more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your project.  
This does not mean that you cannot do the study, only that your proposal will need to 
be approved by a Research Ethics Panel.  Depending upon which questions you 
answered ‘YES’ to, you should proceed as below: 
a) ‘YES’ to 
any of 
questions 1 – 
12 ONLY (i.e. 
not 
questions 
13,14 or 15) 
฀ DO NOT complete this form.  
฀ Submit an application to your Faculty Ethics Panel (FEP) using your 
Faculty’s version of the Application for Faculty Research Ethics Panel 
Approval Form.  This should be submitted to your faculty as directed on 
the form.   
 b) ‘YES’ to 
question 13  
 
฀ You have two options: 
(i)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 13 ONLY you must send copies of 
this form (including attachments) to the Student Survey Unit and the 
Student Communications Unit.  Subject to their agreement you may 
then proceed as at C1 above. (ii)  If you answered ‘YES’ to question 13 
PLUS any other of questions 1 – 12, you must proceed as at C2(b)(i) 
above and then submit an application to your Faculty Ethics Panel (FEP) 
as at C2(a).  
c) ‘YES’ to 
questions 14 
and 15 
฀ You DO NOT need to submit an application to your Faculty Ethics Panel 
(FEP). 
฀ INSTEAD, Please use the HRA decision making tool and proceed 
according to the instructions given.  
฀ Applications must be signed by the relevant faculty Director of Research 
or other nominated signatory prior to submission. 
฀ A satisfactory peer review must be completed.  
฀ Once approval is given, you must send a copy to the relevant FEP.  
d) ‘Yes’ to ฀ If your study involves users of social services or social services staff you 
Nicholas FRANCIS 186 
 
Ethics Rev Checklist V13_July_18 
question 16  may need to undertake different processes: 
฀ If your study involves carers of people receiving NHS care or treatment 
please follow the HRA decision making tool and process outlined in c) 
above   
฀ If your study involves local social services staff or service users who are 
children or adults you should complete an application for full internal 
approval and also contact the relevant Research and Governance 
manager  of the local authority or authorities involved for management 
approval to attach to your application.  
฀ If your study involves more than three local authority children’s social 
services sites you will need to apply to the Association of Directors of 
Children’s Social Services for approval 
฀ If your study involves four or more adult social services sites you will 
need to apply to the Association of Directors of Adult Social Service for 
approval.   
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Section D:  Project Details 
D1. Project 
title: 
 
“How does being an Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO), compared with 
unarmed police officer, affect decision making?” (Working title) 
D2. Start date 
of fieldwork 
As soon as authority is granted. 
D3. End date 
of fieldwork 
30/06/2019 
D4. Project  
summary  
 
(This should 
be written in 
plain English 
avoiding 
overly 
academic 
language and 
acronyms) 
Include information for each of these questions: 
฀ What is the purpose of your project? 
฀ Briefly explain your methodology in lay terms i.e. What are you 
doing and how are you doing it?  
฀ Who are the participants? 
฀ What will the participants be expected to do? 
฀ How will the participants be recruited? 
฀ What are the intended outcomes of your research? 
 
I am conducting research to deepen our understanding of how police 
officers spontaneously respond to incidents where individuals may have 
immediate access to lethal weapons with intent to harm themselves or 
induce officers to do it for them. This will focus on how a primarily unarmed 
police service in England &Wales deals with these instances. Specifically, if 
firearms officers are subsequently called forward, how they respond (within 
tactics, training, command structure) and make decisions to resolve the 
incident to maintain the safety of the public, police and individual. 
 
The focus will be on practitioners in roles which encounter and handle 
incidents relating to the use of force upon vulnerable persons; whether 
individual firearms officers themselves, the tactical advisors or those who 
carry responsibility for commanding the operational deployment of 
firearms officers. These practitioners will be limited to police officers only.   
 
The aim of this research is to increase accountability and confidence in the 
police service in  protecting vulnerable people. The MPS and other UK 
police services need to manage threats to public safety. Persons 
experiencing a mental health crisis can present a significant operational 
challenge to responding police officers; the magnitude of which 
significantly increases when the distressed individuals have a capability to 
cause injury with a weapon.  
 
The limited nature of ‘Suicide by Cop’ (SbC) research has meant that during 
my BSc (Hons) with CCCU I was able to analyse the majority of 
internationally peer reviewed SbC literature, where I identified significant 
academic knowledge gaps. A significant proportion of the literature 
identified was either descriptive or USA based, creating an additional 
challenge in order to bring a UK context to this phenomenon. 
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The ‘learning by mistakes’ approach currently utilised within the UK is 
reliant upon reactive post incident reviews, indicating a lack of SbC 
evidence based research. Although the SbC phenomenon is recognised by 
academics and police, it is not fully understood, placing responders in an 
almost impossible position with a limited range of tactical options. 
 
The aim is to identify evidence of best practise which may be practically 
applied to response policing and safeguard vulnerable persons. It will aim 
to:- 
• Examine UK police shootings against established SbC criteria to 
identify individual vulnerabilities/key risks within UK based context; 
critically analysing policing from both a unarmed/ armed perspective.  
• Examine police use of force on mentally ill subjects, to increase 
understanding of the key risks and when shots are likely to be fired. 
• Use quantifiable data from potentially fatal occurrences to measure 
‘near miss’ incidents and identify the impact or ability of the police to 
‘restrain’ the use of force 
• Explore the unarmed policing paradigm; as unarmed officers have 
to adapt and utilise different methods to engage a potentially dangerous 
suspect. 
 
This research aims to utilise data from publically available sources 
(Coroners’ reports, Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) 
investigations, ‘Use of Force’ databases and media reports) and from 
‘closed’ data sources held by the MPS. As a serving police officer within the 
MPS, a senior officer (Commander Atkin (Armed Policing)) has given initial 
agreement to permit access to all ‘Use of Force’, TASER and police shooting 
reports (internal and IOPC). I am in discussion with two other ‘similar’ 
forces to identify whether they may permit such access. 
 
I aim to review this to develop theory from data using a Grounded Theory 
qualitative method. It aims to analyse interactions between unarmed/ 
armed police to understand how police interact and deal with an individual 
who is intent on self harm.  
 
There will be a mixed methods approach to this research, comprising of:- 
 
฀  Case/data analysis: This research aims to utilise data from publically 
available sources (Coroners’ reports, Independent Office for Police 
Conduct (IOPC) investigations, ‘Use of Force’ databases and media reports) 
and from ‘closed’ data sources held by the MPS. As a serving police officer 
within the MPS, a senior officer  has given initial agreement to permit 
access to all ‘Use of Force’, TASER and police shooting reports (internal and 
IOPC). I am in discussion with two other ‘similar’ forces to identify whether 
they may permit such access. 
 
฀  I aim to review this to develop theory from data using a Grounded Theory 
qualitative method. It aims to analyse interactions between unarmed/ 
armed police to understand how police interact and deal with an individual 
who is intent on self harm.  
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฀  Interviews: The questions for the structured interviews will have to be 
determined by the results from the case/ data analysis. However, it will 
focus upon scenarios that officers may have encountered; so the themes 
will relate to threat/ risk faced, tactical options available, use of force, risk 
factors for officers & suspect, outcome and a reflection based upon their 
experience. Once I have examined and analysed quantitative data then 
semi-structured interviews will be conducted with individuals drawn from 
the practitioner groups, described above. Transcripts of interviews will be 
analysed using Nvivo software and a thematic analysis carried out. Lastly, 
participant understanding of the recommended procedures and policies 
will be critically examined. Data gained from the interviews will be 
securely recorded, transcribed, and coded accordingly for analysis. In 
addition a thorough literature review will be undertaken together with 
analysis of data publically available from the MPS and others.  
 
Data gained from the interviews with police officers will be securely 
recorded, transcribed, and coded accordingly for analysis.  
 
In addition a thorough literature review will be undertaken together with 
analysis of data publically available from the MPS and others. Once I have 
examined and analysed quantitative data then semi-structured interviews 
will be conducted with individuals drawn from the practitioner groups, 
described above. Transcripts of interviews will be analysed using Nvivo 
software and a thematic analysis carried out. Lastly, participant 
understanding of the recommended procedures and policies will be 
critically examined. 
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Section E:  Data protection 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to the processing of personal data 
across the EU. It builds on the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998, which has been replaced by 
the DPA 2018. The GDPR introduces stringent requirements for protecting data and much 
greater accountability. It gives individuals more control over their personal data.  
 
E1. Personal 
data 
Will Personal Identifiable Information (also defined as personal data) be 
collected and/or processed?  
 
          YES – Processed data 
 
If you are in doubt, please refer to the guidance - General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)) 
 
 
฀ If you answered ‘YES’ to the question above please complete the rest of this section 
providing as much detail as possible using the guidance questions. This should be 
written in plain English avoiding overly academic language and acronyms. It must 
contain as much information as possible on how your research will comply with the 
GDPR.  
฀ If you answered ‘NO’ to the question above and having read the guidance are sure 
that no personal data will be collected or processed please move on to section F. 
 
E2. Data 
collection 
 
฀ What personal data will be collected? And what is the reason for this? 
 
 
Please note –  
This is research and permission is subject to a specifically authorised 
Information Sharing Agreement/ Research protocol between the MPS and 
CCCU (attached within supporting files).  
 
This is data legally held by the MPS, who have granted me express permission 
to utilise it within this agreement for the purpose of this research study.  
 
The data will be accessible and processed in the following manner:- 
฀ ‘Raw data’ – The primary researcher will only have access to this in 
accordance with the agreed ISA with the Metropolitan Police Service. 
This will remain on MPS systems until sanitised, anonymised and 
redacted into ‘Processed data’.  
฀ ‘Processed data’ – Access will be available by the primary researcher 
to their supervisor and subsequently any assessors or examiners to 
view for scrutiny. 
 
The data utilised will be from the MPS stored electronic records collated by 
CO19 Firearms Policy Unit relating to TASER, Baton Gun and Firearms 
discharges. These records will be viewed on a Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) issued laptop. The data will be processed with fields extracted onto an 
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Excel sheet for empirical study. At this point all of the data will remain on an 
MPS system and as a serving police officer under my personal secure MPS 
account. No identifying personal data will be recorded onto the Excel sheet and 
only the internal CO19 reference will be retained to allow a more subsequent 
or detailed examination of the record if required.  
 
These electronic records and investigations relate to: 
฀ TASER reporting proforma’s – completed each time an officer ‘uses’ 
TASER i.e. points, red dots or discharges. This would include 
justification for use of force, personal details (officer and suspect- see 
below) and demographic data. 
฀ Baton Gun discharge report.  This would include justification for use of 
force, personal details (officer and suspect- see below) and 
demographic data.   
฀ Firearms discharges – conventional firearms discharges report. This 
would include justification for use of force, personal details (officer and 
suspect- see below) and demographic data. 
 
Until these records are viewed it is anticipated the fields from CO19 records 
will relate to (not an exhaustive list):-  
฀ Time  
฀ Location  
฀ Suspect demographics i.e. age, sex, ethnicity code, mental health 
history, injuries 
฀ Risk factors i.e. drink, drugs, violence, weaponry 
฀ Use of force justification free text box  
฀ Other tactical options considered/ utilised 
฀ Officer- numbers deployed, level of training, equipment available 
฀ Result i.e. arrest, s136 Mental Health referral etc. 
 
Please Note- Any personal identifying data such as names, dates of birth or 
home addresses will not be recorded or removed from any MPS system. Any 
data removed from any MPS system will be redacted in order to prevent any 
individual being identified. I cannot see any reason for this, but if there is a 
requirement to remove any non-redacted records this will be with express 
written authority of Ch. Supt CO19 and conducted within MPS guidelines.  
 
These data fields are required to permit a thematic analysis of this use of force 
data using Nvivo software. This Excel sheet will be transferred from the MPS 
system and stored in accordance with MPS guidelines utilising an MPS issued 
encrypted memory stick. 
 
฀ What is the lawful basis for the collection and processing of personal 
data? N.B This is likely to be consent but not in all cases! Please use 
the lawful basis tool produced by the ICO to determine, if you are in 
doubt: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/resources-and-
support/getting-ready-for-the-gdpr-resources/lawful-basis-
interactive-guidance-tool/ 
 
Section 4 of the research DSA explores the legality of the sharing 
activity, in compliance with Article 6 of the GDPR and the Data 
Protection Act. It details how the agreement will comply with the 
relevant legal and official authorities, when sharing personal and special 
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category data with partner agencies.  
 
 
4.1 First Principle  
 
The first data protection principle states that data must be processed 
lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner.   
 
Common Law Powers are applied where there is no statutory gateway, 
but the public interest in sharing the data outweighs Police's normal 
duty of confidentiality. As no statutory power exists here, Common Law 
may be applied for the purpose of this research. To share information 
under Common Law, the research must be in connection with a Policing 
Purpose, namely:  
 
o Protecting life and property;  
o Preserving order;  
o Preventing the commission of offences;  
o Bringing offenders to justice;  
o Any duty or responsibility of the police arising from, 
common or statute law. 
 
STATE how the information to be shared in this ISA meets the criteria 
of the Common Law power.   
 
฀  Protect life- The primary aim of this research is to identify if 
armed police officers could utilise other methods when dealing 
or resolving incidents those in mental health crisis and prevent a 
fatal shooting. 
฀  Any duty or responsibility of the police arising from, common or 
statute law- The police service has a responsibility under Art 2 
ECHR to preserve life. This is an absolute right and every effort 
must be made to prevent the loss of life. The research of this 
subject area is predominantly USA based and therefore lacks the 
context within UK policing. It is therefore proportionate and 
reasonable to expect the UK police service to conduct research 
to prevent loss of life. 
 
 
4.2 Human Rights Act 1998, Article 8: The Right to Respect for 
Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence 
 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.   
 
Despite there being an established legal gateway and a general public 
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interest to share police information, you must also ensure that an 
individual’s right to privacy is not infringed by the data sharing. 
 
STATE how this agreement meets the criteria of Article 8 of the Human 
Rights Act  
  
 
The aim of this research is to increase legitimacy,  accountability and 
confidence in the police service to protect vulnerable people. The MPS 
and other UK police services need to manage threats to public safety. 
Persons experiencing a mental health crisis can present a significant 
operational challenge to responding police officers; the magnitude of 
which significantly increases when the distressed individuals have a 
capability to cause injury with a weapon.  
 
The ‘learning by mistakes’ approach currently utilised within the UK is 
reliant upon reactive post incident reviews, indicating a lack of SbC 
evidence based research. Although the SbC phenomenon is recognised 
by academics and police, it is not fully understood, placing responders in 
an almost impossible position with a limited range of tactical options. 
 
This research aims to utilise data already held by the MPS to identify 
evidence of best practise which may be practically applied to response 
policing and safeguard vulnerable persons. It will aim to:- 
 
• Examine UK police shootings against established SbC criteria to 
identify individual vulnerabilities/key risks within UK based context; 
critically analysing policing from both a unarmed/ armed 
perspective.  
• Examine police use of force on mentally ill subjects, to increase 
understanding of the key risks and when shots are likely to be fired. 
• Use quantifiable data from potentially fatal occurrences to 
measure ‘near miss’ incidents and identify the impact or ability of 
the police to ‘restrain’ the use of force 
• Explore the unarmed policing paradigm; as unarmed officers 
have to adapt and utilise different methods to engage a potentially 
dangerous suspect. 
 
As stated these records will be viewed on an MPS issued laptop and 
fields extracted onto an Excel sheet for empirical study. At this point all 
of the data will remain on an MPS system and as a serving officer under 
my personal secure MPS account. No identifying personal data will be 
recorded onto the Excel sheet and only the internal CO19 reference will 
be retained to allow a more detailed examination of the record if 
required.  
 
It is anticipated the fields from CO19 records will relate to (not an 
exhaustive list):-  
฀ Time  
฀ Location  
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฀ Suspect demographics i.e. age, sex, ethnicity code, mental health 
history, injuries 
฀ Risk factors i.e. drink, drugs, violence, weaponry 
฀ Use of force justification free text box  
฀ Other tactical options considered/ utilised 
฀ Officer- numbers deployed, level of training, equipment available 
฀ Result i.e. arrest, s136 Mental Health referral etc. 
 
฀ This is in pursuit of a legitimate aim e.g. to protect vulnerable 
persons – under statutory duty within law. 
฀ It is Proportionate as this data is already held by the MPS and the 
redacted use of personal data eliminates any intrusion or 
identification. This therefore minimises the risk of damage or 
distress into a person’s private lifes. 
฀ It is Appropriate and necessary in a democratic society – as there 
is no other UK based studies into this type of phenomenon and 
this may influence public health or police response. 
 
E3. Subject 
access 
requests 
 
฀ What arrangements in place related to any actions required to 
respond to individual requests for access to their personal data 
(Subject Access Requests)? i.e. How are you ensuring that personal 
data can be quickly and easily extracted from the system and/or 
redacted?  
 
This research is subject to a specific Information Sharing Agreement with the 
MPS. This is attached in supporting files but an extract is replicated below for 
clarity:- 
 
4.9 Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) and Subject Access Requests (SAR) 
 
FOIA Requests: Normal practice will be to make all ISAs externally available on 
the MPS Publication Scheme. It is recognised that parties to this agreement 
may receive a request for information made under the Act that relates to the 
operation of this agreement. Where applicable, all partners will observe the 
Code of Practice made under S.45 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, 
relating to consultation with others who are likely to be affected by the 
disclosure (or non-disclosure) of the information requested. The Code also 
relates to the process by which one authority may also transfer all or part of a 
request to another authority if it relates to information held only by the other 
authority. 
 
 
Subject Access Requests: Individuals can request a copy of all the 
information an organisation holds on them, by making a Subject Access 
Request (SAR). This may include information that was disclosed to that 
organisation under this agreement. Where this is the case, as a matter 
of good practice, the organisation will liaise with the originating agency 
to ensure that the release of the information to the individual will not 
prejudice any ongoing investigation/proceedings. Partners will comply 
with subject access requests in compliance with the relevant legislation, 
and if it is to be answered jointly to inform the MPS as soon as possible 
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on receipt in order to comply with the statutory time limit.  
 
฀ If consent is your lawful basis, will participants be able to withdraw 
consent at any stage of the research? What is the process for this? 
What is the cut-off date for withdrawal?  
 
This data is already held by the MPS lawfully and as this will be redacted/ 
anonymised to enable processing into specific fields it is not believed that 
any consent is required. 
 
 
E4. Data 
access & 
sharing 
 
฀ Who will have access to the personal data? Any third party 
involvement? For students this will include your supervisor and 
examiner as a minimum. 
 
This research is subject to a specific Information Sharing Agreement with the 
MPS.  
 
The data will be accessible and processed in the following manner:- 
฀ ‘Raw data’ – The primary researcher will only have access to this in 
accordance with the agreed ISA with the Metropolitan Police Service. 
This will remain on MPS systems until sanitised, anonymised and 
redacted into ‘Processed data’.  
฀ ‘Processed data’ – Access will be available by the primary researcher 
to their supervisor and subsequently any assessors or examiners to 
view for scrutiny. 
 
 
This is attached in supporting files but an extract is replicated below for 
clarity:- 
 
Sixth Principle 
Personal data shall be processed in a manner that ensures the 
appropriate security of the personal data.  
This includes the protection against unauthorised or unlawful 
processing, accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate 
technical or organisational measures.”  
 
Please state how this agreement complies with the sixth data protection 
principle. 
 
฀ Professor Robin Bryant (Canterbury Christ Church University ) is 
my supervisor and he will receive the redacted version of an 
Excel sheet to allow my research to be examined. This does not 
have any personal identifying data on it only the fields as 
described above. This will be stored in electronic form within a 
password protected file on an MPS issued encrypted memory 
stick. This will be physically completed and not transferred via 
any non-secure email system. 
฀ The transcribed data (i.e. redacted data stored on Excel sheet) 
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and all other records pertaining to the study will be stored in on 
an encrypted database within Canterbury ChristChurch 
University, accessible only by the named researchers, with a copy 
stored on the external drive along with any audio files from the 
interviews.   
 
฀ Please list and define the roles of any third party organisations 
(including software providers or partner organisations) with an 
involvement in the processing of the personal data. 
 
This research is subject to a specific Information Sharing Agreement with the 
MPS and this is attached in supporting files. 
 
฀ Have you ensured that all third party involvement in the processing 
of data is covered by a Data Sharing Agreement (with a data 
controller) or a Data Processing Agreement (with a data Processor)? 
(Please refer to CCCU guidance for further 
information.)https://cccu.canterbury.ac.uk/governance-and-legal-
services/the-general-data-protection-regulation/data-sharing.aspx  
YES 
 
฀ Is this an international project? Will personal data be shared outside 
of the EEA? What safeguards are in place? 
NO 
E5. Participant 
recruitment, 
privacy & 
confidentiality 
 
฀ Are you using social media to recruit participants? NO 
฀  How have you ensured the security surrounding your use of 
personal data in social media activities? N/A  
฀ How are you gaining consent? How are you informing participants of 
how their personal data will be used?  
 
This research is subject to a specific Information Sharing Agreement with the 
MPS. This is attached in supporting files but an extract is replicated below for 
clarity:- 
 
4.8  Consent 
 
Explicit consent will be sought from data subjects where it has been 
identified as necessary for the processing of personal data, as stipulated 
in the relevant Data Protection, GDPR, Law Enforcement Directive 
legislation, and policies of the partners of this agreement. 
 
Where consent is required, it is the responsibility of partner agencies to 
seek consent from data subjects. Individuals should be made aware of 
how their personal data will be processed, why and which agencies it 
will be shared with. They should be given the opportunity to opt into the 
given data share and informed that they may withdraw their consent at 
any time.  
 
In circumstances where consent has been refused or withdrawn by the 
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data subject, that data will not be used unless withholding that 
information would risk causing harm or distress to any party. 
  
Given the nature of police information, there may be occasions where 
personal information may be legally shared with other agencies without 
consent. 
 
Please state if data subjects have been made aware of how their 
personal data will be processed as part of this agreement and if their 
explicit consent has been sought. 
฀ previously stated, this research is in the public interest to complete. 
The data already held by the MPS will be redacted to ensure that no 
personal information is removed or recorded within any of this 
research. Therefore only descriptive type data fields as described will 
be recorded for empirical analysis. This is working within Canterbury 
Christ Church code of ethics and any information will remain 
confidential and stored within the processes previously outlined above. 
 
฀ Are you undertaking any activities that could create privacy concerns 
for individuals due to personal intrusion? NO 
฀  How will this be mitigated and addressed? N/A 
 
฀ How will you ensure confidentiality? Please identify and list all the 
risks which could lead to a data breach. 
 
This research is subject to a specific Information Sharing Agreement with the 
MPS. This is attached in supporting files but an extract is replicated below for 
clarity:- 
 
Confidentiality and Vetting 
 
Where OFFICIAL SENSITIVE information is being shared; vetting for 
researchers may be required and access must always be limited on a 
strict “need-to-know” basis. In circumstances where there are national 
security implications, a Counter Terrorist Check [CTC] is required. Data 
requesters must confirm that shared MPS information will be accessed 
by those staff who have a need-to-know, and that they have provisions 
in place to ensure that unauthorised dissemination or copying by their 
staff does not occur. 
 
฀ Detail if recipients of OFFICIAL SENSITIVE data have undergone any 
vetting. Insp Nick Francis (researcher) CO19 Force Firearms Unit- 
SC/DV cleared 
 
฀ Detail if any confidentiality agreements, or evidence of an equivalent 
level of assurance of confidentiality, are used or required by the 
partner employees who request the information. None. 
 
  
 
Nicholas FRANCIS 198 
 
 
Ethics Rev Checklist V13_July_18 
 
Physically 
 
฀ Information will be moved by a trusted person in a closed container 
or package. 
฀ Information will be moved by post or courier in a sealed package 
with no protective markings showing (other than PERSONAL or 
PRIVATE).  It will be addressed to a specified individual within the 
partner organisation by name or appointment (add job title). 
 
฀ Canterbury Christ Church University – Professor Robin Bryant is my 
supervisor and he will receive the redacted version of an Excel sheet 
to allow my work to be examined. This does not have any personal 
identifying data on it only the fields as described above. This will be 
stored in electronic form within a password protected file on an MPS 
issued encrypted memory stick. 
฀ Information will be stored on removable media, this is issued by the 
MPS and will be encrypted to government standards.  
 
Electronically 
 
฀ Canterbury Christ Church University – Professor Robin Bryant is my 
supervisor and he will receive the redacted version of an Excel sheet 
to allow my work to be examined. This does not have any personal 
identifying data on it only the fields as described above. This will be 
stored in electronic form within a password protected file on an MPS 
issued encrypted memory stick. This will be physically completed 
and not transferred via any non-secure email system. 
฀ The transcribed data (i.e. redacted data stored on Excel sheet) and 
all other records pertaining to the study will be stored in on an 
encrypted database within Canterbury ChristChurch University, 
accessible only by the named researchers, with a copy stored on the 
external drive along with any audio files from the interviews.   
 
 
 
3.4 Data Storage  
 
Partner’s Building & Perimeter Security 
 
Where OFFICIAL information is concerned, the information will be kept 
within a secure location with a managed and auditable access control 
system that the general public have no access to.  
 
The guidance below relates to the storage of information classified as 
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE by both physical and electronic means. Please detail 
which will be the primary method of storage, deleting any text which is 
not applicable to this agreement. Not applicable. 
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Hard Copy 
 
฀ OFFICIAL MPS information will be stored in a locked container within 
a secure premise with a managed access control. Access to 
information will be limited to those with a genuine “need-to-know”. 
When the documents are not being used they will be locked away. 
Not applicable. 
 
Electronically on a partner’s system 
 
฀ Where information is being kept electronically, partners confirm that 
system access controls are in place (i.e. username & password / 
keeping permissions to a minimum) to those who have a genuine 
“need-to-know”. It has been confirmed that access to the 
information can be audited. The transcribed data (i.e. redacted data 
stored on Excel sheet) and all other records pertaining to the study 
will be stored in on an encrypted database within Canterbury 
ChristChurch University, accessible only by the named researchers, 
with a copy stored on the external drive along with any audio files 
from the interviews.   
 
฀ Is the partner organisation part of the UK Government ‘Cyber 
Essentials’ scheme? Not known. 
 
 
3.5 Business Continuity 
 
If the need arises for information shared within this agreement to be 
backed up either electronically or with the movement of physical files, 
then the responsible party must ensure that the appropriate storage and 
protection measures are in place. 
 
Electronically 
 
If information is backed up electronically via disc, hard drive, or any 
mobile device, then the appropriate level of encryption and or password 
requirements must be in place. This should be followed by the media 
used being stored in a physical location that has a level of security 
appropriate to the level that the information held is graded to. 
 
Hard Copy 
 
If information shared under this agreement must be moved from its 
usual secure location, which is in accordance with the level of security 
required by this agreement, then any move temporary or permanent 
must provide the same level of security in storage as originally agreed 
and stated in this document. 
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Whilst partners to this agreement may have their own security 
standards & protocols, where MPS information is concerned the 
relevant security standards set out by the GSC for transmitting, storing 
and disposing information must be adhered to at all times. 
 
 
3.6 Data destruction / disposal 
 
The guidance below relates to the disposal of information up to 
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE, including papers and electronic information.  
 
Please detail which will be the primary method of data disposal, and 
delete any text which is not applicable to this agreement. 
 
Hard Copy. 
฀ Papers will be returned to MPS premises for disposal.   
 
Of Electronic Information from Partner’s System 
 
฀ Electronic information held on a partner’s system will be securely 
erased or overwritten using an approved software utility to a 
standard applicable to the protective marking. 
 
3.7 Reporting Security Incidents and Breaches to the Agreement 
 
Partner Agency Responsibility 
 Security breaches, including misuse of MPS information must be 
reported to the MPS SPOC (job title) within 24 hours of occurring / being 
detected.   
 
Detail the process by which this will occur; who is responsible for 
notification (job title) and by what means? In the unlikely event of this 
occurring Insp Nick Francis CO19 will notify his line manager and the 
IAU. 
 
It is confirmed that security breaches, including misuse or unauthorised 
disclosure are covered by the partner’s internal disciplinary procedures. 
If misuse is found there should be a mechanism to facilitate an 
investigation, including initiating criminal proceedings where necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
MPS Responsibility 
The nominated MPS individual must immediately inform the 
Information Assurance Unit of any security incident or breach of this 
agreement, including unauthorised disclosure or loss of information, by 
emailing ‘IAU Mailbox - Security Incidents’. 
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3.8 Compliance 
 
All partners are responsible for ensuring the security controls are 
implemented and staff are aware of their responsibilities under the Data 
Protection Act 2018.   
 
Partners agree where necessary to allow peer-to-peer reviews to ensure 
compliance with the security section of this DSA. Compliance with these 
security controls will be catered for in the periodic reviews of the DSA. 
 
 
 
3.9 Review 
 
฀ In accordance with the Guidance on the Management of Police 
Information (MoPI) this research ISA will be reviewed six months 
after implementation and annually thereafter.   
฀ Have you consulted with the IT department in order to verify if they 
can offer a valid solution?  
NO. This is MPS data lawfully gathered and stored by the police 
service. It is subject to an Information Sharing agreement with the 
MPS.  
฀ If stored external to CCCU systems, how are you ensuring that 
personal data is safely stored, processed and disposed of securely 
when no longer needed?  
How long will personal data be kept/stored for? In what format will 
this be? 
 
Any paper records (unlikely to generate any) will be kept by the lead 
researcher in a secure lockable file.  All documents and data will be 
kept for no longer than 5 years once study has been completed, as 
per University guidelines. No personal data is collated only 
processed as described above.  
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Section F1:  For Students Only 
F1. Module name and number:  
F2. Course:  
F3. Name of Supervisor(s) or module 
      Leader: 
 
F4. Email address of Supervisor(s) or  
      Module leader: 
 
Section F2:  For Supervisors 
Please ensure that this form has been completed correctly and in full. It will delay the 
ethical approval process if the form is incorrect, incomplete or has not been proofread.  
Please tick the appropriate boxes below.  This application should not be submitted 
until all boxes are ticked: 
The student has read the relevant documentation relating to the University’s 
Research Governance, available on the University web pages at: 
https://cccu.canterbury.ac.uk/research-and-enterprise-development-
centre/research-governance-and-ethics/research-governance-and-ethics.aspx  
 
฀  
Both myself and the student have read the relevant documentation relating to 
Data Protection and the GDPR, available on the University web pages at 
https://cccu.canterbury.ac.uk/governance-and-legal-services/governance-
and-legal-services.aspx and I can confirm that this project fully complies. 
 
฀  
The chosen topic merits further investigation  ฀  
The student has the skills to carry out the project  ฀  
I can confirm that the participant information sheet is completed in full and is 
appropriate 
 ฀  
I have reviewed the procedures for participant recruitment and obtaining 
informed consent and can confirm that they are appropriate 
 ฀  
If a Disclosure & Barring Service (DBS) check is required, this has been carried 
out 
 ฀  
 
Comments from supervisor: 
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Section G:  Declaration  
฀ I certify that the information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge 
and belief and I take full responsibility for it. 
฀ I certify that a risk assessment for this study has been carried out in compliance 
with the University’s Health and Safety policy and has been approved and signed by 
the relevant Head of School/Department. 
฀ I certify that my project proposal and methodology has been subject to ‘peer 
review’ commensurate with the level of that research. For students this will be 
carried out by the supervisor and for staff by an appropriately qualified person 
independent of the research proposed. 
฀ I certify that any required Disclosure & Barring Service (DBS) check has been carried 
out. 
฀ I undertake to carry out this project under the terms specified in the Canterbury 
Christ Church University Research Governance Handbook. 
฀ I undertake to inform the relevant Faculty Ethics Panel and 
Red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk of any significant change in the question, design or 
conduct of the research over the course of the project.  I understand that such 
changes may require a new application for ethics approval. 
฀ I undertake to inform the Contracts & Compliance Manager at 
Red.resgov@canterbury.ac.uk in the Research and Enterprise Integrity and 
Development Office when the proposed study has been completed. 
฀ I have read and understood the relevant University documentation relating to Data 
Protection and the GDPR and I am aware of my legal responsibility to comply with 
the terms of the GDPR and appropriate University policies and guidelines relating to 
the security and confidentiality of participant or other personal data. 
฀ I understand that project records/data may be subject to inspection for audit 
purposes if required in future and that project records should be kept securely for 
five years or other specified period. 
฀ I understand that the personal data about me contained in this application will be 
held by the Research and Enterprise Integrity and Development Office and the 
relevant Faculty and that this will be managed according to the principles 
established in the GDPR and appropriate University policies. 
As the Principal Investigator for this study, I confirm that this application 
has been shared with all other members of the study team 
(please tick) 
฀  
 
Principal Investigator Supervisor or module leader (as appropriate) 
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Ethics Rev Checklist V13_July_18 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: 
 
“How does being an Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO), 
compared with unarmed police officer, affect decision 
making?” (Working title) 
 
Name of 
Researcher: 
 
Nick Francis 
 
Contact details:   
Address:  School of Law, Criminal Justice & Computing, 
Canterbury Christ Church University, 
North Holmes Road, 
Canterbury CT1 1QU 
   
   
   
Tel:   07980 402794 
   
Email:   n.j.francis107@canterbury.ac.uk 
 
          Please initial box 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.   
3. I understand that any personal information that I provide to the 
researchers will be kept strictly confidential   
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
  
5.     I agree to be audio recorded as part of an interview for this  
study.       
 
Name of Participant: 
 
 
Date: Signature: 
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Appendix F – Ethics Amendment approval 
 
 
Appendix F - CCCU Ethics Committee- amendment approval email (received 16th January 2019). 
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  Q14_1 Preventing Crime
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 0 1.175 5 3.825 5
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 3 1.879 5 6.121 8
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 8 9.397 32 30.603 40
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 24 23.022 74 74.978 98
5 'Very satisfied' 39 38.527 125 125.473 164
Total 74 241 315
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.6754 (2-sided)
Q14_2 Helping Vulnerable People
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 0 0.705 3 2.295 3
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 2 1.879 6 6.121 8
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 8 10.102 35 32.898 43
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 37 25.841 73 84.159 110
5 'Very satisfied' 27 35.473 124 115.527 151
Total 74 241 315
AFOSTTO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.0359 (2-sided)
Q14_3 Searching Suspects
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 2 4.463 17 14.537 19
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 5 7.517 27 24.483 32
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 22 22.787 75 74.213 97
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 25 24.667 80 80.333 105
5 'Very satisfied' 20 14.565 42 47.435 62
Total 74 241 315
AFOSTTO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.2642  (2-sided)
Q14_4 Detecting Crime
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 1 1.395 5 4.605 6
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 1 3.952 16 13.048 17
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 11 15.576 56 51.424 67
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 25 24.643 81 81.357 106
5 'Very satisfied' 35 27.433 83 90.567 118
Total 73 241 314
STTO AFO
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.1098   (2-sided)
Total
Q14_5 Traffic Related
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 19 22.787 78 74.213 97
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 24 19.968 61 65.032 85
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 20 20.673 68 67.327 88
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 7 6.578 21 21.422 28
5 'Very satisfied' 4 3.994 13 13.006 17
Total 74 241 315
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.7285   (2-sided)
STTO AFO
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  Q14_6 Public Order
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 1 4.698 19 15.302 20
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 11 11.981 40 39.019 51
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 20 25.137 87 81.863 107
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 27 19.968 58 65.032 85
5 'Very satisfied' 15 12.216 37 39.784 52
Total 74 241 315
AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.0481   (2-sided)
STTO
Q14_7 Mental Health
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 9 10.571 36 34.429 45
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 16 14.565 46 47.435 62
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 24 27.956 95 91.044 119
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 21 15.975 47 52.025 68
5 'Very satisfied' 4 4.933 17 16.067 21
Total 74 241 315
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.4958   (2-sided)
Q14_8 Reporting Crime
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 13 17.149 60 55.851 73
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 19 19.733 65 64.267 84
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 26 25.606 83 83.394 109
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 12 8.457 24 27.543 36
5 'Very satisfied' 4 3.054 9 9.946 13
Total 74 241 315
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.4257  (2-sided)
Q14_9 Investigating Crime
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 10 12.490 43 40.510 53
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 12 11.548 37 37.452 49
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 25 28.280 95 91.720 120
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 18 17.204 55 55.796 73
5 'Very satisfied' 9 4.478 10 14.522 19
Total 74 240 314
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.1557  (2-sided)
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 1 1.178 4 3.822 5
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 4 2.357 6 7.643 10
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 21 16.497 49 53.503 70
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 31 24.981 75 81.019 106
5 'Very satisfied' 17 28.987 106 94.013 123
Total 74 240 314
STTO AFO
Total
Q14_10 Firearms Crime - involving 
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Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.0109    (2-sided)
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  Q14_11 Violent Crime
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 0 0.470 2 1.529 2
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 1 1.879 7 6.115 8
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 13 13.625 45 44.331 58
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 32 27.956 87 90.955 119
5 'Very satisfied' 28 30.070 100 97.834 128
Total 74 241 315
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.8449     (2-sided)
Q14_12 Arresting Suspects
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 6 5.911 19 19.089 25
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 15 12.294 37 39.706 52
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 22 29.080 101 93.920 123
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 22 18.204 55 58.796 77
5 'Very satisfied' 9 8.511 27 27.489 36
Total 74 239 313
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.3235    (2-sided)
Q14_13 Community Engagement
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very dissatisfied' 6 5.911 19 19.089 25
2 'Somewhat dissatisfied' 15 12.294 37 39.706 52
3 'Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied' 22 29.080 101 93.920 123
4 'Somewhat satisfied' 22 18.204 55 58.796 77
5 'Very satisfied' 9 8.511 27 27.489 36
Total 74 239 313
STTO AFO
Total
Note: Fisher's Exact Test for Count Data p=0.3616    (2-sided)
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AFO or STTO Mann-Whitney U test p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q14_1 Preventing Crime 0.784 8746 -0.274 -0.0154
Q14_2 Helping Vulnerable People 0.162 9798.5 1.4 0.0789
Q14_3 Searching Suspects 0.031 7496.5 -2.155 -0.1214
Q14_4 Detecting Crime 0.009 7118.5 -2.605 -0.1470
Q14_5 Traffic related 0.598 8568.5 -0.528 -0.0297
Q14_6 Public Order 0.014 7283 -2.47 -0.1392
Q14_7 Mental Heath 0.507 8479.5 -0.664 -0.0374
Q14_8 Reporting Crime 0.082 7771.5 -1.737 -0.0979
Q14_9 Investigating Crime 0.120 7859.5 -1.556 -0.0878
Q14_10 Firearms Crime -illegal use/ possession of 0.002 10835 3.035 0.1713
Q14_11 Violent crime 0.958 8951 0.053 0.0030
Q14_12 Arresting Suspects 0.232 8126 -1.196 -0.0675
Q14_13 Community Engagement 0.750 8635 -0.319 -0.0180
AFO or STTO
Mean N Std. Dev Median Mean N Std. Dev Median Mean N Std. Dev Median
Q14_1 Preventing Crime 4.34 74 0.832 5 4.28 241 0.919 5 4.3 315 0.899 5
Q14_2 Helping Vulnerable People 4.2 74 0.74 4 4.28 241 0.892 5 4.26 315 0.858 4
Q14_3 Searching Suspects 3.76 74 1.018 4 3.43 241 1.116 4 3.5 315 1.101 4
Q14_4 Detecting Crime 4.26 73 0.866 4 3.92 241 1.013 4 4 314 0.99 4
Q14_5 Traffic related 2.36 74 1.13 2 2.29 241 1.166 2 2.31 315 1.156 2
Q14_6 Public Order 3.59 74 1.019 4 3.22 241 1.136 3 3.31 315 1.119 3
Q14_7 Mental Heath 2.93 74 1.102 3 2.85 241 1.117 3 2.87 315 1.112 3
Q14_8 Reporting Crime 2.66 74 1.114 3 2.41 241 1.08 2 2.47 315 1.092 3
Q14_9 Investigating Crime 3.05 74 1.204 3 2.8 240 1.11 3 2.86 314 1.136 3
Q14_10 Firearms Crime - illegal use or possession of 3.8 74 0.906 4 4.14 240 0.938 4 4.06 314 0.941 4
Q14_11 Violent crime 4.18 74 0.765 4 4.15 241 0.88 4 4.15 315 0.853 4
Q14_12 Arresting Suspects 4.38 74 0.716 5 4.17 240 0.988 4 4.22 314 0.934 4
Q14_13 Community Engagement 3.18 74 1.139 3 3.14 239 1.067 3 3.15 313 1.083 3
AFO TotalSTTO
Fishers Chi-Sq
Q14_1 Preventing Crime 0.6754 NA
Q14_2 Helping Vulnerable People 0.0359 0.034
Q14_3 Searching Suspects 0.2642 NA
Q14_4 Detecting Crime 0.1098 NA
Q14_5 Traffic related 0.7285 NA
Q14_6 Public Order 0.0481 0.053
Q14_7 Mental Heath 0.4958 NA
Q14_8 Reporting Crime 0.4257 NA
Q14_9 Investigating Crime 0.1557 NA
Q14_10 Firearms Crime -illegal use/ possession of 0.0109 0.021
Q14_11 Violent crime 0.8449 NA
Q14_12 Arresting Suspects 0.3235 NA
Q14_13 Community Engagement 0.3616 NA
Note: Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.828
AFO or STTO
Significance level
Table 26. Q14 - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for Unarmed and STTO. 
Table 25. Q14 – Significance level results. 
Table 27. Q14 – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
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Table 28. Q14 Spearman’s Correlation (r
s
) results.  
Correlations
Q14_1 Q14_2 Q14_3 Q14_4 Q14_5 Q14_6 Q14_7 Q14_8 Q14_9 Q14_10 Q14_11 Q14_12 Q14_13
Q14_1 Preventing Crime Correlation Coefficient 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .
N 74
Q14_2 Helping Vulnerable People Correlation Coefficient .466** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 .
N 74 74
Q14_3 Searching Suspects Correlation Coefficient .286* .296* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013 0.011 .
N 74 74 74
Q14_4 Detecting Crime Correlation Coefficient .425** .418** 0.192 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0.103 .
N 73 73 73 73
Q14_5 Traffic related Correlation Coefficient -0.169 -0.003 0.061 -0.012 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.149 0.977 0.608 0.921 .
N 74 74 74 73 74
Q14_6 Public Order Correlation Coefficient 0.107 0.086 0.071 0.103 0.155 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.364 0.467 0.545 0.386 0.188 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74
Q14_7 Mental Heath Correlation Coefficient 0.113 .273* 0.083 .279* 0.108 0.186 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.336 0.019 0.48 0.017 0.36 0.113 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74
Q14_8 Reporting Crime Correlation Coefficient -0.086 -0.151 0.121 -0.001 0.171 0.197 .465** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.466 0.2 0.304 0.995 0.146 0.093 0 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74
Q14_9 Investigating Crime Correlation Coefficient 0.088 0.147 0.045 .338** 0.112 -0.166 .461** .459** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.455 0.212 0.705 0.003 0.343 0.158 0 0 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74 74
Q14_10 Firearms Crime Correlation Coefficient .383** .368** .265* .328** 0.127 .431** 0.123 0.06 0.084 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.005 0.281 0 0.295 0.612 0.475 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74 74 74
Q14_11 Violent crime Correlation Coefficient .409** .382** .263* .342** 0.13 .291* 0.08 0.076 0.159 .690** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.001 0.024 0.003 0.271 0.012 0.498 0.519 0.175 0 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Q14_12 Arresting Suspects Correlation Coefficient .370** .249* .450** .334** 0.118 .363** 0.045 0.08 -0.057 .522** .664** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.033 0 0.004 0.315 0.001 0.705 0.498 0.632 0 0 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Q14_13 Community Engagement Correlation Coefficient 0.212 .399** 0.174 .240* 0.216 .233* .434** .311** 0.184 .285* .244* .252* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.07 0 0.138 0.041 0.065 0.046 0 0.007 0.116 0.014 0.036 0.03 .
N 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Q14_1 Q14_2 Q14_3 Q14_4 Q14_5 Q14_6 Q14_7 Q14_8 Q14_9 Q14_10 Q14_11 Q14_12 Q14_13
Q14_1 Preventing Crime Correlation Coefficient 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .
N 241
Q14_2 Helping Vulnerable People Correlation Coefficient .695** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 .
N 241 241
Q14_3 Searching Suspects Correlation Coefficient .311** .204** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.001 .
N 241 241 241
Q14_4 Detecting Crime Correlation Coefficient .569** .463** .401** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 .
N 241 241 241 241
Q14_5 Traffic related Correlation Coefficient 0.053 0.088 .246** .228** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.412 0.173 0 0 .
N 241 241 241 241 241
Q14_6 Public Order Correlation Coefficient .161* .144* .442** .304** .373** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.012 0.025 0 0 0 .
N 241 241 241 241 241 241
Q14_7 Mental Heath Correlation Coefficient 0.03 .146* .228** .153* .400** .322** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.643 0.024 0 0.017 0 0 .
N 241 241 241 241 241 241 241
Q14_8 Reporting Crime Correlation Coefficient 0.122 .204** .315** .251** .580** .341** .546** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.059 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 .
N 241 241 241 241 241 241 241 241
Q14_9 Investigating Crime Correlation Coefficient .224** .209** .339** .406** .465** .330** .396** .618** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 .
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240
Q14_10 Firearms Crime Correlation Coefficient .310** .211** .250** .226** -.153* .188** -0.054 -.127* 0.006 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.001 0 0 0.017 0.003 0.403 0.05 0.931 .
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 239 240
Q14_11 Violent crime Correlation Coefficient .383** .297** .439** .369** -0.052 .341** 0.085 0.022 .131* .772** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0.426 0 0.186 0.732 0.042 0 .
N 241 241 241 241 241 241 241 241 240 240 241
Q14_12 Arresting Suspects Correlation Coefficient .401** .202** .428** .385** -0.028 .312** 0.072 0.061 .274** .539** .635** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.002 0 0 0.667 0 0.266 0.349 0 0 0 .
N 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 239 239 240 240
Q14_13 Community Engagement Correlation Coefficient .274** .366** .198** .288** .332** .225** .403** .448** .406** 0.04 0.072 .189** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.536 0.269 0.003 .
N 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 238 238 239 238 239
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed
a AFO or STTO = AFO
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
STTO
AFO
Spearman's rho
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 0 1.175 5 3.825 5
2 'Disagree' 1 2.114 8 6.886 9
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 8 10.337 36 33.663 44
4 'Agree' 27 27.956 92 91.044 119
5 'Strongly agree' 38 32.419 100 105.581 138
Total 74 241 315
STTO AFO
Total
Q15_1 Public Service- making a 
difference
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 1 4.698 19 15.302 20
2 'Disagree' 11 12.451 42 40.549 53
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 25 27.956 94 91.044 119
4 'Agree' 26 20.673 62 67.327 88
5 'Strongly agree' 11 8.222 24 26.778 35
Total 74 241 315
STTO AFOQ15_2 Recognition - peers / 
managers
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 1 1.644 6 5.356 7
2 'Disagree' 2 4.229 16 13.771 18
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 17 22.552 79 73.448 96
4 'Agree' 36 31.479 98 102.521 134
5 'Strongly agree' 18 14.095 42 45.905 60
Total 74 241 315
Q15_3 Learning/ career 
development
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 0 1.879 8 6.121 8
2 'Disagree' 3 4.933 18 16.067 21
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 12 18.089 65 58.911 77
4 'Agree' 32 26.311 80 85.689 112
5 'Strongly agree' 27 22.787 70 74.213 97
Total 74 241 315
Q15_4 Appreciation- public or 
victims
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 0 1.178 5 3.822 5
2 'Disagree' 1 3.535 14 11.465 15
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 7 14.611 55 47.389 62
4 'Agree' 27 28.752 95 93.248 122
5 'Strongly agree' 39 25.924 71 84.076 110
Total 74 240 314
Q15_5 Excitement or Enjoyment Total
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 0 2.778 12 9.222 12
2 'Disagree' 9 7.408 23 24.592 32
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 31 31.254 104 103.746 135
4 'Agree' 18 20.373 70 67.627 88
5 'Strongly agree' 14 10.186 30 33.814 44
Total 72 239 311
Q15_6 Public expectation
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 0 0.470 2 1.530 2
2 'Disagree' 0 1.175 5 3.825 5
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 3 4.933 18 16.067 21
4 'Agree' 23 26.546 90 86.454 113
5 'Strongly agree' 48 40.876 126 133.124 174
Total 74 241 315
Q15_7 Personal Pride
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Strongly disagree' 0 0.940 4 3.060 4
2 'Disagree' 0 1.410 6 4.590 6
3 'Neither agree nor disagree' 5 7.752 28 25.248 33
4 'Agree' 30 27.251 86 88.749 116
5 'Strongly agree' 39 36.648 117 119.352 156
Total 74 241 315
Q15_8 Personal Challenge
STTO AFO
Total
Mean N SD Median Mean N SD Median Mean N SD Median Range
Q15_1 Public service- make a difference 4.38 74 0.735 5 4.14 241 0.932 4 4.19 315 0.894 4 4
Q15_2 Recognition - peers / managers 3.47 74 0.968 3.5 3.12 241 1.065 3 3.21 315 1.052 3 4
Q15_3 Learning/ career development 3.92 74 0.84 4 3.64 241 0.93 4 3.7 315 0.916 4 4
Q15_4 Appreciation- public or victims 4.12 74 0.827 4 3.77 241 1.054 4 3.85 315 1.015 4 4
Q15_5 Excitement or Enjoyment 4.41 74 0.72 5 3.89 240 0.968 4 4.01 314 0.941 4 4
Q15_6 Public expectation 3.51 72 0.949 3 3.35 239 0.988 3 3.39 311 0.98 3 4
Q15_7 Personal pride 4.61 74 0.569 5 4.38 241 0.782 5 4.43 315 0.743 5 4
Q15_8 Personal challenge 4.46 74 0.623 5 4.27 241 0.884 4 4.31 315 0.833 4 4
TotalSTTO AFO
AFO or STTO
Table 29. Q15 - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for Unarmed and STTO. 
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Fishers Chi-Sq
Q15_1 Public service- make a difference 0.4973 NA
Q15_2 Recognition - peers / managers 0.1011 NA
Q15_3 Learning/ career development 0.2170 NA
Q15_4 Appreciation- public or victims 0.0731 NA
Q15_5 Excitement or Enjoyment 0.0014 NA
Q15_6 Public expectation 0.1562 NA
Q15_7 Personal pride 0.3313 NA
Q15_8 Personal challenge 0.4101 NA
Note: Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.815
AFO or STTO
p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q15_1 Public service- make a difference 0.067 7754 -1.831 -0.2128
Q15_2 Recognition - peers / managers 0.016 7329.5 -2.418 -0.2811
Q15_3 Learning/ career development 0.019 7397.5 -2.353 -0.2735
Q15_4 Appreciation- public or victims 0.015 7327 -2.431 -0.2826
Q15_5 Excitement or Enjoyment 0.000 6166.5 -4.211 -0.4895
Q15_6 Public expectation 0.365 8031.5 -0.906 -0.1068
Q15_7 Personal pride 0.034 7632 -2.116 -0.2460
Q15_8 Personal challenge 0.229 8166.5 -1.204 -0.1400
Mann-Whitney U test 
AFO or STTO
Table 30. Q15 – Significance level results. 
Table 31. Q15 – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 1 2.592 10 8.408 11
2 'Seldom' 22 14.847 41 48.153 63
3 'About half the time' 20 25.452 88 82.548 108
4 'Usually' 18 18.146 59 58.854 77
5 'Always' 13 12.962 42 42.038 55
Total 74 240 314
AFO
TotalQ16_1 Person alone shouting
STTO
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 1 2.357 9 7.643 10
2 'Seldom' 8 9.427 32 30.573 40
3 'About half the time' 23 17.911 53 58.089 76
4 'Usually' 27 27.809 91 90.191 118
5 'Always' 15 16.497 55 53.503 70
Total 74 240 314
Q16_2 Known person with mental health 
issues, alone shouting
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.946 4 3.054 4
2 'Seldom' 3 3.783 13 12.217 16
3 'About half the time' 13 13.949 46 45.051 59
4 'Usually' 32 27.898 86 90.102 118
5 'Always' 26 27.425 90 88.575 116
Total 74 239 313
Q16_3 Person shouting at another 
person   
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 1.182 5 3.818 5
2 'Seldom' 1 2.601 10 8.399 11
3 'About half the time' 8 10.639 37 34.361 45
4 'Usually' 26 24.588 78 79.412 104
5 'Always' 39 34.990 109 113.010 148
Total 74 239 313
Q16_4 Known person with mental health issues 
shouting at another individual    
    
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 0 0.471 2 1.529 2
3 'About half the time' 0 3.771 16 12.229 16
4 'Usually' 12 14.140 48 45.860 60
5 'Always' 62 55.382 173 179.618 235
Total 74 240 314
Q16_5 Person pushing another in the 
chest    
STTO AFO
Total
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_1 Person alone shouting
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_2 Known person with mental health issues, 
alone shouting 
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_3 Person shouting at another person 
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_4 Known person with mental health issues 
shouting at another individual 
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_5 Person pushing another in the chest 
STTO
AFO
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 0 0.471 2 1.529 2
3 'About half the time' 0 4.478 19 14.522 19
4 'Usually' 9 11.076 38 35.924 47
5 'Always' 65 57.739 180 187.261 245
Total 74 240 314
Q16_6 Known person with mental health issues 
pushing another individual in the chest
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'About half the time' 0 1.178 5 3.822 5
4 'Usually' 6 4.478 13 14.522 19
5 'Always' 67 67.873 221 220.127 288
Total 74 240 314
STTO AFO
Total
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
walking    
    
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'About half the time' 0 1.182 5 3.818 5
4 'Usually' 6 3.783 10 12.217 16
5 'Always' 67 68.562 223 221.438 290
Total 74 239 313
STTO AFO
Total
Q16_8 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking    
    
Observed Expected Observed Expected
2 'Seldom' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'About half the time' 0 1.414 6 4.586 6
4 'Usually' 2 2.828 10 9.172 12
5 'Always' 71 69.522 224 225.478 295
Total 74 240 314
Q16_9 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another    
    
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_6 Known person with mental health issues 
pushing another individual in the chest 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_8 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
walking 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
2 'Seldom' 3 'About half the
time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_9 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
2 'Seldom' 3 'About half the
time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_10 Known person with mental health issues armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) shouting and aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
Observed Expected Observed Expected
2 'Seldom' 2 0.471 0 1.529 2
3 'About half the time' 0 1.178 5 3.822 5
4 'Usually' 2 3.299 12 10.701 14
5 'Always' 70 69.051 223 223.949 293
Total 74 240 314
Q16_10 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another    
    
STTO AFO
Total
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 0 0.471 2 1.529 2
3 'About half the time' 0 4.478 19 14.522 19
4 'Usually' 9 11.076 38 35.924 47
5 'Always' 65 57.739 180 187.261 245
Total 74 240 314
Q16_6 Known person with mental health issues 
pushing another individual in the chest
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'About half the time' 0 1.178 5 3.822 5
4 'Usually' 6 4.478 13 14.522 19
5 'Always' 67 67.873 221 220.127 288
Total 74 240 314
STTO AFO
Total
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
walking    
    
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Seldom' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'About half the time' 0 1.182 5 3.818 5
4 'Usually' 6 3.783 10 12.217 16
5 'Always' 67 68.562 223 221.438 290
Total 74 239 313
STTO AFO
Total
Q16_8 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking    
    
Observed Expected Observed Expected
2 'Seldom' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'About half the time' 0 1.414 6 4.586 6
4 'Usually' 2 2.828 10 9.172 12
5 'Always' 71 69.522 224 225.478 295
Total 74 240 314
Q16_9 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another    
    
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_6 Known person with mental health issues 
pushing another individual in the chest 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_8 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
walking 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
2 'Seldom' 3 'About half the
time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_9 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
2 'Seldom' 3 'About half the
time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_10 Known person with mental health issues armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) shouting and aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
Observed Expected Observed Expected
2 'Seldom' 2 0.471 0 1.529 2
3 'About half the time' 0 1.178 5 3.822 5
4 'Usually' 2 3.299 12 10.701 14
5 'Always' 70 69.051 223 223.949 293
Total 74 240 314
Q16_10 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another    
    
STTO AFO
Total
Nicholas FRANCIS 221 
Appendix G- Survey Analysis Q16. 
  
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 7 1.655 0 5.345 7
2 'Seldom' 5 1.655 2 5.345 7
3 'About half the time' 6 2.837 6 9.163 12
4 'Usually' 4 2.837 8 9.163 12
5 'Always' 52 65.016 223 209.984 275
Total 74 239 313
Q16_11 Person armed with a weapon (firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another    
    
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Never' 7 1.660 0 5.340 7
2 'Seldom' 5 1.897 3 6.103 8
3 'About half the time' 7 2.846 5 9.154 12
4 'Usually' 4 2.372 6 7.628 10
5 'Always' 51 65.224 224 209.776 275
Total 74 238 312
Q16_12 Known person with mental health issues 
armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another    
STTO AFO
Total
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_12 Known person with mental health issues armed with a 
weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
0
50
100
150
200
250
1 'Never' 2 'Seldom' 3 'About half
the time'
4 'Usually' 5 'Always'
Q16_11 Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another 
STTO
AFO
Mean N Std. Deviation Median Mean N Std. Deviation Median Mean N Std. Deviation Median
Q16_1 Person alone shouting 3.27 74 1.114 3 3.34 240 1.082 3 3.32 314 1.089 3
Q16_2
Known person with mental health issues, alone 
shouting 3.64 74 0.973 4 3.63 240 1.09 4 3.63 314 1.062 4
Q16_3 Person shouting at another person 4.09 74 0.830 4 4.03 239 0.97 4 4.04 313 0.938 4
Q16_4
Known person with mental health issues shouting 
at another individual 4.39 74 0.737 5 4.15 239 0.973 4 4.21 313 0.927 4
Q16_5 Person pushing another person in the chest 4.84 74 0.371 5 4.63 240 0.685 5 4.68 314 0.632 5
Q16_6
Known person with mental health issues pushing 
another individual in the chest 4.88 74 0.329 5 4.64 240 0.7 5 4.7 314 0.64 5
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking 4.88 74 0.436 5 4.89 240 0.439 5 4.89 314 0.437 5
Q16_8
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) walking 4.88 74 0.436 5 4.9 239 0.428 5 4.89 313 0.429 5
Q16_9
Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another 4.93 74 0.382 5 4.91 240 0.366 5 4.91 314 0.369 5
Q16_10
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another 4.89 74 0.512 5 4.91 240 0.354 5 4.9 314 0.396 5
Q16_11
Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting 
and aggressive towards another 4.2 74 1.375 5 4.89 239 0.445 5 4.73 313 0.824 5
Q16_12
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive 
towards another 4.18 74 1.378 5 4.89 238 0.461 5 4.72 312 0.838 5
STTO AFO Total
Table 33. Q16 - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for AFO and STTO. 
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Appendix G- Survey Analysis Q16. 
  
Fishers Chi-Sq
Q16_1 Person alone shouting 0.1404 NA
Q16_2
Known person with mental health issues, alone 
shouting 0.5610 NA
Q16_3 Person shouting at another person 0.7965 NA
Q16_4
Known person with mental health issues shouting 
at another individual 0.4692 NA
Q16_5 Person pushing another person in the chest 0.0730 NA
Q16_6
Known person with mental health issues pushing 
another individual in the chest 0.0311 NA
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking 0.2416 NA
Q16_8
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) walking 0.1596 NA
Q16_9
Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another 0.2010 NA
Q16_10
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another 0.0718 NA
Q16_11
Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting 
and aggressive towards another 0.0000 NA
Q16_12
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive 
towards another 0.0000 NA
Note: Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.836
Significance level
p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q16_1 Person alone shouting 0.520 9304 0.644 0.0363
Q16_2
Known person with mental health issues, alone 
shouting 0.796 9049 0.258 0.0146
Q16_3 Person shouting at another person 0.822 8698.5 -0.225 -0.0127
Q16_4
Known person with mental health issues shouting 
at another individual 0.113 7846.5 -1.585 -0.0896
Q16_5 Person pushing another person in the chest 0.026 7727 -2.229 -0.1258
Q16_6
Known person with mental health issues pushing 
another individual in the chest 0.012 7641 -2.513 -0.1418
Q16_7 Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) walking 0.696 9007.5 0.391 0.0221
Q16_8
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) walking 0.448 9076.5 0.759 0.0429
Q16_9
Person armed with a weapon (not firearm) 
shouting and aggressive towards another 0.415 8650 -0.815 -0.0460
Q16_10
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) shouting and 
aggressive towards another 0.643 8743 -0.463 -0.0261
Q16_11
Person armed with a weapon (firearm) shouting 
and aggressive towards another 0.000 10973 5.521 0.3121
Q16_12
Known person with mental health issues armed 
with a weapon (firearm) shouting and aggressive 
towards another 0.000 11096 6.019 0.3408
Mann-Whitney U test 
Table 34. Q16 – Significance level results. 
Table 35. Q16 – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
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Appendix G- Survey Analysis Q16. 
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Table 36. Q16 Spearman’s Correlation (r
s
) results.  
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 18 17.865 40 44.342 58
2 'Fair' 25 21.869 46 54.281 71
3 'Average' 20 37.886 103 94.035 123
4 'Good' 5 11.397 32 28.287 37
5 'Excellent' 5 6.468 16 16.055 21
Total 73 237 310
Q17_1 Training 
(classroom based)   
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 7 5.236 10 12.997 17
2 'Fair' 11 9.241 19 22.935 30
3 'Average' 22 26.181 63 64.984 85
4 'Good' 22 30.186 76 74.923 98
5 'Excellent' 11 24.641 69 61.161 80
Total 73 237 310
Q17_2 Training (practical 
based)   
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) 
STTO Observed
AFO Observed
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) 
STTO Observed
AFO Observed
AFO or STTO Mean N Std. Dev Median Mean N Std. Dev Median Mean N Std. Dev Median
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) 2.37 73 1.137 2 2.74 237 1.1 3 2.65 310 1.118 3
Q17_2 Training (practical based) 3.26 73 1.179 3 3.74 237 1.093 4 3.63 310 1.13 4
STTO AFO Total
Table 37. Q17 - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for AFO and STTO. 
AFO or STTO Fishers Chi-Sq
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) 0.1404 NA
Q17_2 Training (practical based) 0.5610 NA
Note: Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.795
Significance level
Table 38. Q16 – Significance level results. 
AFO or STTO p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) 0.005 10446 2.8 0.1590
Q17_2 Training (practical based) 0.002 10633 3.071 0.1744
Mann-Whitney U test 
Table 39. Q16 – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
Nicholas FRANCIS 225 
Appendix G- Survey Analysis Q17. 
 
 
  
Correlations
Spearman's rho Q17_1 Q17_2
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 73
Q17_2 Training (practical based) Pearson Correlation .694** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 73 73
Q17_1 Training (classroom based) Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 237
Q17_2 Training (practical based) Pearson Correlation .637** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 237 237
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
AFO
STTO
Table 40. Q17 Spearman’s Correlation (r
s
) results.  
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  Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 24 13.669 34 44.331 58
2 'Little' 19 17.439 55 56.561 74
3 'Somewhat' 23 28.280 97 91.720 120
4 'Much' 3 8.248 32 26.752 35
5 'A great deal' 5 6.363 22 20.637 27
Total 74 240 314
Q18_1 Training 
(classroom based)   
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 10 4.949 11 16.051 21
2 'Little' 8 6.363 19 20.637 27
3 'Somewhat' 28 21.446 63 69.554 91
4 'Much' 19 22.153 75 71.847 94
5 'A great deal' 9 19.089 72 61.911 81
Total 74 240 314
Total
Q18_2 Training (practical 
based)    
STTO AFO
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Little' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
3 'Somewhat' 6 7.541 26 24.459 32
4 'Much' 31 29.694 95 96.306 126
5 'A great deal' 37 36.293 117 117.707 154
Total 74 240 314
Q18_3 Experience when 
observing colleagues   
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Little' 0 0.473 2 1.527 2
3 'Somewhat' 2 3.546 13 11.454 15
4 'Much' 30 29.316 94 94.684 124
5 'A great deal' 42 40.428 129 130.572 171
Total 74 239 313
Q18_4 Experience 
working with colleagues 
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
2 'Little' 1 0.236 0 0.764 1
3 'Somewhat' 1 2.837 11 9.163 12
4 'Much' 18 18.677 61 60.323 79
5 'A great deal' 54 52.013 166 167.987 220
Total 74 239 313
Q18_5 Practical policing 
experience    
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great deal'
Q18_1 Training (classroom based)
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great deal'
Q18_2 Training (practical based) 
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great deal'
Q18_3 Experience when observing colleagues
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great deal'
Q18_4 Experience working with colleagues
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great
deal'
Q18_5 Practical policing experience
STTO
AFO
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 0 0.707 3 2.293 3
2 'Little' 0 0.236 1 0.764 1
3 'Somewhat' 4 4.242 14 13.758 18
4 'Much' 26 24.981 80 81.019 106
5 'A great deal' 44 43.834 142 142.166 186
Total 74 240 314
Q18_6 Your own personal 
abilities
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Not much' 0 0.472 2 1.528 2
2 'Little' 0 0.708 3 2.292 3
3 'Somewhat' 6 6.138 20 19.862 26
4 'Much' 18 21.246 72 68.754 90
5 'A great deal' 48 43.436 136 140.564 184
Total 72 233 305
Q18_7 Your own personal 
life experience
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great deal'
Q18_6 Your own personal abilities
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 'Not much' 2 'Little' 3 'Somewhat' 4 'Much' 5 'A great deal'
Q18_7 Your own personal life experience
STTO
AFO
AFO or STTO
p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q18_1 Training (classroom based) 0.000 11270 3.644 0.2056
Q18_2 Training (practical based) 0.000 11503.5 3.983 0.2248
Q18_3 Experience when observing colleagues 0.666 8614 -0.431 -0.0243
Q18_4 Experience working with colleagues 0.509 8448 -0.66 -0.0373
Q18_5 Practical policing experience 0.515 8489.5 -0.651 -0.0368
Q18_6 Your own personal abilities 0.855 8772 -0.182 -0.0103
Q18_7 Your own personal life experience 0.205 7668 -1.268 -0.0726
Mann-Whitney U test 
Table 43. Q18 – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
AFO or STTO
Mean N Std. Dev Median Mean N Std. Dev Median Mean N Std. Dev Median
Q18_1 Training (classroom based) 2.27 74 1.162 2 2.8 240 1.124 3 2.68 314 1.154 3
Q18_2 Training (practical based) 3.12 74 1.182 3 3.74 240 1.109 4 3.6 314 1.155 4
Q18_3 Experience when observing colleagues 4.42 74 0.641 4.5 4.36 240 0.724 4 4.37 314 0.705 4
Q18_4 Experience working with colleagues 4.54 74 0.554 5 4.46 239 0.678 5 4.48 313 0.651 5
Q18_5 Practical policing experience 4.69 74 0.572 5 4.64 239 0.613 5 4.65 313 0.603 5
Q18_6 Your own personal abilities 4.54 74 0.601 5 4.49 240 0.737 5 4.5 314 0.707 5
Q18_7 Your own personal life experience 4.58 72 0.645 5 4.45 233 0.776 5 4.48 305 0.748 5
STTO AFO Total
Table 41. Q18 - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for AFO and STTO. 
AFO or STTO
Fishers Chi-Sq
Q18_1 Training (classroom based) 0.0032 0.00248
Q18_2 Training (practical based) 0.0012 NA
Q18_3 Experience when observing colleagues 0.9063 NA
Q18_4 Experience working with colleagues 0.8777 NA
Q18_5 Practical policing experience 0.3236 NA
Q18_6 Your own personal abilities 0.9914 NA
Q18_7 Your own personal life experience 0.7420 NA
Note: Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.795.
Significance level
Table 42. Q18 – Significance level results. 
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Table 44. Q18 Spearman’s Correlation (r
s
) results.  
Q18_1 Q18_2 Q18_3 Q18_4 Q18_5 Q18_6 Q18_7
Q18_1 Training (classroom based) Correlation Coefficient 1 .702**
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0
N 74 74
Q18_2 Training (practical based) Correlation Coefficient .702** 1 .347**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 . 0.002
N 74 74 74
Q18_3 Experience when observing colleagues Correlation Coefficient 0.205 .347** 1 .851**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.08 0.002 . 0
N 74 74 74 74
Q18_4 Experience working with colleagues Correlation Coefficient 0.035 0.221 .851** 1 .362**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.767 0.059 0 . 0.002
N 74 74 74 74 74
Q18_5 Practical policing experience Correlation Coefficient 0.224 0.207 .508** .362** 1 .320**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.055 0.077 0 0.002 . 0.005
N 74 74 74 74 74 74
Q18_6 Your own personal abilities Correlation Coefficient 0.217 0.203 0.072 -0.033 .320** 1 .837**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.063 0.083 0.544 0.779 0.005 . 0
N 74 74 74 74 74 74 72
Q18_7 Your own personal life experience Correlation Coefficient 0.134 0.078 -0.018 -0.064 .256* .837** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.263 0.516 0.878 0.594 0.03 0 .
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Q18_1 Training (classroom based) Correlation Coefficient 1 .639**
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0
N 240 240
Q18_2 Training (practical based) Correlation Coefficient .639** 1 .361**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 . 0
N 240 240 240
Q18_3 Experience when observing colleagues Correlation Coefficient .229** .361** 1 .833**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 . 0
N 240 240 240 239
Q18_4 Experience working with colleagues Correlation Coefficient .129* .278** .833** 1 .545**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.047 0 0 . 0
N 239 239 239 239 238
Q18_5 Practical policing experience Correlation Coefficient -0.018 0.106 .474** .545** 1 .568**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.777 0.103 0 0 . 0
N 239 239 239 238 239 239
Q18_6 Your own personal abilities Correlation Coefficient 0.059 0.055 .305** .308** .568** 1 .721**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.363 0.395 0 0 0 . 0
N 240 240 240 239 239 240 233
Q18_7 Your own personal life experience Correlation Coefficient 0.108 0.087 .208** .192** .423** .721** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.101 0.188 0.001 0.003 0 0 .
N 233 233 233 232 232 233 233
STTO
AFO
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
Spearman's rho
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Q_19 What type of incident was this?
STTO AFO
Note: n=315 
Q19 What type of incident was this?
c 2 Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected (Fishers)
Q19_1 Preventing Crime 11 9.632 30 31.368 0.292 41
Q19_2 Helping Vulnerable Person 14 11.041 33 35.959 1.218 47
Q19_3 Searching Suspect(s) 6 8.927 32 29.073 1.426 38
Q19_4 Detecting Crime 4 2.819 8 9.181  (0.486) 12
Q19_5 Traffic related 1 0.705 2 2.295  (0.553) 3
Q19_6 Public Order 8 8.927 30 29.073 0.143 38
Q19_7 Mental Heath 36 24.902 70 81.098 9.744** 106
Q19_8 Reporting Crime 0 0.235 1 0.765  (1) 1
Q19_9 Investigating Crime 4 2.114 5 6.886  (0.222) 9
Q19_10 Firearms crime 1 11.746 49 38.254 13.886*** 50
Q19_11 Violent crime 13 16.679 58 54.321 1.37 71
Q19_12 Arresting Suspects 29 22.552 67 73.448 3.466 96
Q19_13 Other 1 0.235 0 0.765 0.308 1
 * p < .05. ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.
STTO AFO
Table 45. Q19_a STTO/ AFO responses. 
Chart 13. Q19 What type of incident was this? 
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 13 6.498 14 20.502 27
2 'Rarely Effective' 14 7.942 19 25.058 33
3 'Sometimes Effective' 6 6.258 20 19.742 26
4 'Often Effective' 12 18.292 64 57.708 76
5 'Very Effective' 25 30.325 101 95.675 126
Not Applicable' 1 1.685 6 5.315 7
Total 71 224 295
STTO AFO
Total
Q19_a_1 Communication to de-
escalate
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 13 7.297 17 22.703 30
2 'Rarely Effective' 9 9.000 28 28.000 37
3 'Sometimes Effective' 12 9.486 27 29.514 39
4 'Often Effective' 18 21.649 71 67.351 89
5 'Very Effective' 15 19.946 67 62.054 82
Not Applicable' 5 4.622 14 14.378 19
Total 72 224 296
Q19_a_2 Time or space to de-
escalate
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 9 7.325 22 23.675 31
2 'Rarely Effective' 15 10.161 28 32.839 43
3 'Sometimes Effective' 10 10.634 35 34.366 45
4 'Often Effective' 10 12.288 42 39.712 52
5 'Very Effective' 6 9.688 35 31.312 41
Not Applicable' 19 18.904 61 61.096 80
Total 69 223 292
Q19_a_3 OST ‘Open handed 
techniques'
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 4 3.139 9 3.139 13
2 'Rarely Effective' 8 4.347 10 4.347 18
3 'Sometimes Effective' 5 7.728 27 7.728 32
4 'Often Effective' 17 19.078 62 19.078 79
5 'Very Effective' 25 25.840 82 25.840 107
Not Applicable' 12 10.867 33 10.867 45
Total 71 223 294
Q19_a_4 Restraint (physical, 
cuffs or spit-hood)
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 14 10.397 30 33.603 44
2 'Rarely Effective' 6 7.798 27 25.202 33
3 'Sometimes Effective' 3 7.089 27 22.911 30
4 'Often Effective' 4 4.253 14 13.747 18
5 'Very Effective' 1 2.599 10 8.401 11
Not Applicable' 41 36.863 115 119.137 156
Total 69 223 292
Q19_a_5 ASP
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Very Ineffective' 2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_1  Communication to de-escalate
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 'Very Ineffective' 2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_2  Time or space to de-escalate
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 'Very Ineffective' 2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_3 OST ‘Open handed techniques’
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1 'Very Ineffective' 2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_4 Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood)
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1 'Very Ineffective' 2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_5 ASP
STTO
AFO
Nicholas FRANCIS 231 
Appendix G- Survey Analysis Q19_a. 
 
  
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 1 2.887 11 9.113 12
2 'Rarely Effective' 1 1.684 6 5.316 7
3 'Sometimes Effective' 5 3.849 11 12.151 16
4 'Often Effective' 10 8.660 26 27.340 36
5 'Very Effective' 26 20.447 59 64.553 85
Not Applicable' 27 32.474 108 102.526 135
Total 70 221 291
Q19_a_7 Conductive electronic 
devices (Taser)
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 14 13.028 42 42.972 56
2 'Rarely Effective' 8 7.677 25 25.323 33
3 'Sometimes Effective' 2 4.653 18 15.347 20
4 'Often Effective' 2 2.326 8 7.674 10
5 'Very Effective' 1 1.628 6 5.372 7
Not Applicable' 40 37.688 122 124.313 162
Total 67 221 288
Q19_a_6 CS Spray
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 5 5.671 19 18.329 24
2 'Rarely Effective' 2 1.654 5 5.346 7
3 'Sometimes Effective' 0 1.654 7 5.346 7
4 'Often Effective' 0 0.945 4 3.055 4
5 'Very Effective' 0 0.709 3 2.291 3
Not Applicable' 62 58.366 185 188.634 247
Total 69 223 292
Q19_a_8 AEP Baton Gun 
rounds
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Very Ineffective' 5 4.283 13 13.717 18
2 'Rarely Effective' 1 1.190 4 3.810 5
3 'Sometimes Effective' 0 2.855 12 9.145 12
4 'Often Effective' 0 1.666 7 5.334 7
5 'Very Effective' 0 10.707 45 34.293 45
Not Applicable' 63 48.300 140 154.700 203
Total 69 221 290
Q19_a_9 Firearms
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 'Very Ineffective' 2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_9 Firearms
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1 'Very
Ineffective'
2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_8 AEP Baton Gun rounds
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Very
Ineffective'
2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_7 Conductive electronic devices (CED or Taser)
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1 'Very
Ineffective'
2 'Rarely  Effective' 3 'Sometimes
Effective'
4 'Often Effective' 5 'Very Effective' Not Applicable'
Q19_a_6 CS Spray
STTO
AFO
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p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q19_a_1 Communication to de-escalate 0.002 9797.5 3.102 0.181
Q19_a_2 Time or space to de-escalate 0.034 9369.0 2.124 0.123
Q19_a_3 OST ‘Open handed techniques’ 0.186 8488.5 1.322 0.077
Q19_a_4 Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood) 0.852 8028.5 0.186 0.011
Q19_a_5 ASP 0.668 7452.0 -0.430 -0.025
Q19_a_6 CS Spray 0.777 7251.0 -0.283 -0.017
Q19_a_7 Conductive electronic devices (CED or Tase0.371 8248.0 0.895 0.052
Q19_a_8 AEP Baton Gun rounds 0.205 7205.5 -1.268 -0.074
Q19_a_9 Firearms 0.000 5688.5 -3.940 -0.231
AFO or STTO Mann-Whitney U test 
Fishers Chi-Sq
Q19_a_1 Communication to de-escalate 0.0027 NA
Q19_a_2 Time or space to de-escalate 0.1096 NA
Q19_a_3 OST ‘Open handed techniques’ 0.3218 NA
Q19_a_4 Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood) 0.3067 NA
Q19_a_5 ASP 0.2228 NA
Q19_a_6 CS Spray 0.8074 NA
Q19_a_7 Conductive electronic devices (Taser) 0.3246 NA
Q19_a_8 AEP Baton Gun rounds 0.6114 NA
Q19_a_9 Firearms 0.0000 NA
Note:  Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.78
Significance levelAFO or STTO
Mean N Std. Dev Median
Grouped 
Median Mean N Std. Dev Median
Grouped 
Median Mean N Std. Dev Median
Grouped 
Median
Q19_a_1 Communication to de-escalate 3.35 71 1.596 4 3.61 4.06 224 1.246 4 4.33 3.89 295 1.369 4 4.23
Q19_a_2 Time or space to de-escalate 3.39 72 1.561 4 3.53 3.83 224 1.353 4 4.07 3.72 296 1.416 4 3.96
Q19_a_3 OST ‘Open handed techniques’ 3.67 69 1.82 4 3.55 4 223 1.677 4 4.14 3.92 292 1.714 4 4.02
Q19_a_4 Restraint (physical, cuffs or spit-hood) 4.23 71 1.426 5 4.48 4.33 223 1.233 5 4.48 4.31 294 1.281 5 4.48
Q19_a_5 ASP 4.38 69 2.129 6 5.33 4.31 223 1.961 6 5.14 4.33 292 1.998 6 5.19
Q19_a_6 CS Spray 4.31 67 2.183 6 5.34 4.25 221 2.106 6 5.23 4.27 288 2.12 6 5.25
Q19_a_7 Conductive electronic devices (Taser) 5 70 1.09 5 5.19 4.99 221 1.362 5 5.32 4.99 291 1.3 5 5.29
Q19_a_8 AEP Baton Gun rounds 5.52 69 1.441 6 5.56 5.34 223 1.56 6 5.8 5.38 292 1.532 6 5.82
Q19_a_9 Firearms 5.58 69 1.376 6 5.63 5.2 221 1.398 6 5.56 5.29 290 1.4 6 5.65
STTO AFO Total
Table 47. Q19_a - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for STTO and STTO. 
Table 46. Q19_a  Significance level results. 
Table 48. Q19_a – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
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Q20. What type of incident was this?
Unarmed AFO
c 2
n % n % (Fishers)
Q20_1 Preventing Crime 8 11% 22 9% 0.186 30
Q20_2 Helping Vulnerable Person 10 14% 26 11% 0.415 36
Q20_3 Searching Suspect(s) 7 9% 35 15% 1.256 42
Q20_4 Detecting Crime 1 1% 5 2% (0.33) 6
Q20_5 Traffic related 1 1% 9 4%  (1) 10
Q20_6 Public Order 14 19% 56 23% 0.611 70
Q20_7 Mental Heath 24 32% 55 23% 2.783 79
Q20_8 Reporting Crime 0 0% 5 2%  (0.595) 5
Q20_9 Investigating Crime 2 3% 8 3%  (1) 10
Q20_10 Firearms crime 1 1% 18 7%  (0.054) 19
Q20_11 Violent crime 11 15% 35 15% 0.005** 46
Q20_12 Arresting Suspects 25 34% 56 23% 3.297 81
Total
Unarmed AFO
Note:  ** p < .01. 
Q20. What type of incident was this?
Table 50. Q20 STTO/AFO responses. 
Chart 14. Q20 What type of incident was this? 
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 4 4.013 13 12.987 17
2 'Fair' 9 10.151 34 32.849 43
3 'Average' 23 20.302 63 65.698 86
4 'Good' 23 20.066 62 64.934 85
5 'Excellent' 13 17.469 61 56.531 74
Total 72 233 305
Q21_1 Use of time to de-
escalate  
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 2 1.647 5 5.353 7
2 'Fair' 1 3.294 13 10.706 14
3 'Average' 12 11.059 35 35.941 47
4 'Good' 27 23.059 71 74.941 98
5 'Excellent' 30 32.941 110 107.059 140
Total 72 234 306
Q21_2 Establish rapport  
    
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 1 0.713 2 2.287 3
2 'Fair' 0 1.189 5 3.811 5
3 'Average' 5 3.805 11 12.195 16
4 'Good' 14 15.932 53 51.068 67
5 'Excellent' 53 51.362 163 164.638 216
Total 73 234 307
Q21_3 Use of effective 
communication
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 0 0.945 4 3.055 4
2 'Fair' 1 1.181 4 3.819 5
3 'Average' 4 5.434 19 17.566 23
4 'Good' 28 24.333 75 78.667 103
5 'Excellent' 40 41.107 134 132.893 174
Total 73 236 309
Q21_4 Temperament – calm 
and composed character  
STTO AFO
Total
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_1 Use of time to de-escalate
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_2 Establish rapport
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_3 Use of effective communication
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_4  Temperament – calm and composed character
STTO
AFO
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The initial Chronbach Alpha score ∝ =0.641, therefore 
Question 21_7 was removed from further analysis to 
increase ∝= 0.705 for this set of questions. 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 0 1.185 5 3.815 5
2 'Fair' 0 0.711 3 2.289 3
3 'Average' 8 9.481 32 30.519 40
4 'Good' 33 30.101 94 96.899 127
5 'Excellent' 32 31.523 101 101.477 133
Total 73 235 308
Q21_5 Knowledge – 
situational and within own 
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 1 0.948 3 3.052 4
2 'Fair' 0 0.474 2 1.526 2
3 'Average' 6 4.740 14 15.260 20
4 'Good' 25 26.782 88 86.218 113
5 'Excellent' 41 40.055 128 128.945 169
Total 73 235 308
Q21_6 Experience - learning from 
previous encounters to de-escalate  
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 4 2.651 7 8.349 11
2 'Fair' 18 11.811 31 37.189 49
3 'Average' 25 27.961 91 88.039 116
4 'Good' 17 19.765 65 62.235 82
5 'Excellent' 10 11.811 39 37.189 49
Total 74 233 307
Q21_7 Force - Use or threat 
of to resolve the incident 
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 'Poor' 11 5.941 14 19.059 25
2 'Fair' 14 11.406 34 36.594 48
3 'Average' 22 21.149 67 67.851 89
4 'Good' 15 20.673 72 66.327 87
5 'Excellent' 10 12.832 44 41.168 54
Total 72 231 303
Q21_8 Character– imposing 
authoritative personality 
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_5 Knowledge – situational and within own role
STTO
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_6 Experience - learning from previous encounters to 
de-escalate
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_7 Force - Use or threat of to resolve the incident
STTO
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 'Poor' 2 'Fair' 3 'Average' 4 'Good' 5 'Excellent'
Q21_8 Character– imposing authoritative personality as a police 
officer
STTO
AFO
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AFO or NonAFO
Fishers Chi-Sq p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q21_1 Use of time to de-escalate 0.6055 NA 0.517 8799 0.649 0.0372
Q21_2 Establish rapport  0.4605 NA 0.717 8646 0.363 0.0208
Q21_3 Use of effective communication 0.6202 NA 0.667 8313 -0.43 -0.0245
Q21_4 Temperament – calm and composed charac 0.7809 NA 0.962 8586 -0.047 -0.0027
Q21_5 Knowledge – situational and within own rol 0.7210 NA 0.524 8188 -0.637 -0.0363
Q21_6 Experience - learning from previous encoun  0.9072 NA 0.889 8495 -0.139 -0.0079
Q21_8 Character– imposing authoritative personal 0.0621 NA 0.008** 9793 2.632 0.1512
Note:  ** p < .01.Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.828
Mann-Whitney U test Significance level
AFO or Non AFO
Table 53. Q21 - Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for STTO and STTO. 
Table 52. Q21 – Mann-Whitney U test results. 
Mean N
Std. 
Dev Median
Grouped 
Median Mean N
Std. 
Dev Median
Grouped 
Median Mean N
Std. 
Dev Median
Grouped 
Median
Q21_1 Use of time to de-escalate 3.44 72 1.099 3.5 3.5 3.53 233 1.185 4 3.61 3.51 305 1.164 4 3.58
Q21_2 Establish rapport 4.14 72 0.939 4 4.26 4.15 234 1.009 4 4.31 4.14 306 0.991 4 4.3
Q21_3 Use of effective communication 4.62 73 0.738 5 4.7 4.58 234 0.755 5 4.67 4.59 307 0.75 5 4.68
Q21_4 Temperament – calm and composed character 4.47 73 0.668 5 4.51 4.4 236 0.842 5 4.51 4.42 309 0.804 5 4.51
Q21_5 Knowledge – situational and within own role 4.33 73 0.668 4 4.37 4.2 235 0.878 4 4.31 4.23 308 0.833 4 4.33
Q21_6 Experience - previous learning to de-escalate 4.44 73 0.764 5 4.52 4.43 235 0.756 5 4.5 4.43 308 0.756 5 4.51
Q21_8 Character– imposing authoritative personality 2.99 72 1.261 3 3 3.42 231 1.135 4 3.49 3.32 303 1.179 3 3.39
STTO TotalAFO
Table 54. Q21 Spearman’s Correlation (r
s
) results.  
Correlations
Spearman's rho Q21_1 Q21_2 Q21_3 Q21_4 Q21_5 Q21_6 Q21_8
Q21_1 Use of time to de-escalate Correlation Coefficient 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .
N 72
Q21_2 Establish rapport Correlation Coefficient .506** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 .
N 70 72
Q21_3 Use of effective communication Correlation Coefficient .302* .441** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0 .
N 71 71 73
Q21_4 Temperament – calm and composed chCorrelation Coefficient .242* .445** .516** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.042 0 0 .
N 71 72 72 73
Q21_5 Knowledge – situational and within ownCorrelation Coefficient .274* .371** 0.196 .340** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.001 0.099 0.003 .
N 72 71 72 72 73
Q21_6 Experience - learning from previous encCorrelation Coefficient 0.138 0.189 0.208 0.121 .344** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.248 0.115 0.08 0.309 0.003 .
N 72 71 72 72 73 73
Q21_8 Character– imposing authoritative persoCorrelation Coefficient 0.008 0.094 -0.037 0.165 0.163 0.027 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.948 0.436 0.76 0.166 0.171 0.82 .
N 71 71 71 72 72 72 72
Q21_1 Use of time to de-escalate Correlation Coefficient 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .
N 233
Q21_2 Establish rapport Correlation Coefficient .620** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 .
N 233 234
Q21_3 Use of effective communication Correlation Coefficient .472** .616** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 .
N 229 230 234
Q21_4 Temperament – calm and composed chCorrelation Coefficient .294** .471** .557** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 .
N 232 233 230 236
Q21_5 Knowledge – situational and within ownCorrelation Coefficient .253** .274** .255** .449** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 .
N 233 234 231 234 235
Q21_6 Experience - learning from previous encCorrelation Coefficient .195** .309** .344** .443** .507** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0 0 0 0 .
N 233 234 231 234 235 235
Q21_8 Character– imposing authoritative persoCorrelation Coefficient -0.024 -0.087 -0.014 -0.084 0.07 0.09 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.72 0.19 0.828 0.206 0.288 0.175 .
N 230 230 228 229 230 230 231
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
STTO
AFO
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  Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
Q22_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect 0.828 0.686
Q22_a
A Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.876 0.767
Q22_b For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 0.846 0.716
Q22_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a weapon 
(not firearm) 0.816 0.666
Q22_d
For a Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.812 0.659
Q22_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect armed 
with a weapon (not firearm) 0.815 0.665
Q22_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another 0.756 0.571
Q22_g
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another 0.739 0.546
Note. 
Unarmed * AFO
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p < .001 (2 tailed) 
(N=315, AFO n=215, Unarmed n=70, df =99).
Table 55. Q22 Spearman’s Rank Correlation (r
s
). 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
Q23_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm Victim 0.853 0.668
Q23_a
A Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.879 0.728
Q23_b For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 0.870 0.698
Q23_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) 0.804 0.579
Q23_d
For a Victim presenting threat of violence towards 
another armed with a weapon (not firearm)
0.797 0.567
Q23_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.834 0.638
Q23_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of 
violence towards another 0.800 0.638
Q23_g
Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon 
(firearm) presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.815 0.607
Note. 
Unarmed * AFO
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p < .001 (2 tailed) 
(N=315, AFO n=215, Unarmed n=70, df=106).
Table 56. Q23 Spearman’s Rank Correlation (r
s
). 
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Spearman 
Rank 
Correlation 
rs
R
2
Q25_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm Victim 0.929 0.863
Q25_a A Victim presenting threat of violence towards another 0.891 0.794
Q25_b For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim 0.932 0.869
Q25_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon (not 
firearm) 0.912 0.832
Q25_d
For a Victim presenting threat of violence towards another 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.849 0.720
Q25_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) 0.937 0.878
Q25_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed Victim armed with 
a weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.895 0.802
Q25_g
Suicidal or Self Harm Victim armed with a weapon (firearm) 
presenting threat of violence towards another 0.929 0.863
Note. 
Unarmed * AFO
All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p < .05 level (2 
tailed) (N=315, AFO n=215, Unarmed n=70, df=7).
Table 58. Q25 Spearman’s Rank Correlation (rs). 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation rs
R
2
Q24_1 For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect 0.996 0.992
Q24_1_a
A Suspect presenting threat of violence towards 
another 0.949 0.901
Q24_1_b
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect
0.865 0.749
Q24_1_c
A Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (not firearm) 0.924 0.855
Q24_1_d
For a Suspect presenting threat of violence 
towards another armed with a weapon (not 
firearm) 0.844 0.714
Q24_1_e
An Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (not firearm) 0.844 0.855
Q24_1_f
For an Emotionally or Mentally Disturbed suspect 
armed with a weapon (firearm) presenting threat 
of violence towards another 0.949 0.903
Q24_1_g
For a Suicidal or Self Harm suspect armed with a 
weapon (firearm) presenting threat of violence 
towards another 0.890 0.794
Note. All Spearman Rank Correlation coefficients are significant at p < .05 level (2 
tailed) (N=315, AFO n=215, Unarmed n=70, df=9).
Unarmed * AFO
Table 57. Q24 Spearman’s Rank Correlation (r
s
). 
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Observed Expected Observed Expected
Poor 4 1.428 2 4.572 6
Fair 2 2.379 8 7.621 10
Average 17 15.942 50 51.058 67
Good 31 31.408 101 100.592 132
Excellent 20 22.842 76 73.158 96
Total 74 237 311
STTO AFO
Total
Q26_1 How does your current training 
adequately prepare you to fulfil the 
requirements of your role?   
   
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Poor 7 2.609 4 8.391 11
Fair 17 9.487 23 30.513 40
Average 23 24.192 79 77.808 102
Good 21 27.987 97 90.013 118
Excellent 6 9.724 35 31.276 41
Total 74 238 312
Q 26_2 How does your current 
training adequately prepare you to 
deal with individuals in mental crisis?  
   
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Poor 3 1.666 4 5.334 7
Fair 9 5.235 13 16.765 22
Average 12 15.228 52 48.772 64
Good 33 32.360 103 103.640 136
Excellent 17 19.511 65 62.489 82
Total 74 237 311
Q26_3 How does your current 
equipment adequately prepare you to 
fulfil the requirements of your role?    
   
STTO AFO
Total
Observed Expected Observed Expected
Poor 0 1.428 6 4.572 6
Fair 13 8.328 22 26.672 35
Average 26 26.412 85 84.588 111
Good 23 26.650 89 85.350 112
Excellent 12 11.183 35 35.817 47
Total 74 237 311
Q26_4 How does your current 
equipment adequately prepare you to 
deal with individuals in mental 
crisis?   
STTO AFO
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Poor Fair Average Good Excellent
Q26_1 How does your current training adequately 
prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your role?
Unarmed
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Poor Fair Average Good Excellent
Q 26_2 How does your current training adequately 
prepare you to deal with individuals in mental crisis? 
Unarmed
AFO
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Poor Fair Average Good Excellent
Q26_3 How does your current equipment adequately 
prepare you to fulfil the requirements of your role? 
Unarmed
AFO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Poor Fair Average Good Excellent
Q26_4 How does your current equipment adequately 
prepare you to deal with individuals in mental crisis?
Unarmed
AFO
Nicholas FRANCIS 242 
Appendix G- Survey Analysis Q26. 
 
  
Mean N Std. Dev Mean N Std. Dev Mean N Std. Dev
Q26_1 3.82 74 1.038 4.02 237 0.863 3.97 311 0.91
Q26_2 3.03 74 1.11 3.57 238 0.915 3.44 312 0.99
Q26_3 3.7 74 1.082 3.89 237 0.926 3.85 311 0.967
Q26_4 3.46 74 0.968 3.53 237 0.941 3.51 311 0.946
TotalAFOSTTO
Fishers Chi-Sq
Q26_1 0.073  -
Q26_2 0.0005  -
Q26_3 0.168  -
Q26_4 0.231  -
Note: Chronbach Alpha ฀  =.758
Significance level
p-value MW U value Std test Stat z Effect size r
Q26_1 0.236 8016.5 -1.185 -0.0672
Q26_2 0 6374.5 -3.768 -0.2133
Q26_3 0.272 8069.5 -1.099 -0.0623
Q26_4 0.475 8310.5 -0.715 -0.0405
Mann-Whitney U test 
Table 59. Q26 Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for STTO and STTO. 
Table 60. Q26 Significance level results. 
Table 61. Q26 Mann-Whitney U test results. 
Correlations Q26_1 Q26_2 Q26_3 Q26_4
Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 74
Pearson Correlation .491** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 74 74
Pearson Correlation .745** .338** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.003
N 74 74 74
Pearson Correlation .381** .460** .512** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0 0
N 74 74 74 74
Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed)
N 237
Pearson Correlation .459** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 237 238
Pearson Correlation .511** .316** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0
N 236 237 237
Pearson Correlation .349** .490** .385** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0
N 236 237 237 237
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Q26_4 How does your current equipment 
adequately prepare you to deal with 
individuals in mental crisis?
Q26_3 How does your current equipment 
adequately prepare you to fulfil the 
requirements of your role?
Q26_2 How does your current training 
adequately prepare you to deal with 
individuals in mental crisis?
Q26_1 How does your current training 
adequately prepare you to fulfil the 
requirements of your role?
Q26_1 How does your current training 
adequately prepare you to fulfil the 
requirements of your role?
Q26_2 How does your current training 
adequately prepare you to deal with 
individuals in mental crisis?
Q26_3 How does your current equipment 
adequately prepare you to fulfil the 
requirements of your role?
Q26_4 How does your current equipment 
adequately prepare you to deal with 
individuals in mental crisis?
STTO
AFO
Table 62. Q26. Spearman’s Correlation (r
s
). 
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URN
Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
36A STTO
Strategy based on NDM and use/ application. 
Systems & measures in place to formulate 
considered and logical planned decisions. 9
More. Scenarios at training involving this/ also in 
tandem with negotiating team to improve 
knowledge around roles and responsibilities. 3 POD [Control Room officer] based at this time 99 POD [Control Room officer] based at this time 99
2A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
3A AFO
REGULAR TRAINING CYCLES WHICH HELP TEST 
AND IMPROVE YOU 2
At the moment I don't know a way that this 
could be improved it is well covered 5
The equipment is great but could be better with 
lighter bod [BodyArmour] which is coming 10
We are all able to deal with suspects/ victims 
from a safe distance if required 8
4A AFO
Constant training on continuation training days 
with current up to date training scenarios 2 More scenarios with EMD suspects? 3
Finally received adequate useful kit (Crye) [ARV 
issue Uniform] 13
Our kit could look aggressive/ too much to 
someone with mental health issues. 14
5A AFO
The current training is very applicable and as 
realistic as it can be 2
Training can only prepare you so much for this is 
my opinion. It comes down to life/job experience 9
Could be improved with better less lethal 
options being available to us 12
As above. Improved less lethal options should be 
available to us should they be required 11
6A AFO Frequent training of realistic scenarios 2 Occasional scenarios relevant to this 2
Consistent training with equipment and constant 
analysis of the kit provided to maintain the 
required equipment 1 Better restraint equipment i.e. Leg restraints 11
7A AFO
I believe that we are wearing many different 
hats. Therefore training time is spread to thin 
between to many tactics 6
Next to none mental health training received. 
Best training learnt on the job 9
Our kit has always been very good. Better 
facilities for quick name checks etc would be 
good 5
As above [Our kit has always been very good. 
Better facilities for quick name checks etc would 
be good] 5
8A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
9A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
10A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
11A AFO
Good level of initial and continuation training - 
could always do more 2 Specific elements of training focus on this 3 Well equipped in general for the role 5 Does not differ from above 5
12A AFO
Regular training at a high level, high 
expectations required constantly 2
Again, regular training & input surrounding 
individuals who are EMD 3
Heavily equipped to deal with a variety of 
incidents 5
Leaa than lethal options carried by each person 
& AEP as well as general policing skills. 11
13A AFO
Our training enables us to provide the safest/ 
dynamic response to armed persons 2 No response 0
Whether an individual/ suspect is declared EMD 
or not we have sufficient equipment (Lethal/ 
Non Lethal) to deal with most circumstances 5 No response 0
1B STTO You can never have enough training 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
2B STTO No response 0
Further training on negotaiting with someone 
suffering a MH issue or EMD 3
As an ARV officer I feel suitably equipped to deal 
with a variety of incidents in comparison to 
uniformed officers 5 No response 0
3B STTO
Training is basic and very artificial compared to 
real life scenarios 3
There could be more input on all types of Mental 
Health 3
Kit is enough to prepare and protect you for 
most incidents we deal with 5
With the uplift in taser on response team it is 
easier to deal with that however the most 
important is communication 9
4B STTO
You can't replicate real life scenarios in a 
training environment 3
Mental health professionals giving talks about 
their views and experiences 3
A uniformed PC has enough equipment to 
defend themselves from incidents they are likely 
to attend 5 No response 0
5B STTO No response 0
Little practical training of dealing with EMD. 
Normally PowerPoint based. 3 No response 0 No response 0
6B STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
7B STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
8B STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
9B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
10B STTO
Every situation is unique and you cannot train for 
every circumstance 3
Again, you cannot train for every circumstance I 
feel experience is key top above training 9
Equipment air satisfactory since the introduction 
of TASER to borough 5
As above. More pressing is LAS response times 
and the severe issues of beds at MH hospitals 6
11B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
12B STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
13B AFO Realism within training environment 2
Mental health is an evolving situation. Cannot 
train for every eventuality 9
We have all (unreadable) from less lethal-lethal. 
Negotiating skills and OST techniques 5
Equipment is good but heavy and bulky. Could be 
reduced in weight. 14
14B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
15B AFO No response 0 One hour input on [unreadable] a year 3 No response 0 No response 0
16B STTO
More role plays and classroom input at training 
school/ NOT NCALT! 3 As above 3 Better CS/ Shields to go in [unreadable] 11 As above [Better CS/ Shields to go in] 11
17B STTO No response 0 Not much role play training 3 No response 0
There is no specific equipment for persons 
suffering MH within the Met that I am aware of 11
18B STTO
The infrequency of OST means that physical 
reflexes are o revert to instinct, non-OST 
techniques 15 Every case is different, hard to prepare for 9
Taser, Asp, Handcuffs and your comms skills 
cover most things 5 No response 0
19B STTO
OST once a year is not enough training to stay 
safe 15 Have no medical training 99
Gangs officers on borough have some of the 
most confrontation violence towards them. yet 
despite being trained in TASER are not allowed 
to carry. The VCTF who target the same 
individuals in the same estates are allowed to? 11 Have no medical training 99
20B STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
22B STTO
Training is role specific, incidents/ replays are 
realistic 2
I do not feel police officers are given training to 
understand and help individuals in a crisis 6 PPE, radios etc good 5
We do not have access to peoples mental health 
history. Often taking people top places 
(hospitals) they are not known to 6
23B STTO
The OST package is almost exactly the same 
very year. However the TASER training covers 
decision making & conflict management in much 
greater detail 15
There is almost no training in Mental Health at 
the moment 3
I am currently TASER trained and in addition to 
other OST kit, is an extra tactical option 5 Again as above we have very limited MH training 3
23B STTO
I AM FORTUNATE ENOUGHT TO ATTEND 
SPECIALIST TRAINING AT PLACES LIKE MPSTC. 
UNLIKE OFFICERS ON BOROUGH WHO HAVE 
MORE LIMITED ACCESS TO GOOD PRACTICAL 
TRAINING 2
Any training I have received its been somewhat 
[unreadable]. It sometime difficult to train for 
the subtle differences between EMD subjects 3
With the exception of warm weather gear I feel 
adequately equipped on mobile patrol 
[unreadable] 5
Perhaps some sort of tech-iPad or other 
interface to build common ground 99
24B AFO
It is a comprehensive, detailed input into all of 
the potential aspects of the role I undertake 2
We could always have more input around this 
subject 3
It is of a much better standards these days than 
it was years ago 5
As with 1No responseb[current training above] 
we could have better options 11
58B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
59B AFO
Should be more scenario based training & 
shooting practise 3
More training around communication techniques 
& understanding 3 Pretty satisfactory 5 Obviously can look over aggressive 14
60B AFO Need to practise more search 99 More specific training day input 3 No response 0 No response 0
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URN
Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
61B AFO
Good knowledge of use of force and when to use 
it 2 Very little practical training 3
Previous [unreadable] several options to use 
force if required 5 No response 0
62B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
63B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
64B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
65B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
65B AFO Good overall but need more time 3
Need more up to date/ relevant training 
scenarios 3 Too bulky body armour- is CS necessary? 10 Need more < lethal options. Taser s/gun? 11
43V AFO
More practise for muscle memory & confidence 
using the training given 2 More input would improve it 3 Ballistic vest too cumbersome 10 Too cumbersome [Ballistic vest] 10
44B AFO
We are trained to deal with known threats as 
they stand 2
As above [We are trained to deal with known 
threats as they stand] 5 No response 0 No response 0
41B AFO Not enough training 3 More training 3 Sufficient options 5 Sufficient options 5
42B AFO
Our training has recently changed and inputs 
need to be more role specific 3
As above [Our training has recently changed and 
inputs need to be more role specific] 3
Better clothing and current upgrade ti SiG has 
improved 5 No response 0
9C STTO
TASER- sometimes I am not allowed to carry it 
for example on Aid 7
Training is OK. Experience (police)  & experience 
(life) are better 9
Taser is the best bit of kit the job have ever 
given me. The days of twenty officers running 
away whilst waiting for ARVs to not get stabbed 
are gone. 12 No issues. 5
10C STTO
OST is farcical and not up to date with current 
treat/ levels of violence shown 15
Little to no training on MH other than a video 
which is staged 3
Taser is a great tool but CS is useless and batons 
are ineffectiveAs above [ 11
As above [Taser is a great tool but CS is useless 
and batons are ineffective] 11
11C STTO Limited tactics 7 Limited input or guidance 3 Poor body armour 10 All officers given TASER 11
12C STTO
Doesn't cover the situations of too many officers 
or public at incident/ no PIP/PIM input 3
This is better learnt through experience mental 
health is very unpredictable 9
More alternative uses would be useful entry to 
buildings, close grappling 99
You need communications skills not equipment. 
Beds in 163 sites 9
13C STTO No response 0
V. little input at all. Taser training scenarios is 
about it 3 Taser is good. CS is not 11 handcuffs and TASER, could be better 11
14C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
15C STTO
It provides the skills I need to deal with 
members of the public 5
Mental crisis is incorporated into training 
scenarios 2 The X2 [TASER] is a big improvement on the X26 12
They offer protection for us and the ability to 
protect others 5
999C STTO OST/TASER/Team updates 9 Regular updates from Mental Health team 3 TASER/ASP/CS 12 There if required 5
17C STTO
It gives us the knowledge of the capabilities of 
the weapon to give better understanding when it 
would be effective in certain situations 2 More input from medical professionals 3
I feel the equipment is fit for purpose for us to 
do our job effectively 5
More inputs from medical professionals and 
recommendations from them 6
18C STTO
Role plays are too slow paced compared to 
reality 3
Typically mental health incidents occur in my 
experience in a property with family present and 
drugs/alcohol present 99
Batons are too small and slow to draw. TASER 
holsters on belt are too awkward to draw from 11
Leg restraints and spit hoods are typically not 
available on patrol 11
39C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
40C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
1C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
2C STTO No response 0 No real training for it 3 No response 0 No response 0
3C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
4C STTO
Opportunity to practise would be more 
beneficial rather than tested. ie TASER you 
should be able to visit a range and practise 
shooting TASER 3
To learn what happens after people are 
sectioned, medication and what happens when 
they are released 3 Different options available to us 5 All TASER equipped 11
5C STTO
What training? OST is pants and TASER 
refresher once a year is all we get 15
I can't remember having any training. You're 
either  effective at communication or you're not. 
Training will only prepare you for contingencies 
if the suspect won't co-operate 3
TASERs often don't work (close confinement 
etc.) I once chased a suspect with a pistol on 
him and I could have been shot dead. 11 Bring back body cuffs. 11
6C STTO
Response role with TASER and OST equipment  I 
have 5 More input on MH crisis management 3 At present TASER is adequate 12
With access to Level 2 equipment & TASER I can 
deal with most situations 11
7C STTO
Cant teach common sense or communication 
skills 9 No response 0 Tablets- never work- IT overall not working 99 No response 0
8C STTO No response 0 Every situation unique so hard to train 7 No response 0 No response 0
998C AFO No response 0 More knowledge on Mental Health 3 No response 0 No response 0
30C STTO
Equipment in some areas is old and dated needs 
to be looked at 1
Training is good but feel that some incidents can 
not be taught how to deal with it 9
TASER is brilliant, other equipment needs 
updating 12 Can never prepare for everything 9
31C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
32C STTO No response 0
Needs more input on managing mental health & 
understanding it 3 No response 0 No response 0
33C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
34C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
35C STTO Very well prepped 5 Could be better-re signs & symptoms 3 No response 0 Need the training re enhanced tactics 3
36C STTO
Providing training and insight is better than not 
providing such training 2 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
37C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 Leg restraints 11
38C STTO Not enough use like incidents 3
A lot of MH is from incidents [unreadable] have 
personally dealt with 9 CS is a waste of time 11 NHS is the [unreadable] need 6
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Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
20C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
21C AFO This is not long enough [training] 3 As above [This is not long enough -training] 3 No response 0 No response 0
22C AFO Learn from other calls 9 Firearms may not go down well 4 Old equipment MPS 1 Firearms may not go down well 4
23C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
24C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
25C AFO
As an AFOP we could always have more training. 
We only get to shoot once every three months 3
There is very little training towards Mental 
Health 3 We are equipped as an AFO with all we need 5 No response 0
26C AFO Improving 2 Firearms command improving 4 Poorly prepared 99 No response 0
27C STTO No response 0
I can't think of any mental crisis training I have 
ever been [unreadable] in 3
Broken IVMA in cars, no support channel on 
radios 99 No response 0
28C STTO Equipped with TASER 5
Have special Mental Health cars who come & 
assist with professional aboard 6 Equipped with TASER 5 No response 0
29C STTO Feel confident in using equipment 5
Training is adequate although behaviour is 
unpredictable 3 Equipmen is good 5
Equipment is good, but sometimes reluctant on 
using on person in crisis 7
1E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
50B AFO No response 0 In depth mental health training 3 Terrible uniform, thin trousers, bulky overcoat 14 We don't know enough about mental health 6
51B AFO
More training should be implemented to assist 
officers in dealing 3
Local based training could be implemented to 
assist younger officers who do not have prior 
experience 3
Equipment that totally negates any risk to the 
officer using them 5
Use of implements like X2 and X26 TASER are 
helpful but  a more  [unreadable] tool could be 
considered 11
52B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
997C AFO No response 0 We now pick up the failings of the NHS 7 No response 0 No response 0
1A AFO
Up to date with current threat & climate. 
Continually training to current threat 5 Continually thrown into EMD scenarios 3
Kit has changed for the better over the past 5-6 
years Much better prepared for evolving 
[unreadable] now. Always evolving so always a 
need to review & update 12
Could do with more less lethal options on all 
cars eg. Baton Gun- X2 has improved TASER 11
26A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
27A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
33A AFO No response 0 No response 0 Needs updated equipment i.e. bod &a lids 10 No response 0
32A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
33A AFO
Very realistic and gives all skills to enable 
development 2 Perhaps further training would help 3 Have the equipment needed 5 Its decision making and the actions with the kit 9
45B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 More training on mental health 3
46B AFO
More role related training now rather than 
covering non relevant tactics ie Vehicle Drills 3
FTAC at our own disposal at BP [Buckingham 
Palace] 99 A S baton gun be an option 11 Baton gun as an option in addition 11
53B AFO
Exercises based on experienced firearms officers 
previous experience helps 9
Time, distance and space. Support from mental 
health team is where the failure lay 6 X26 [TASER] 12 mark one mouth!! 9
54B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
55B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
56B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
156B AFO More of the same would be better 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
48B AFO More than 4 days training a year would be good 3 No response 0 Still waiting on pelters and helmets 1
Good OST equipment provide however still 
waiting for helmets 14
47B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
34A AFO
The training is excellent but there are always 
more variables on live operations that it is 
impossible to factor into training 2
As above [The training is excellent but there are 
always more variables on live operations that it 
is impossible to factor into training] 9
As above [The training is excellent but there are 
always more variables on live operations that it 
is impossible to factor into training] 99 No response 0
49B AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
35A AFO
Training dept work hard to copy real life 
scenarios. However on the ground always more 
elements to deal with 2
Maybe ask someone who has/ had MH crisis 
what they feel how we could help? 3
On person great stuff, in V [vehicles] not so good 
IVMA etc. 1 Kit on person spot on. 5
41C STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
43C STTO No response 0
So many types of MH that it is hard to prepare 
for all events 9 No response 0 No response 0
41C STTO
Training brief- don't use equipment often until 
refresher 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
5G AFO
I feel we don't have enough training in 
[Unreadable] to keep the skill up 3
Someone who has a mental crisis is 
unpredictable so you can't prepare for every 
outcome 9 We have a lot of options/tactics to use 5
[As above] We have a lot of options/tactics to 
use 5
4G AFO Would like more time for training 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
3G AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
2G AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
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Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
1G AFO
The AFO role is unclear and there is an overlap 
with ARV role 99 It is very difficult to prepare for mental crisis 9
Equipment is old, vests are heavy, most firearms 
too old 10 Not really the best equipment 11
60F AFO
Not enough time training and practicing. Not 
enough range time 3
Scenarios in training around dealing with mental 
health whilst on annual ops 3
Kit is good. Body armour could be a lot more 
agile, very bulky and cumbersome 10
There is no emphasis on dealing with mental 
health 3
59F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
58F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
57F AFO
It is of a good quality, its just not often or long 
enough for both range and tactics 2
We always do tactics role plays involving EMD as 
they our biggest worry 2
It does, Id just like more practice to be even 
better 3
Again regular training done as its our biggest 
worry around discharging a firearm 3
56F AFO Good but need more of it 3 We have good training for mental crisis 2 We apparently have all the kit we need 5 We are equipped with what we need 5
55F AFO
I think we're pretty well trained but require 
more refresher training 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
54F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
53F AFO Lack of investment and time 3 Lack of investment and time 3 Lack of investment 99 Lack of investment 99
52F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
51F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
50F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
49F AFO We receive good training, just not enough 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
48F AFO More range time required for the role 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
47F AFO
More training time required to meet current 
threat 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
46F AFO Could do with more training more regularly 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
45F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
44F AFO Don't shoot enough 3 No response 0
Armour too heavy/cumbersome, limits 
movement 10
Presence of MP5 can make it difficult to engage 
as distance is required 4
43F AFO No response 0 More mental health training 3
MP5 getting a dated weapon, better weapons 
available 4
Equipment is fine but constantly being Tri-armed 
is not effective in most non firearm situations 4
42F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
41F AFO
It is improving but not enough training days a 
year 3 No response 0 No response 0
AFO's get all the old rubbish kit, body armour, 
belt rigs, weapons, training time. 4
40F AFO Need more training 3 No response 0 No response 0 Too heavy, old kit, but getting better. 4
39F AFO No response 0 No response 0 MP5 - not fit for purpose 4 No response 0
38F AFO
Undergo AFO training 4 times a year and able to 
train and simulate scenarios 3
Undergo AFO training 4 times a year and able to 
train and simulate scenarios 3 Recently been given better equipment 5 No response 0
37F AFO Various option 5 More input required 3 Adequate options 5 More training 3
36F AFO Need more training in searching and range time 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
35F AFO
Training delivered covers what I need to do my 
job effectively 2
Risk assessment training allows you to make 
effective decisions 9 No response 0 No response 0
34F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
33F AFO We don't get enough training 3 Always need more training 3 No response 0 No response 0
32F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
31F AFO Still needs more role specific scenarios 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
30F AFO More role specific training & regular training 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
28F AFO Tac Ref is aimed at our AFO role 2 We don't have any training for this 3 [unreadable] for more adequate equipment 99 No response 0
29F AFO
They do as much as they can with what they 
have - time, equipment, money 2 More training 3 Ageing weapons, not enough kit 4 More items available for deployment 11
27F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
26F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
25F AFO
Training has become more relevant to present 
threat to us from terrorism/ attack 2
More support with mental crisis situations once 
suspect arrested/ sectioned 6
Equipment is only just being updated to relevant 
calibers, clothing is getting better 5
Adapt to the situation, use what's available. 
Mental health issues are fluid 9
24F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
21F AFO
Excellent training which gives you a variety 
scenarios and situations 2
Training provides situations of dealing with 
'suspects' who are displaying crisis 2 Carry a range of equipment and weapons 5
Somewhere to store long arms other than on 
your person 4
23F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
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URN
Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
20F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
19F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
17F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
18F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
16F AFO Training has improved over the years 2 Not really touched upon 3 Equipment issued is getting better each year 5 No response 0
15F AFO Not enough time 3 As above [Not enough time] 3 Updated weaponry needed 4 As above [Updated weaponry needed] 4
13F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
14F AFO We now have good equipment 1
We are given training on how to deal with 
mental health situations 2 No response 0 No response 0
11F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
12F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
9F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
10F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
LIGHTER EQUIPMENT, BODY ARMOUR FOR 
MANOEUVRABILITY 10
7F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
8F AFO No response 0 No response 0 Poorly equipped 1 No response 0
6F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
5F AFO More frequent training 3 No response 0 Not up to standard 1 No response 0
4F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
3F AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
2F AFO Too little training time 3 Too little training time 3 Too little training time 3 No response 0
1F AFO We don't get enough training to fulfil the role 3
Give us time to think about the situation then 
deal with it 3
Enough firepower to deal with most known 
threats 5 Communication is the best method 9
60E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
59E AFO Not enough. Not bespoke to RASP 3 There isn't any MH training 3
CC is poor, MP5 in front limits options as always 
on offer 11
MP5 in front is cumbersome & threatening to 
them 4
57E AFO
AFO training is current bottom of priorities- time 
on the range/ site is poor 3
Training changes constantly and generally once 
done is many years before further training 3
Although currently changing, weapon used 
(MP5) 4No response years old & held together 
with duct tape 4
X2 TASER if necessary, but communication is 
best equipment 9
55E AFO More shooting practise 3 No response 0 More warm weather kit & clothing 0 No response 0
56E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
53E AFO Training is very good for the role 2 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
54E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
51E AFO More tactical & Firearms training required 3 Very little training since becoming an AFO 3 Lack of equipment on post 1 Lack of equipment on post & work outside MPS 11
52E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
49E AFO
Outdated Firearms, heavy kit, no ballistic cover 
at some gates 1 More training at ELS 3
Vehicle fleet needs updating/ not enough. AfOs 
having to walk or get the tube to posts = Threat 1 No response 0
50E AFO
More range time is needed and 2 day Tac Ref 
cycles 3
mental health is unpredictable, training does it 
best to prepare 9 We have kit? 99 As above [We have kit?] 99
47E AFO It develops your skills 5 No response 0 Could do with thermal gloves and thermals 14 No response 0
48E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
46E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
45E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
43E AFO
More training/ Tac Refs required. More range 
time required 3 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
44E AFO Training not frequent enough 3 Scenarios- nothing 3 No response 0 We carry all PPE , TASERs and Firearms 5
42E AFO
TASER training & classification not done with 
firearms perspective. Not enough training in 
shooting & tactics 3 Very limited input. No where near enough 3
Tri Weapons, OST equipment & ballistic vest 
Good. We are still waiting for kevlar helmet & 
Pelters 4 Very little more kit would help 99
40E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
41E AFO Primary weapons are old and in poor nick 4 More time to train 3 As 1No responsea [More time to train] 3 No response 0
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URN
Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
39E AFO Good training/ shooting- need more 3 As above [Good training/ shooting- need more] 2 As above [Good training/ shooting- need more] 3 As above [Good training/ shooting- need more] 3
38E AFO More time to practise would be great 3 More training 3 No response 0
Carrying firearm may not help when dealing 
with mental health 4
36E AFO Training is good but not frequent enough 3 Training not frequent enough 3 Most things are adequate 5
We have PPE. I don't see what other options 
there are for us 5
37E AFO Not enough training 3 All training is computer based 3 Equipment can always be improved for our role 5 TASER and communication 5
344E AFO
Limited time allocated for training. Approx 1 day 
every 3 months 3
Little input other than NCALT computer 
packages. Occasional scenario in practical 
training 3
Receive equipment ad-hoc. Seems constant 
battle to request 1 Not applicable 99
32E AFO
Training is varied & unique to my role. Using the 
NDM & less lethal as well as conventional 
firearms 9
Knowledge of EMD/EBI & bugle principles allow 
for a response to the above 2
Equipment used is best on the market & up to 
date 1
As above [Equipment used is best on the market 
& up to date] 5
33E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
31E STTO No response 0 No response 0 X2 generally less effective than X26 11 As above [X2 generally less effective than X26] 11
30E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
28E AFO
This course is specifically geared towards the 
role of AFO/ARV 2
Emphasis is placed on EMD and how we can 
deal with them effectively. Input [unreadable] 
someone who has been dealt with by police and 
an EMD 3
Wehn operatonal we have access to all 
equipment 5 No response 0
29E STTO No response 0
Had various NCALTs but learning first hand and 
from colleagues 3
I currently carry a TASER and this is a very good 
tool as prevents situations getting worse 12
Unsure, but maybe have a shield of some sort 
for protection 11
26E AFO
As a level one public order and AFO officer I 
have been equipped with the relevant 
equipment 2 More in depth training 3 Satisfied I have relevant equipment 5 No response 0
27E STTO
Taser training prepares you very well, emphases 
communication 2 I don't feel we do enough training in this 3 No response 0
I think more trainings needed in this, with 'real 
life scenarios' 3
24E AFO Covers EMD, vulnerable, violent- a good range 9
Lots of EMD principles but very difficult to know 
how a mental crisis (esp with a firearm) could 
look 3
Its good but understandably even better equip is 
more expensive 5 No response 0
25E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
55C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
17E STTO
We have no role specific training in relation to 
use of force 3 Role specific training 3
RTPC do not carry tasers even though for London 
& can deal with anything just as borough do 11
Basic equipment, and I would use 
communication where possible and sometimes 
deal with those in mental crisis in a car 99
19E STTO
Taser instructor, used taser for number of years 
on TSG, building on that knowledge & 
experience with courses 2
More training, we have limited knowledge of 
how to provide first aid 3 All the equipment I need & more 5 No response 0
18E STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
43A AFO Regular training with excellent scenarios 2 No mental health scenarios for a while 3 Good kit & easy to maintain/replace 5 No response 0
42A AFO
I feel I have enough training, but there's always 
room for more. Our facilities and training 
locations are excellent and a privilege 2
We aren't mental health experts, there's always 
room for improvement, but I feel we receive 
enough training 2
I feel I have enough equipment but new 
equipment is always welcome 5
Our equipment shouldn't change too much. If its 
a healthy person or someone dealing with a 
mental health crisis, you must deal with the 
threat 9
41A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
40A AFO
Current training practises are very good. Usual 
constraints of time/money/facilities remain an 
issue 2
We have dedicated scenario based training for 
individuals in "mental crisis" 3
Generally very good, limited equipment, 
especially as there are better options out there 5
Difficult to answer without without a specific 
example, especially in my role 5
39A AFO
Not enough training regarding "running jobs", 
outside of OFC course 3 No response 0 We have enough kit for the job 5 No response 0
38A AFO No response 0 [Unreadable] 0 No response 0 No response 0
37A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
53A STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
52A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
51A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
50A AFO No response 0
Very little current dealing with individuals with a 
MH crisis in my role 3 No response 0 No response 0
49A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
48A AFO No response 0 No response 0
NCALT is not an effective learning tool for how I 
learn and take in information 3 No response 0
47A STTO
Although I do not carry on shift, so my tactical 
options change from day to day, whether issued 
a taser or a firearm 99
This isn't a big thing in our training as TSG AFO 
is really only for CT operation 99
Yes when issued, as only get taser on some 
shifts and firearm extremely rarely 4 No response 0
46A STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
45A STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
44A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
21E AFO
Training time reduced due to trim force training 
travel time 3 Good EMO input 2
Good tools, mental health knowledge could be 
better signs/symptoms 6 No response 0
20E STTO
Qualified instructors but there are more centres 
available 99
Not medically trained to assess there, working 
off assumption and best guess 3 No requirement for further equipment 5 Training/educator 3
46C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
45C AFO Thorough intensive training 2 Limited MH training 3 No response 0 No response 0
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URN
Q5. 
STTO/AFO Q26_1_b Code Q26_2_b Code Q26_3_b Code Q26_4_b Code
39E AFO Good training/ shooting- need more 3 As above [Good training/ shooting- need more] 2 As above [Good training/ shooting- need more] 3 As above [Good training/ shooting- need more] 3
38E AFO More time to practise would be great 3 More training 3 No response 0
Carrying firearm may not help when dealing 
with mental health 4
36E AFO Training is good but not frequent enough 3 Training not frequent enough 3 Most things are adequate 5
We have PPE. I don't see what other options 
there are for us 5
37E AFO Not enough training 3 All training is computer based 3 Equipment can always be improved for our role 5 TASER and communication 5
344E AFO
Limited time allocated for training. Approx 1 day 
every 3 months 3
Little input other than NCALT computer 
packages. Occasional scenario in practical 
training 3
Receive equipment ad-hoc. Seems constant 
battle to request 1 Not applicable 99
32E AFO
Training is varied & unique to my role. Using the 
NDM & less lethal as well as conventional 
firearms 9
Knowledge of EMD/EBI & bugle principles allow 
for a response to the above 2
Equipment used is best on the market & up to 
date 1
As above [Equipment used is best on the market 
& up to date] 5
33E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
31E STTO No response 0 No response 0 X2 generally less effective than X26 11 As above [X2 generally less effective than X26] 11
30E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
28E AFO
This course is specifically geared towards the 
role of AFO/ARV 2
Emphasis is placed on EMD and how we can 
deal with them effectively. Input [unreadable] 
someone who has been dealt with by police and 
an EMD 3
Wehn operatonal we have access to all 
equipment 5 No response 0
29E STTO No response 0
Had various NCALTs but learning first hand and 
from colleagues 3
I currently carry a TASER and this is a very good 
tool as prevents situations getting worse 12
Unsure, but maybe have a shield of some sort 
for protection 11
26E AFO
As a level one public order and AFO officer I 
have been equipped with the relevant 
equipment 2 More in depth training 3 Satisfied I have relevant equipment 5 No response 0
27E STTO
Taser training prepares you very well, emphases 
communication 2 I don't feel we do enough training in this 3 No response 0
I think more trainings needed in this, with 'real 
life scenarios' 3
24E AFO Covers EMD, vulnerable, violent- a good range 9
Lots of EMD principles but very difficult to know 
how a mental crisis (esp with a firearm) could 
look 3
Its good but understandably even better equip is 
more expensive 5 No response 0
25E AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
55C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
17E STTO
We have no role specific training in relation to 
use of force 3 Role specific training 3
RTPC do not carry tasers even though for London 
& can deal with anything just as borough do 11
Basic equipment, and I would use 
communication where possible and sometimes 
deal with those in mental crisis in a car 99
19E STTO
Taser instructor, used taser for number of years 
on TSG, building on that knowledge & 
experience with courses 2
More training, we have limited knowledge of 
how to provide first aid 3 All the equipment I need & more 5 No response 0
18E STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
43A AFO Regular training with excellent scenarios 2 No mental health scenarios for a while 3 Good kit & easy to maintain/replace 5 No response 0
42A AFO
I feel I have enough training, but there's always 
room for more. Our facilities and training 
locations are excellent and a privilege 2
We aren't mental health experts, there's always 
room for improvement, but I feel we receive 
enough training 2
I feel I have enough equipment but new 
equipment is always welcome 5
Our equipment shouldn't change too much. If its 
a healthy person or someone dealing with a 
mental health crisis, you must deal with the 
threat 9
41A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
40A AFO
Current training practises are very good. Usual 
constraints of time/money/facilities remain an 
issue 2
We have dedicated scenario based training for 
individuals in "mental crisis" 3
Generally very good, limited equipment, 
especially as there are better options out there 5
Difficult to answer without without a specific 
example, especially in my role 5
39A AFO
Not enough training regarding "running jobs", 
outside of OFC course 3 No response 0 We have enough kit for the job 5 No response 0
38A AFO No response 0 [Unreadable] 0 No response 0 No response 0
37A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
53A STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
52A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
51A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
50A AFO No response 0
Very little current dealing with individuals with a 
MH crisis in my role 3 No response 0 No response 0
49A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
48A AFO No response 0 No response 0
NCALT is not an effective learning tool for how I 
learn and take in information 3 No response 0
47A STTO
Although I do not carry on shift, so my tactical 
options change from day to day, whether issued 
a taser or a firearm 99
This isn't a big thing in our training as TSG AFO 
is really only for CT operation 99
Yes when issued, as only get taser on some 
shifts and firearm extremely rarely 4 No response 0
46A STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
45A STTO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
44A AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
21E AFO
Training time reduced due to trim force training 
travel time 3 Good EMO input 2
Good tools, mental health knowledge could be 
better signs/symptoms 6 No response 0
20E STTO
Qualified instructors but there are more centres 
available 99
Not medically trained to assess there, working 
off assumption and best guess 3 No requirement for further equipment 5 Training/educator 3
46C AFO No response 0 No response 0 No response 0 No response 0
45C AFO Thorough intensive training 2 Limited MH training 3 No response 0 No response 0
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Main Duty n %
Foot patrol 1047 2.5
Mobile patrol 36182 85.1
Custody 551 1.3
PSU/Public order 1595 3.8
Other 2515 5.9
Roads policing 328 0.8
Dog handler duty 25 0.1
CID 130 0.3
Off duty 93 0.2
Surveillance 64 0.2
Mounted section duties 2 0
sub-total 42532 100
ARV 3427 91
CTSFO 102 2.7
AFO 235 6.2
sub-total 3764 100
Total 46296  -
S
T
T
O
A
F
O
Table 63. Frequencies - Main Duty 
Table 64. Frequencies - Location 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Public area 28381 66.7 2742 72.8
Privare Dwelling 9130 21.5 795 21.1
Police area 2419 5.7 35 0.9
Other area 2602 6.1 192 5.1
Total 42532 100 3764 100
AFOSTTO
Location
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Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 1812 4.3 39 1
No 40720 95.7 3725 99
Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 1812 4.3 39 1
No 40720 95.7 3725 99
Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 918 2.2 49 1.3
No 41614 97.8 3715 98.7
Total 42532 100 3764 100
Threatened with Weapon?
Assaulted With Weapon
STTO AFO
Assaulted By Subject
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
Table 65. Frequencies – 
Assaulted by Subject 
Table 66. Frequencies – 
Assaulted with Weapon 
Table 67. Frequencies – 
Threatened with Weapon 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Made off/escaped 345 0.8 35 0.9
Arrested 32174 75.6 2850 75.7
Hopitalised 1141 2.7 79 2.1
Detained - Mental health Act 1131 2.7 88 2.3
Other 7741 18.2 711 18.9
Not entered 0 0 1 0
Total 42532 100 3764 100
Outcome
STTO AFO
Table 68. Frequencies – Outcome 
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Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 13213 31.1 2785 74 Yes 7178 16.9 380 10.1
No 29319 68.9 979 26 No 35354 83.1 3384 89.9
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 12099 28.4 435 11.6 Yes 13157 30.9 954 25.3
No 30433 71.6 3329 88.4 No 29375 69.1 2810 74.7
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 14875 35 512 13.6 Yes 15514 36.5 672 17.9
No 27657 65 3252 86.4 No 27018 63.5 3092 82.1
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 944 2.2 58 1.5 Yes 3432 8.1 249 6.6
No 41588 97.8 3706 98.5 No 39100 91.9 3515 93.4
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 6128 14.4 323 8.6
No 36404 85.6 3441 91.4
Total 42532 100 3764 100
Impact Factor: Other
Impact Factor: Crowd
Impact Factor: Possesion of a weapon
Impact Factor: Acute Behavioural Disorder
Impact Factor: Size/Gender/Build
Impact Factor: Prior K'wledge
Impact Factor: Mental Health
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
Impact Factor: Drugs
Impact Factor: Alcohol
Tactic 1 Tactic 2 Tactic 3 Total n % n %
Alcohol 0.903 0.959 0.860 0.914 21459 26.2% 728 11.0%
Drugs 0.910 0.943 0.893 0.917 24634 30.0% 815 12.4%
Mental Health 0.814 0.795 0.879 0.821 13393 16.3% 629 9.5%
Poss. Weapon 0.633 0.721 0.835 0.670 22540 27.5% 4418 67.0%
Total 82026  - 6590  -
STTO and AFO reponse to Impact Factors
AFOSTTOSpearman Correlation (rs)
Impact Factor
Table 69. Frequencies – Impact Factors 
Table 70. Spearman Correlation – Impact Factors * Tactics 
(Note: All  p< .001, df= 25) 
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STTO 
(n )
AFO 
(n )
STTO 
(n )
AFO 
(n )
STTO 
(n )
AFO 
(n )
STTO 
(n )
AFO 
(n )
STTO 
(n )
AFO 
(n )
Non-comp h/cuff 3754 89 398 18 3502 66 2371 75 2584 164
AEP aimed 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 10
Baton drawn 84 1 5 0 98 1 27 1 157 2
Baton used 39 1 8 0 62 0 15 0 66 3
TASER aimed 187 7 23 0 259 12 221 9 640 109
TASER a/d stun 5 0 1 0 4 0 6 0 3 0
TASER arced 8 0 1 0 10 0 7 0 17 0
TASER drawn 580 10 68 3 656 12 724 13 1720 35
TASER d/stun 3 0 1 0 6 0 3 0 4 0
TASER fired 147 13 42 9 172 14 202 12 363 51
TASER red-dot 687 69 83 10 798 64 701 47 2107 550
Comp h/cuff 4543 139 143 10 7658 223 1968 95 5769 886
Dog bite 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Dog deploy 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 1
Firearm aimed 3 76 0 7 5 93 6 101 70 1150
Firearm fired 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Ground restrain 1788 36 289 10 1630 38 1091 24 1011 111
CS drawn 23 0 3 0 36 0 16 0 39 0
CS used 26 1 2 0 34 0 8 0 31 0
L/B restrain 765 10 121 2 705 10 579 10 352 17
Other 294 8 29 1 300 10 178 10 226 73
Shield 20 8 4 0 19 6 44 2 49 16
Spit guard 102 5 8 0 84 2 59 3 25 0
Tactical comms 4543 138 446 15 5084 149 2965 130 4865 836
U/arm skills 3856 116 400 18 3511 112 2199 93 2433 403
Total (n ) 21459 728 2075 104 24634 815 13393 629 22540 4418
Impact Factors * STTO/AFO Tactical response
ABD Poss. WeaponMental HealthDrugsAlcohol
Tactic 
n % n %
Passive resistance 4483 10.5 443 11.8
Compliant 14234 33.5 2151 57.1
Verbal resistance/gestures 6033 14.2 300 8
Active resistance 8960 21.1 536 14.2
Aggressive resistance 6858 16.1 258 6.9
Serious or aggravated resistance 1964 4.6 76 2
40568  - 3688  -
STTO AFO
Primary Conduct
Compliant
Non-Compliant
Total
Table 73. Ranked response – Impact Factors * Tactics 
Table 74. Frequencies - Primary Conduct.  
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1 Non-comp h/cuff 3790 Unarmed skills 3288 Comp h/cuff 12288 Comp h/cuff 2046 Unarmed skills 868 Comp h/cuff 3619
2 Tactical comms 3613 Non-comp h/cuff 3079 Tactical comms 2930 Tactical comms 1698 Tactical comms 823 Tactical comms 2053
3 Unarmed skills 3486 Tactical comms 2842 TASER drawn 675 Non-comp h/cuff 1018 Non-comp h/cuff 679 Non-comp h/cuff 1016
4 Comp h/cuff 1666 Ground restraint 1764 TASER red-dot 639 Unarmed skills 969 Ground restraint 573 Unarmed skills 902
5 Ground restraint 1337 L/B restraint 685 Unarmed skills 430 TASER red-dot 462 TASER red-dot 239 TASER drawn 351
6 TASER red-dot 938 Comp h/cuff 684 TASER aimed 186 TASER drawn 348 L/B restraint 231 TASER red-dot 334
7 TASER drawn 552 TASER red-dot 500 Other 150 Ground restraint 209 TASER drawn 207 L/B restraint 171
8 L/B restraint 511 TASER drawn 343 Non-comp h/cuff 148 TASER aimed 144 TASER fired 177 Ground restraint 167
9 TASER aimed 287 Other 200 L/B restraint 85 L/B restraint 143 Comp h/cuff 140 Other 138
10 Other 253 TASER fired 166 Ground restraint 60 Other 116 TASER aimed 108 TASER aimed 91
11 TASER fired 169 TASER aimed 149 Firearm aimed 57 Baton drawn 35 Other 59 Baton drawn 23
12 Baton drawn 111 Spit guard 93 Baton drawn 25 TASER fired 23 Baton used 51 TASER fired 17
13 Baton used 46 Baton drawn 81 CS drawn 9 Baton used 12 Baton drawn 33 Spit guard 11
14 Spit guard 33 Baton used 40 Shield 7 Firearm aimed 9 CS used 27 CS drawn 10
15 CS drawn 30 CS drawn 24 TASER fired 6 CS drawn 7 Spit guard 24 Firearm aimed 4
16 CS used 20 CS used 24 TASER arced 4 Shield 5 Shield 14 Shield 4
17 Shield 13 Shield 22 Dog deploy 3 Spit guard 5 CS drawn 11 Baton used 2
18 Firearm aimed 8 TASER arced 11 AEP aimed 2 TASER arced 4 TASER arced 4 TASER arced 2
19 TASER arced 5 TASER a/d stun 6 Spit guard 2 Dog deploy 3 TASER d/stun 3 Dog bite 2
20 TASER d/stun 3 TASER d/stun 4 Baton used 1 CS used 1 Firearm aimed 3 Dog deploy 2
21 TASER a/d stun 1 Firearm aimed 4 TASER d/stun 1 AEP aimed 0 TASER a/d stun 2 CS used 2
22 Dog bite 1 AEP aimed 0 TASER a/d stun 0 TASER a/d stun 0 AEP aimed 1 TASER d/stun 1
23 Dog deploy 1 Dog bite 0 Dog bite 0 TASER d/stun 0 Firearm fired 1 AEP aimed 0
24 Firearm fired 1 Dog deploy 0 Firearm fired 0 Dog bite 0 Dog bite 0 TASER a/d stun 0
25 AEP aimed 0 Firearm fired 0 CS used 0 Firearm fired 0 Dog deploy 0 Firearm fired 0
N= 16875 N= 14009 N= 17708 N= 7257 N= 4278 N= 8922
1 Unarmed skills 202 Unarmed skills 108 Comp h/cuff 956 Firearm aimed 159 Tactical comms 28 Comp h/cuff 110
2 Tactical comms 169 Non-comp h/cuff 88 Firearm aimed 842 Tactical comms 151 Unarmed skills 24 Tactical comms 99
3 Non-comp h/cuff 137 Tactical comms 88 Tactical comms 543 Comp h/cuff 121 Firearm aimed 23 Firearm aimed 88
4 TASER red-dot 116 Ground restraint 48 TASER red-dot 355 Unarmed skills 113 Non-comp h/cuff 20 Unarmed skills 58
5 Firearm aimed 108 TASER red-dot 34 Unarmed skills 126 TASER red-dot 89 TASER fired 18 TASER red-dot 43
6 Comp h/cuff 83 TASER fired 24 TASER aimed 71 Non-comp h/cuff 42 Ground restraint 10 Non-comp h/cuff 23
7 Ground restraint 76 Firearm aimed 21 Other 33 Ground restraint 20 TASER red-dot 9 Other 13
8 TASER fired 26 Comp h/cuff 20 Non-comp h/cuff 31 Other 15 Other 8 Ground restraint 11
9 TASER aimed 23 L/B restraint 13 Ground restraint 31 TASER aimed 13 Comp h/cuff 5 TASER aimed 5
10 Other 23 Other 13 TASER drawn 20 L/B restraint 6 TASER aimed 2 TASER fired 5
11 TASER drawn 15 TASER aimed 10 Shield 13 AEP aimed 3 Baton used 1 TASER drawn 4
12 L/B restraint 12 TASER drawn 7 L/B restraint 12 TASER fired 3 TASER drawn 1 L/B restraint 4
13 Baton used 2 Spit guard 4 AEP aimed 7 Shield 3 L/B restraint 1 AEP aimed 1
14 Baton drawn 1 Baton used 2 Baton used 1 Baton drawn 2 Spit guard 1 Baton drawn 0
15 Shield 1 Baton drawn 1 Dog bite 1 Baton used 1 AEP aimed 0 Baton used 0
16 Spit guard 1 Dog deploy 1 Baton drawn 0 TASER drawn 1 Baton drawn 0 TASER a/d stun 0
17 AEP aimed 0 CS used 1 TASER a/d stun 0 TASER a/d stun 0 TASER a/d stun 0 TASER arced 0
18= TASER a/d stun 0 AEP aimed 0 TASER arced 0 TASER arced 0 TASER arced 0 TASER d/stun 0
18= TASER arced 0 TASER a/d stun 0 TASER d/stun 0 TASER d/stun 0 TASER d/stun 0 Dog bite 0
18= TASER d/stun 0 TASER arced 0 TASER fired 0 Dog bite 0 Dog bite 0 Dog deploy 0
18= Dog bite 0 TASER d/stun 0 Dog deploy 0 Dog deploy 0 Dog deploy 0 Firearm fired 0
18= Dog deploy 0 Dog bite 0 Firearm fired 0 Firearm fired 0 Firearm fired 0 CS drawn 0
18= Firearm fired 0 Firearm fired 0 CS drawn 0 CS drawn 0 CS drawn 0 CS used 0
18= CS drawn 0 CS drawn 0 CS used 0 CS used 0 CS used 0 Shield 0
18= CS used 0 Shield 0 Spit guard 0 Spit guard 0 Shield 0 Spit guard 0
N= 995 N= 483 N= 3042 N= 742 N= 151 N= 464
AFO
STTO
Rank
Rank
STTO/ AFO ranked response to Primary Conduct
Active resist Aggressive resist Compliant Passive resist Serious/Agg resist Verbal resist/gestures
Verbal resist/gesturesSerious/Agg resistPassive resistCompliantAggressive resistActive resist
Table 76. Ranked  - Primary Conduct * Tactical Option 
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Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 32662 76.8 3436 91.3 Yes 28774 67.7 3180 84.5
No 9870 23.2 328 8.7 No 13758 32.3 584 15.5
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 16992 40 2766 73.5 Yes 19747 46.4 2310 61.4
No 25540 60 998 26.5 No 22785 53.6 1454 38.6
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 18028 42.4 1857 49.3 Yes 15142 35.6 2118 56.3
No 24504 57.6 1907 50.7 No 27390 64.4 1646 43.7
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 17528 41.2 2089 55.5 Yes 1778 4.2 51 1.4
No 25004 58.8 1675 44.5 No 40754 95.8 3713 98.6
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 23815 56 2198 58.4 Yes 17241 40.5 1645 43.7
No 18717 44 1566 41.6 No 25291 59.5 2119 56.3
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 1212 2.8 210 5.6 Yes 24450 57.5 2248 59.7
No 41320 97.2 3554 94.4 No 18082 42.5 1516 40.3
Total 42532 100 3764 100 Total 42532 100 3764 100
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Yes 86 0.2 4 0.1
No 42446 99.8 3760 99.9
Total 42532 100 3764 100
Reason for Force: Effect Search
Reason for Force: Secure Evidence
Reason for Force: Prevent Offence
Reason for Force: Protect Other Officers
Reason for Force: Protect Subject
Reason for Force: Protect Public
Reason for Force: Protect self
STTO AFO
Reason for Force: Effect Arrest
Reason for Force: Method of Entry
Reason for Force: Remove Handcuffs
Reason for Force: Prevent Harm
Reason for Force: Prevent Escape
Reason for Force: Other
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
STTO AFO
Table 77. Frequencies-  Reason for Force 
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STTO AFO STTO AFO STTO AFO STTO AFO STTO AFO
(n ) (n ) (n ) (n ) (n ) (n ) (n ) (n ) (n ) (n )
Protect self 6153 352 10045 383 11284 431 860 56 11951 2694
Protect Public 3575 286 5780 294 5687 315 605 47 7183 2298
Protect Subject 5189 264 6099 252 6942 273 750 43 6143 1483
Protect Other Officers 5089 328 9134 357 10015 392 851 55 10731 2551
Prevent Offence 3272 239 6087 264 7829 314 539 39 7613 1855
Secure Evidence 1194 172 2372 185 7463 312 187 24 6937 1806
Effect Search 1641 176 3207 179 8309 290 229 22 7623 1766
Effect Arrest 3252 236 7566 275 7856 315 420 35 7425 1683
Method of Entry 274 31 204 17 542 29 43 3 705 185
Remove H/Cuffs 402 9 707 17 890 16 87 0 488 32
Prevent Harm 4616 246 5917 225 6270 239 703 42 6898 1321
Prevent Escape 3636 225 6352 245 9294 331 568 37 8383 1701
Other 13 0 20 0 7 0 0 0 5 0
Total 38306 2564 63490 2693 82388 3257 5842 403 82085 19375
ABD WeaponDrugsAlcoholMH
Reason for Force
STTO AFO STTO AFO
Protect self 12213.8 2566.33 40293 3916
Protect Public 1717.96 830.453 22830 3240
Protect Subject 986.048 0.664 25123 2315
Protect Other Officers 5301.43 1790.44 35820 3683
Prevent Offence 217 194.67 25340 2711
Secure Evidence 3527.07 59.188 18153 2499
Effect Search 1314.08 45.536 21009 2433
Effect Arrest 611.06 106.117 26519 2544
Method of Entry 37822.2 2970.87 1768 265
Remove H/Cuffs 35717.3 3562.76 2574 74
Prevent Harm 1523.62 59.691 24404 2073
Prevent Escape 953.433 142.355 28233 2539
Other 42188.7 3748.02 45 0
(Note: All significant at p  < .001, df =12)
Reason for Force
Chi-Sq (n )
Table 78. Frequencies- Reason for Force * Impact 
Factors 
Table 79.  Chi-Square test Reason for Force. 
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Effective 
%
Cumulative 
%
Effective 
%
Cumulative
% Y N
Tactic 1 58.10% 58.10% 61.90% 61.90% 0.737 0.650
Tactic 2 25.80% 83.90% 25.80% 87.70% 0.779 0.698
Tactic 3 10.42% 94.32% 8.95% 96.65% 0.767 0.696
Tactic 4 3.93% 98.25% 2.65% 99.29% 0.390 0.114
Spearman  
coefficient(rs)
AFOSTTO
Table 82. Tactical Options 1 to 4 – Culminative percentage and 
Spearman Correlation.  
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Appendix I.  Hendy (2018) Interview research questions 
 
IVQ1: What kinds of incidents give you the most satisfaction as a police officer? What is it about these 
incidents that makes them satisfying?8  
IVQ2: When you are on patrol, either on foot or in a vehicle, what type of event would cause you to stop 
and intervene?  
IVQ3: Do you see any differences in the way you attempt to resolve conflict compared to the way other 
officers you work with? 
IVQ4: How did you learn to resolve conflict when dealing with members of the public?  
IVQ5: Describe an encounter where you witnessed effective conflict resolution tactics being used. (This 
can be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed).  
IVQ6: Describe an encounter where you witnessed ineffective conflict resolution tactics used. (This can 
be either your own encounter or an encounter you have observed).  
IVQ7: From time to time, police officers run into situations where someone is a bully. What do you think is 
the best way to deal with a bully? 
IVQ8: When thinking about when you attempt to resolve conflict, please provide an example when you 
think it would be appropriate to use communication tactics (such as talking) and when it would be 
appropriate to use coercive tactics (such as physical force)?  
Source: Hendy (2018, pp. 62-63). 
 
